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Abstract 
 
The proper management of wastewater and its reuse is crucial in order to reduce hazards 
and maintain a variety of benefits. The merits of improvements in wastewater management 
are particularly high where effective wastewater treatment is not in place and completely 
untreated wastewater is reused. This setting applies to many developing countries. There is 
a need to study the trade-off between benefits and costs of the use of wastewater to 
establish efficient water management. Moreover, successful water management needs to 
take the individual incentives of stakeholders into account. The general objective of this 
thesis is to study how economic incentives of stakeholders determine welfare along the 
water chain of use, treatment and reuse and how these incentives can be regulated in order 
to maximize welfare. This thesis identifies four characteristic settings in which either 
asymmetric information or externalities cause welfare losses, at least in the absence of 
regulation. For each setting the thesis develops a game theoretic model that can be used to 
design incentive schemes that govern the generation, treatment, and reuse of wastewater in 
developing countries such that the highest possible welfare is obtained.  
 
 x 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The proper management of wastewater and its reuse is crucial in order to reduce hazards 
and maintain a variety of benefits. The merits of improvements in wastewater management 
are particularly high where effective wastewater treatment is not in place and completely 
untreated wastewater is reused in irrigation because this introduces health hazards into the 
food chain. This setting applies to many developing countries. Concerning effective 
wastewater treatment, the 2000 WHO Global Water Supply and Sanitation Assessment 
Report states that the median percentage of effectively treated urban wastewater is zero for 
Africa, 35% for Asia, and 14% for Latin America and the Caribbean (WHO 2000 p.19). 
Concerning the reuse of wastewater in irrigation, Drechsel et al. (2006) report that in most 
West African cities, 60-100% of the consumed vegetables are produced in urban and peri-
urban areas which are mainly irrigated with wastewater. Hence, it can be concluded that it 
is particularly important to improve wastewater management in developing countries.  
 
The discharge of untreated or poorly treated wastewater into surface waters causes 
health hazards to the local population and environmental damages. Health hazards stem 
from excreta-related pathogens, vector borne diseases and chemicals (WHO 2006b) which 
threaten the wellbeing of consumers if they enter the food chain via wastewater irrigation 
(Seidu et al. 2008). Furthermore they threaten people who have direct contact to the 
polluted water, like workers on farms irrigating with wastewater and residents who live 
close to polluted surface waters (WHO 2006a p.9). Srinivasan and Reddy (2009) for 
example find higher morbidity rates in wastewater irrigated villages compared to control 
villages. Wastewater discharge brings about environmental hazards which result in costs 
through reduced productivity of the downstream environment. An example is how saline 
wastewater reduces soil productivity (Halliwell, Barlow and Nash 2001).  
 
Besides damages, the availability of untreated or poorly treated wastewater also 
generates benefits for agricultural production. Four features of wastewater irrigation are 
particularly beneficial. First, wastewater irrigated agriculture can be conducted all year long 
because wastewater is steadily available (Raschid-Sally, Carr and Büchler 2005). This is an 
important advantage over rain fed agriculture and fresh water irrigation by means of surface 
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water in areas with seasonal differences in water availability. Second, wastewater irrigated 
agriculture is conducted close to wastewater sources. It can therefore increase the supply of 
fresh vegetables in urban areas which otherwise would need to be transported from longer 
distances with negative effects on quality as refrigeration equipment is scarce (Keraita 
2007). Third, wastewater contains nutrients which serve as substitutes for artificial 
fertilizer. In this context Ensink, Simmons and van der Hoek (2004) found that in Pakistan 
wastewater is sold at a higher price than fresh water when used for irrigation. Forth, when 
properly managed, wastewater irrigation becomes a low cost wastewater treatment step 
(Huibers and van Lier 2005). These benefits have the potential to reduce poverty as can be 
observed in urban and peri-urban agriculture (Graefe, Schlecht and Buerkert 2008). 
 
In order to achieve the welfare optimum, the benefits and costs of the use of 
untreated wastewater have to be traded off efficiently. When costs dominate benefits, one 
option is to reduce or prohibit the use of wastewater. The latter is a drastic measure which 
is usually not efficient, sometimes not even feasible because it threatens livelihoods of poor 
people who depend on the use of wastewater (Drechsel 2008). Another option to achieve 
the welfare optimum is to apply wastewater treatment. Full treatment is generally not 
optimal because it removes the benefits from saved treatment costs and nutrient substitute. 
Partial wastewater treatment, however, can be applied to optimally reducing damages and 
maintaining benefits.  
 
Wastewater treatment requirements for reuse have been addressed by different 
guidelines. The State of California for example established guidelines which are based on a 
‘zero risk’ concept (State of California 1978). The World Health Organization on the other 
hand established guidelines which are based on less strict safety requirements. The “Health 
Guidelines for the Use of Wastewater in Agriculture and Aquaculture” (WHO 1989) define 
maximum acceptable concentrations for a variety of pollutants depending on the use of the 
wastewater in agriculture in order to reduce health risks to an acceptable level. Compliance 
with the WHO guidelines can be achieved with partial wastewater treatment which can 
usually be done by low cost treatment technologies. 
 
The 1989 WHO guidelines failed to be effectively implemented, however, in many 
developing countries. This indicates that the guidelines require a treatment level which does 
not balance costs and benefits optimally. It was concluded that the guidelines were too strict 
for many developing countries rendering more flexible guidelines necessary. “There exists 
a complex relationship between urban return of wastewater and its irrigation use in peri-
urban areas. A proper evaluation of various types of externalities is required to take policy 
measures which would maximise positive externalities. In other words evaluation of 
 3 
various externalities is very important to determine the economically and socially optimum 
level of wastewater discharge and treatment, and also the types of uses to which it can be 
put into safely” (Srinivasan and Reddy 2009).  
 
The WHO reacted to this by revising their guidelines. The 2006 “WHO Guidelines 
for the Safe Use of Wastewater, Excreta and Greywater” (WHO 2006a) recommend that 
countries define individual health-based targets by applying the Stockholm Framework 
(WHO 2006b) which is an integrated approach that combines risk assessment and risk 
management to control water related diseases. The targets should be achieved by managing 
risks at different barriers along the entire chain - from wastewater generation to 
consumption of produce cultivated with wastewater. This allows national authorities to 
develop their own regulation which is in line with national socio-economic realities. Each 
country can implement individual solutions for the treatment and reuse of wastewater such 
that its benefits and costs are balanced optimally.  
 
Identifying and implementing country- or region-specific solutions comprises two 
tasks. First, technical facilities which provide the appropriate wastewater treatment level 
need to be designed. Technical facilities cannot operate successfully, however, when the 
incentives of stakeholders do not support their viable operation. Hence, the second task is to 
design an institutional setting in which the technical facilities can be operated effectively. 
This requires a complementary incentive scheme that brings the incentives of stakeholders 
in line with effective wastewater management. To achieve this it is necessary to understand 
the complex behavioural pattern which emerges from strategic interaction between a large 
variety of stakeholders along the water chain of use, treatment and reuse. Asymmetric 
information and externalities make this interaction even more complex.  
 
The general objective of this thesis is to study how economic incentives of 
stakeholders determine welfare along the water chain of use, treatment and reuse and how 
these incentives can be regulated in order to maximize welfare. This thesis identifies four 
characteristic settings in which either asymmetric information or externalities causes 
welfare losses in the absence of regulation. For each setting the thesis develops a game 
theoretic model that can be used to design incentive schemes that govern the generation, 
treatment, and reuse of wastewater in developing countries such that \ the highest possible 
welfare is obtained. 
 
The remainder of the introduction is organized as follows. The next section 
presents a short overview over the relevant literature to the topic. Special focus is on non-
cooperative game theory. Section 1.3 states the general objective of this thesis. Furthermore 
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it presents the specific settings along the water chain with their corresponding research 
question which are answered in the following 4 chapters. Section 1.4 describes the 
methodology to answer these research questions and points out the novel contributions to 
the literature. Lastly, section 1.5 presents the overall organization of the remaining chapters. 
 
1.1. Wastewater treatment and reuse in the literature 
 
In this section I provide an overview over the development in managing wastewater over 
the last 30 years by means of a short literature review. Until the beginning of the 1990s 
management of water resources which includes wastewater treatment was mainly a 
technically dominated issue in the engineering domain. De Mello (1994) provides a 
literature review. With respect to the topic of this thesis, the economics of reuse of 
wastewater in irrigation, little work has been done before the mid-1990s. Moore, Olson and 
Marino (1985) provide a detailed assessment of the on-farm economics of reclaimed 
wastewater irrigation in California. Dinar and Yaron (1986) analyze the optimal treatment 
of municipal wastewater before its reuse in irrigation. Haruvy and Sadan (1994) provide a 
nation wide cost and benefit analysis for Israel. Haruvy et al. (1999) determine monthly 
optimal treatment levels and of the mix of crops calculated to maximize agricultural 
incomes, according to farmers’ point of view. Game-theoretical approaches are discussed 
below.  
  
As a result of the technically dominated approach to water management many 
facilities were designed solely according to engineering considerations. Many of these 
facilities proved to be unsuccessful in their operation. This was particularly observed in 
developing countries. As a response to this observation a new approach, the Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM), was developed in the 1990s. It integrates 
economic, social, ecological, and legal considerations into the engineering design process. 
Solutions have to be not only technically efficient but also feasible from an economic, 
social, ecological, and legal point of view. Among the huge literature on IWRM the 
conceptual approaches to wastewater management with focus on the reuse of wastewater 
are particularly interesting with respect to this thesis. Examples are Harremoes (1997), 
Huibers and van Lier (2005), Nhapi, Siebel and Gijzen (2005), van Lier and Huibers (2007), 
Neubert (2009) and Guest et al. (2009). 
 
A general drawback of IWRM is that finding optimal solutions becomes increasingly 
complex because the economic, social, ecological and legal domains have to be considered 
besides engineering. In large water basins the number of stakeholders is large, the 
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ecological setting is diverse, and the legal framework demanding. This poses considerable 
challenges to researchers who want to describe the functioning of wastewater systems in 
formal models. Many models simply use an objective function which sums up the payoffs 
of stakeholders. Examples are Sousa et al. (2002), Wang and Jamieson (2002), Ward and 
Pulido-Velazquez (2008), Cunha et al. (2009), Zeferino, Antunes and Cunha (2009), and 
Murray and Ray (2010). 
 
Assuming one aggregate objective function, however, misses an important point. 
Stakeholders try to achieve their own goals independently which makes outcomes depend 
on strategic interaction. While it is important to include effects from strategic interaction in 
the management of water resources, IWRM is not the appropriate approach to model and 
analyze it. Game theory, on the other hand, is a powerful tool to analyze the incentives of 
stakeholders resulting strategic interaction. It can therefore complement Integrated Water 
Resource Management by providing essential input to the design of incentive schemes in 
order to manage water resources efficiently.  
 
Up to now game theory was applied to a variety of areas in water management. 
Here, I will focus on the application of game theory in wastewater management. Some 
papers apply axiomatic sharing rules to allocate treatment costs among stakeholders. Early 
examples are Giglio and Wrightington (1972), Loehman et al. (1979) and Kilgour, Okada 
and Nishikori (1988). More recent examples include Lejano and Davos (1995) who discuss 
a new solution concept, the normalized nucleus, and apply it to a water reuse project in 
California. Lejano and Davos (1999) apply cooperative game theory to allocate costs of a 
water resource project. Wu and Willet (2004) analyze an optimal location problem of a 
regional wastewater treatment plant assigning costs with cooperative game theory. Ni and 
Wang (2007) analyze how to split costs of cleaning the whole river among agents located 
along it. Dinar, Yaron, and Kannai (1986) analyze different allocation schemes to divide 
the benefits from regional cooperation in using wastewater for irrigation. 
  
Some other papers analyze water pollution problems that are due to asymmetric 
information. Alban (1995) discusses regulation of industrial pollution when the regulator 
has limited information about the abatement costs of polluters. Dinar and Xepapadeas 
(1998) analyze agricultural non-point pollution of an aquifer. Asymmetric information 
between regulator and agricultural producer makes proper management and regulation a 
monitoring problem. Kerschbamer and Maderner (2001) model a game between upstream 
and downstream agents where downstream pays upstream to reduce pollution but has 
asymmetric information on the polluter’s concern for the environment. Dinar and 
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Xepapadeas (2002) analyze the optimal design of a tax scheme to prevent unobservable 
pollution from agriculture. 
 
The game theory literature on the reuse of wastewater is still small. Feinerman, 
Plessner and DiSegni Eshel (2001) analyze the allocation of costs and benefits of 
wastewater treatment and reuse with a bargaining game between a wastewater producing 
city and irrigating farmers. Axelrad and Feinerman (2009) develop a planning model on 
how to maximize regional welfare when municipal wastewater is utilized for agricultural 
irrigation and river rehabilitation. In a second step they apply different approaches from 
transferable utility games to allocate benefits to stakeholders. Axelrad and Feinerman (2010) 
analyze the design of contracts that allocate profits from wastewater reuse among a 
wastewater generating city and two wastewater reusing farmers where the city has 
incomplete information about the farmers’ demand for treated water. The above cited 
articles analyze characteristic settings where stakeholders interact strategically. This thesis 
contributes to this literature by identifying and analyzing strategic interaction in further 
characteristic settings. In the following section I present the general objective of this thesis 
and the specific settings that I will analyze. 
 
1.2. Objective and research questions 
 
The general objective of this thesis is to study how economic incentives of stakeholders 
determine welfare along the water chain of use, treatment and reuse and how these 
incentives can be regulated in order to maximize welfare. This thesis identifies four 
characteristic settings in which either asymmetric information or externalities causes 
welfare losses in the absence of regulation. Each setting is characterized by its stakeholders 
with their strategies and payoffs and by either asymmetric information or externalities 
which give each setting a specific problem that generates its research question. In this 
section I briefly sketch the four settings of this thesis and state the research questions which 
will subsequently be answered in the chapters 2 to 5.  
 
(i) In chapter 2 I consider a setting where fresh water and wastewater irrigated 
products are supplied to the local food market where consumers prefer fresh water irrigated 
products, but cannot distinguish the two types of food. Hence, they face a situation of 
asymmetric information which might cause inefficiencies in the market. I assume that both 
fresh water and wastewater production is constrained because fresh water supply is limited. 
This supply is distributed between fresh water irrigation and a city for domestic use. The 
resulting domestic wastewater is reused for irrigation. Since the allocation of fresh water 
 7 
determines production constraints, it may help reducing the inefficiencies in the local food 
market which are caused by asymmetric information. This leads to the following research 
question. 
Can the allocation of fresh water between a city and fresh water farmers be an 
instrument to reduce the asymmetric information inefficiency on the local food market? 
 
(ii) In chapter 3 I turn to wastewater management in an urban water chain which 
involves water pollution, wastewater treatment to its reuse. I analyze a typical urban setting 
in a developing country where households and industrial firms are not separated into 
distinct zones and urban wastewater consists of domestic and industrial wastewater. A 
treatment scheme is suggested which requires firms to pre-treat their industrial wastewater 
before discharging it into urban wastewater. This scheme generates two advantages. First, it 
facilitates cost recovery of the scheme because it enables the application of a low cost 
treatment technology for urban wastewater. Second, it generates downstream benefits 
because it enables the safe reuse of treated urban wastewater for irrigation. The success of 
such a scheme depends on whether firms pre-treat. This is private information to them, 
however, and cannot be directly observed by a regulator without costly monitoring. Since 
monitoring is costly its benefits have to be traded off against its costs. This raises the 
following research question. 
How much monitoring maximizes welfare in the urban water chain while the costs 
of the treatment scheme can still be recovered? 
 
(iii) In Chapter 4 I analyze cooperation in wastewater treatment of cities along a 
river in a setting which is characteristic to many developing countries. Each city uses water 
from the river and discharges emissions into the river which causes damages to itself and all 
downstream cities. Each city can abate emissions by, for example, wastewater treatment 
which generates benefits to itself and all downstream cities by reducing damages. Emission 
abatement is costly, however, which makes cities trade off abatement benefits against 
abatement costs when choosing their optimal individual abatement levels. An authority 
which regulates emissions is missing. Cities rely therefore on cooperation in form of a self 
enforcing coalition in which members take abatement benefits of downstream coalition 
members into account. Coalition members distribute the coalition payoff in order to 
stabilize the coalition. Free riding is an obstacle, however, to such cooperation because 
downstream water users cannot be excluded from upstream cooperation treatment. This 
leads to the following research question. 
Can voluntary cooperation in wastewater treatment among cities along a river 
improve the welfare in the river basin? 
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(iv) In chapter 5 I analyze cooperation in wastewater treatment in the Upper 
Citarum River Basin, Indonesia. Although guidelines for the discharge of wastewater are 
established, their enforcement is not effective which makes the Ciratum River one of the 
most polluted rivers in the world. Downstream population, therefore, suffer damages from 
upstream pollution. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, voluntary cooperation where 
downstream cities who suffer most from river pollution compensate upstream polluters for 
reducing pollution can improve welfare when cities are symmetric. The Upper Citarum 
River Basin consists, however, of asymmetric rural and densely populated urban regions. 
This leads to the following research questions. 
Is there scope for stable coalition(s) in wastewater treatment in the Upper Citarum 
River Basin? What are general characteristics of the structure of the stable coalitions in 
transboundary river pollution games with asymmetric players? 
 
1.3. Methodology 
 
Non cooperative game theory offers an appropriate methodology to analyze economic 
incentives in interactive settings. It was applied to a variety of settings in water resources 
management as I have shown in section 1.2. After raising the research questions in the 
previous section, I spell out the methodology to answer them here. For each of the four 
research questions I develop a genuine non cooperative game which captures the core 
characteristics of the corresponding setting. Each game contributes to the existing literature 
of non cooperative game theory by incorporating some new features. These contributions 
are also sketched in this section. 
 
As a methodology to answer the first research question - Can the allocation of 
fresh water between a city and fresh water farmers be an instrument to reduce the 
asymmetric information inefficiency on the local food market? - I develop a signalling game 
where farmers use price to signal whether they sell fresh water or wastewater irrigated food 
to consumers.  
This chapter contributes to the literature of signalling games by integrating a 
public agency which sets production constraints by allocating a scarce resource. The 
allocation is common knowledge to consumers who infer market shares and probabilities to 
buy either type in case of uncertainty. The probabilities are therefore endogenously 
determined which complements Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2000) who model consumers 
who attach equal probabilities to each of two qualities. Furthermore, we can study how 
quality signalling by price depends on market shares, a key characteristic of the supply side. 
The model therefore complements Wilson (1979, 1980) who analyses quality signalling by 
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price for different structures of the demand side. Besides contributing to the theoretical 
literature on quality signalling one feature distinguishes our model from the literature on 
water allocation. While most of these studies analyze direct effects of water allocation on 
the welfare of agents, our model describes an indirect welfare effect via the food market. 
 
As a methodology to answer the second research question - How much monitoring 
maximizes welfare in the urban water chain? - I develop a compliance game where a water 
utility has incomplete information about the pre-treatment compliance of firms that produce 
industrial wastewater.  
This game contributes to the literature by providing a formal model of the 
economic incentives in the entire water chain consisting of water pollution, wastewater 
treatment and its reuse. One distinguishing feature is related to the modelling of water. In 
economic studies on wastewater reuse wastewater is almost exclusively modelled with only 
one quality dimension. We model wastewater with multiple dimensions where each 
dimension represents the concentration level of one pollutant. This enables us to trace the 
concentration levels of each pollutant along the water chain which substantially increases 
transparency in two ways. First, welfare effects can be captured in more detail by 
specifying the benefit and cost functions for each pollutant along the chain. Second, the 
effect of pollutants on the treatment process can be specified explicitly.  
 
As a methodology to answer the third research question - Can voluntary 
cooperation in wastewater treatment among water users improve the welfare in the river 
basin?- I develop a coalition formation game in a transboundary river pollution setting.  
This game contributes to the literature in two domains. First, we add to the 
literature on transboundary river pollution games by analyzing coalition stability in a multi-
player setting. This literature has largely focused on two player games which can be solved 
by bargaining approaches. Second, we contribute to the literature on international 
environmental agreements. This literature has largely focused on uniformly mixing 
pollutants where the abatement of one player is a public good for all others and the 
pollution stock is the same for all players. My setting, however, is characterized by 
unidirectional pollution flow where abatement is a public good for downstream players 
only and the emission stock varies between players unless all upstream players choose full 
abatement. Hence, a player’s location matters in our game, which distinguishes our work 
from the literature on international environmental agreements. 
 
In order to answer the research questions of the fifth chapter - Is there scope for 
stable coalition(s) in wastewater treatment in the Upper Citarum River Basin? What are 
general characteristics of the structure of the stable coalitions in transboundary river 
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pollution games with asymmetric players? – I calibrate a coalition formation game with 
asymmetric players for the Upper Citarum River Basin and computing its equilibria.  
The chapter continues the analysis of transboundary river pollution games in a 
multi-agent setting started in chapter 4 in which I assume symmetric agents. This 
assumption cannot be sustained when analyzing the Upper Citarum River Basin because the 
basin consists of asymmetric rural and densely populated urban regions. This chapter 
contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it is a case study which provides insights 
into the scope and structure of voluntary cooperation in wastewater treatment in the Upper 
Citarum River Basin. Second, it illustrates the applicability of the approach developed in 
Chapter 4. Third, its findings contribute to the theoretical literature on coalition formation 
games for transboundary river pollution. As analytical results of the asymmetric player 
game can only be obtained under very restrictive assumptions the findings of this chapter 
give an intuition on which assumptions should be made and how to proceed in the 
analytical analysis of these games. 
 
1.4. Outline of the thesis 
 
 This thesis consists of six chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 to 5 
contain the main contributions. In chapter 2 I analyze how the allocation of fresh water 
between a city and fresh water farmers be an instrument to reduce the asymmetric 
information inefficiency of the local food market. In chapter 3 I analyze how a regulator 
maximizes benefits of the urban water chain while being able to recover costs for 
wastewater treatment. In chapter 4 I analyze how and to what extent voluntary cooperation 
in wastewater treatment can improve welfare in a river basin. In chapter 5 I analyze 
whether voluntary cooperation in wastewater treatment can be an option to clean the Upper 
Citarum River Basin in Indonesia. Chapter 6 summarizes the main findings, presents a 
general discussion and conclusions and suggests some lines of future research.
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Chapter 2 
 
Wastewater irrigation, unobservable food quality and 
the efficiency of local food markets* 
 
 
Food irrigated with untreated wastewater is considered low quality because of health 
hazards. When consumers cannot distinguish food qualities, asymmetric information 
threatens the efficiency of local food markets. We examine in a sequential game whether 
prices can credibly signal quality when farmers face production constraints due to the 
allocation of scarce water. Besides inefficient pooling equilibria and separating equilibria 
with distorted prices we surprisingly find efficient equilibria with undistorted prices if the 
water allocation to wastewater irrigated agriculture is large. We conclude that water 
allocation may have a crucial impact on the functioning of the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This chapter is based on Gengenbach and Weikard (2010a) “Wastewater irrigation, 
unobservable food quality and the efficiency of local food markets” European Review of 
Agricultural Economics 37(1): 27-49. 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
Wastewater irrigation substantially supplements fresh water irrigation in securing local 
food supply in water scarce regions in developing countries. Since wastewater hardly 
receives any treatment in most developing countries – Scott, Faruqui and Raschid (2004) 
report that the share of urban wastewater that is treated to secondary level is zero per cent 
for Africa, 35 per cent for Asia and 14 per cent for Latin America and the Caribbean – 
consumers face health hazards when crops are eaten raw (Shuval et al., 1986; WHO, 1989; 
WHO, 2006). To avoid these health hazards consumers would prefer to buy crops that are 
irrigated with fresh water for a higher price instead.1 They cannot, however, distinguish 
between freshwater and wastewater irrigated crops by appearance alone. Farmers who 
irrigate with wastewater are aware of this lack of market transparency and disguise the 
origin of their produce. For instance, Obuobie et al. (2006: 116) observe in their study of 
wastewater irrigation in Ghana: ‘(Wastewater) farmers do not wish to be openly associated 
with the low (irrigation) water quality, owing to the media and some public criticism out of 
fear that such an association may possibly influence the sale of produce and livelihoods‘. 
As a result asymmetric information about food quality where fresh water irrigated crops are 
high quality and wastewater irrigated crops are low quality threatens efficient trading in 
local food markets. Akerlof (1970) has shown that if price is the only signal for quality, 
asymmetric information can cause serious market failures by driving high quality out of the 
market. To enable that high quality supply and demand can trade efficiently credible quality 
signalling is necessary. But credible signalling of quality by means of advertising and 
certification is costly and not feasible for most small scale farmers in developing countries 
who supply to local food markets. They must rely on price to credibly signal quality which 
seems, in the light of Akerlof’s result, impossible given low quality farmers’ incentive to 
disguise their quality. This chapter shows that the initial water allocation which determines 
market shares for high and low quality food plays a crucial role for the possibility of quality 
signalling by price. This extends previous work on markets with asymmetric information 
about product quality. 
 
Following Akerlof’s (1970) seminal work, Wilson (1979; 1980) has shown that 
quality signalling by price alone can be credible if the low quality seller loses the incentive 
to mimic high quality by price. Price pooling, i.e. mimicking high quality by price, reduces 
demand because consumers face quality uncertainty. A low quality seller may, then, prefer 
                                                 
1 To the best of our knowledge, all studies that estimate consumers’ willingness to pay for a reduction of health 
hazards have been conducted in industrialised countries or rich urban centres, e.g. Rozan, Stenger and Willinger 
(2004).   
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to signal low quality by charging a low price if the reduction sales under price pooling is 
sufficiently large. This establishes a price separating equilibrium in which low quality sells 
at a low price and high quality at a high price. Later studies have analyzed whether prices 
are distorted in separating equilibria. Bagwell (1991), Bagwell and Riordan (1991), 
Overgaard (1993) and Ellingsen (1997) analyze monopoly seller settings and find that price 
separating equilibria exist, but prices are distorted compared to the full information case. 
Hence, market inefficiencies remain. For oligopolistic competition, little work has been 
done on quality signalling to consumers with price. Studies rather have focussed on costly 
signalling instruments. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Fluet and Garella (2002) consider 
advertising. Shapiro (1982) looks at seller reputation. Other studies focus on games where 
firms use price to signal private information, such as costs, to each other. Bagwell and 
Ramey (1991) and Martin (1995) analyze entry games. Bagwell and Ramey (1991) find 
that competition causes firms to behave as if there were full information. This contrasts the 
results of studies of monopolies (Overgaard, 1993; Bagwell and Riordan, 1991; Ellingsen, 
1997) where prices are distorted upwards. The only studies where competing firms use 
price to signal quality to consumers are Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2000; 2001). They 
analyse how duopolistic competition affects firms’ ability to signal quality through price. 
They find that prices are distorted in any separating equilibrium. Furthermore, they need 
non-standard equilibrium refinements to deal with multiple equilibria. Hertzendorf and 
Overgaard (2001) study advertising in a duopoly setting and find credible prices even for 
small quality differences. Hertzendorf and Overgaard’s model approach has been extended 
by Yehezkel (2008) to examine equilibrium pricing behaviour if a fraction of consumers 
has quality information. 
 
Our study extends the recent work on quality signalling by price in a different 
direction. We assume that consumers are informed about market shares of high and low 
quality and that these market shares result from the allocation of an essential input, water. 
Our study is motivated by the fact that water allocation for domestic and agricultural use 
implicitly determines the share of high and low quality food on a local market. We consider 
a developing country setting where a public agency allocates the scarce supply of fresh 
water between farmers and the city. The city discharges urban wastewater which is reused 
without prior treatment by wastewater farmers. We assume that water is the limiting input 
to agriculture. Hence, by allocating fresh water the agency sets production constraints for 
fresh water and for wastewater farmers. Both fresh water and wastewater farmers supply to 
the local food market where they compete with price. On the food market consumers 
consider fresh water irrigated crops as high quality and wastewater irrigated crops as low 
quality because of health hazards related to wastewater irrigation. Since consumers cannot 
observe the quality of a particular food item by appearance, asymmetric information about 
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quality exists between consumers and producers. In this setting certification and advertising 
are usually not feasible or too costly which makes price the only possible signal for quality. 
This allows a low quality farm to – incorrectly - signal high quality to consumers by setting 
a high price. Both types of farmers take this into account when setting their prices on the 
market.   
 
We construct a sequential signalling game. First, a public agency allocates fresh 
water and thereby determines production constraints for high and low quality production. 
Because we want to focus on the competition between the two quality segments we assume 
a duopoly on the production side where each quality is produced by one farm.2  Subsequent 
to the water allocation, farms play a Stackelberg price setting game in which they signal 
quality by price to consumers. First, the high quality farm, who is the Stackelberg leader, 
sets its price. Then, the low quality farm follows either mimicking high quality by price 
pooling or setting a lower separation price. Finally, consumers observe prices and buy one 
unit of either high or low quality or abstain from buying.  
 
Two features distinguish our model from the literature on signalling product quality 
to consumers. First, we integrate a public agency which sets production constraints by 
allocating a scarce resource. The agency’s allocation is common knowledge and consumers 
infer market shares of high and low quality from it. In this setting we can study how quality 
signalling by price depends on market shares, a key characteristic of the supply side. Our 
study therefore complements Wilson (1979; 1980) who analyses quality signalling by price 
for different structures of the demand side. Furthermore, the probability to buy high quality 
in case of quality uncertainty is endogenously determined because consumers can infer it 
from known production constraints. This complements Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2000) 
who model ignorant consumers who attach equal probabilities to each of two qualities. A 
second distinguishing feature is that we conduct our analysis not only for the uniform 
distribution of consumer preferences which is the default in the literature. We conduct our 
analysis for two additional distributions: one where only few consumers have a high 
valuation for high quality and one where many consumers have high valuation for high 
quality. Thereby, we derive additional results for poor and prospering developing countries, 
respectively. 
 
We find that the allocation of scarce fresh water between a city and irrigation 
determines the possibility of quality signalling by price and, thereby, affects the functioning 
of the local food market. More specifically, we find a pooling equilibrium, a separating 
                                                 
2 This is a simplifying assumption. We discuss its implications below. A possible interpretation is that farmers’ 
associations determine the price setting.  
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equilibrium with distorted prices and a separating equilibrium with efficient prices to exist 
for small, medium and large water allocation to the city, respectively. Therefore, water 
allocation may be used as an instrument to facilitate the functioning of the market. In any 
case the water allocation decision must not only balance domestic and agricultural demands 
for water but must also take the impact on the food market into account. We also find that, 
considering the food market only, it is optimal to allocate more fresh water to agriculture if 
the fraction of consumers with a high valuation for high quality food is larger, as in 
prospering developing countries. Thus higher incomes in urban centres lead to increasing 
urban water demand and, at the same time to increasing agricultural water demand. Given 
the increasing pressure on water resources it is important to implement policies that reduce 
health hazards – like establishing urban wastewater treatment facilities – while allowing for 
the re-use of waste water. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the 
model. Section 2.3 presents the full information case. Section 2.4 introduces asymmetric 
information. In section 2.3 and 2.4 we assume a uniform distribution of consumers’ high 
quality reservation values. In section 2.5 we relax this assumption and compare the uniform 
distribution benchmark to cases with a concave and a convex cumulative distribution 
function. Section 2.6 discusses assumptions and relates our findings to the literature. Then 
we conclude.  
 
2.2. The model 
 
We study a sequential game with three stages. The public agency moves first and allocates 
the available water. Then, farms play a Stackelberg price setting game and signal quality to 
consumers. Finally, consumers observe prices and buy or abstain from buying. Each stage 
of the game is introduced in turn. 
 
The public agency: At the first stage the public agency allocates a share   
( 10  ) of available fresh water W  to a city and the remaining share 1  to 
agriculture for fresh water irrigation. While fresh water irrigation does not discharge any 
water, the city discharges its share   as urban wastewater. All urban wastewater is 
recovered and used for wastewater irrigation. The agency sets   to maximise the sum of 
consumers’ and producers’ surplus in the food market. We neglect the direct welfare effect 
of urban water consumption in order to highlight the effect of water allocation on the food 
market.   
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Farms: At the second stage farms compete in the market by setting prices. We 
consider two qualities ,Q L H . In order to focus on competition between qualities, 
rather than competition within the quality segments, we assume that supply of each quality 
is bundled. This simplifies the analysis but does not affect our qualitative results as we will 
argue below. Hence, we consider a duopoly with two farms. One farm relies on fresh water 
irrigation and produces high quality. It is indexed by HQ  . The other farm relies on 
wastewater irrigation and produces low quality. It is indexed by LQ  . For ease of 
exposition we assume a linear production function ( )Qy   that only depends on water. We 
assume for both farms that marginal costs of production are zero, that water is the 
constraining factor in production and that therefore both farms produce at their production 
constraint. Hence, low quality production is ( )Ly W    and high quality production 
is  ( ) 1Hy W    . Total production is H Ly y y W   . Both farms supply their 
production to the local food market where they play a Stackelberg price setting game to 
maximise their profits. We choose a Stackelberg type game in which the high quality farm 
is the Stackelberg leader because this captures the stylised fact that high quality is dominant 
in the market. The high quality farm sets its price Hp . After observing Hp , the low 
quality farm follows setting price Lp  which is set equal to the high quality price when 
mimicking high quality by price is beneficial or some lower price when signalling low 
quality is beneficial. Both prices determine the demand ( , )Q H LX p p  for either quality 
LHQ , . A farm’s profit is ( , )Q Q Q H Lp X p p   . Demand depends on both prices 
because consumers compare them before choosing which quality to buy. Each farm 
maximises its profit subject to the production constraint ( , ) ( )Q H L QX p p y  .  
 
Consumers: Each of M  consumers buys one unit of either high or low quality or 
refrains from buying. We assume MW   such that all consumers can be served and 
normalise 1M  for simplification. Like Bagwell and Riordan (1991) we assume that all 
consumers have a common reservation value R  for low quality and heterogeneous 
reservation value   for high quality. Hence, consumers payoff is LR p  or Hp   
when buying low or high quality, respectively. The high quality reservation value is an add-
on of at most 1 on the low quality reservation value,  1,  RR , and is distributed 
according to a density function  f  with cumulative distribution function  F  with 
 17 
  0RF  and   11 RF . After observing prices for each quality, all consumers with 
HL ppR   would prefer to buy high quality because they get a higher payoff than 
buying low quality. Aggregate demand is therefore  1 L HF R p p    for high quality 
and  L HF R p p   for low quality. Note that RpL 0 . Like Bagwell and 
Riordan (1991) we present the model assuming uniformly distributed reservation values, 
with   1f  for  1,  RR  and   0f  otherwise. In section 2.5, however, we 
relax this assumption. 
 
The game is solved backwards and we start our analysis with the full information 
case.  
 
2.3. Full information 
 
If product quality is observable, prices do not have signalling function. This case serves as a 
welfare benchmark for the asymmetric information case. 
 
The low quality farm has a dominant strategy. Its profit maximizing price under 
full information is Rp FL  . Any price of RpL   generates zero profit because 
consumers refrain from buying as they would obtain a negative payoff. As H  cannot serve 
more than 1  consumers, farm L  faces a positive demand of at least   for any price 
Lp R . Since   is also L ’s production constraint, L  does not gain in sales by 
reducing price below R . Hence, Rp FL   is independent of FHp  and therefore a 
dominant strategy. Given Rp FL  , H  maximises profit subject to its production 
constraint by setting price  
(2.1)    
ˆ0
ˆ 1,
HF
H
H
p if
p
p if
    
     
 
 
where Hp  is implicitly defined by    / 1H H H Hp F p p F p    , 
   1Hp F   and ˆ  is the threshold which is obtained by solving  ˆH Hp p   ; 
see Appendix 2.1.  
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We call the full information prices, FLp  and 
F
Hp , undistorted with respect to 
quality signalling. They are depicted in Figure 2.1.3 The low quality price is constant over 
the entire interval. The high quality price depends on whether the high quality production 
constraint is binding. If it is not binding (in the interval  ˆ0   with   2/1ˆ R ) 
the high quality farm sets   1 / 2Hp R  . If the production constraint is binding (in the 
interval 1ˆ  ), H sets the price which equates its production and demand, 
 Hp R   .  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Full information prices FLp  (Equation 2.1) and 
F
Hp  depending on wastewater 
share   depicted for 1.0R . 
 
To evaluate welfare effects we determine producer and consumer surplus in both 
quality segments. Producer surplus in the low quality segment is the low quality farm’s 
                                                 
3   1f  for  1,  RR  and   0f  otherwise. 
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profit   RFL . Consumer surplus in the low quality market segment is zero since 
price equals reservation value for all consumers. Producer surplus in the high quality 
segment is the high quality farm’s profit,       FHFHFH pFp  1 . Each 
consumer with a reservation value   1 Rp FH   buys high quality and obtains his 
reservation value minus price, FHp . Hence, aggregate consumer surplus in the high 
quality market segment is       1Rp FHFC FH dfp  . The agency’s objective is to 
maximise welfare, i.e. the sum of the profits of the low and the high quality farm plus the 
consumer surplus for the high quality product, FC
F
H
F
L
F
A   . This yields 
      1RpFA FH dfR  . The first term on the right hand side is low quality 
producer surplus. Low quality consumer surplus is zero. The second term is welfare 
generated in the high quality segment which is the sum of consumer and producer surplus.  
 
Proposition 2.1: Under full information the agency maximises welfare by setting ˆ*  . 
Proof: See Appendix 2.2.  
 
The individual payoffs and aggregate welfare under full information is depicted in 
Figure 2.2. The low quality producer surplus strictly increases over the entire interval 
because its production constraint is relaxed. High quality producer and consumer surplus is 
constant for  ˆ0   because in this interval the high quality farm charges its global 
profit maximizing price, Hp  and serves  1 HF p  customers. For 1ˆ   high 
quality producer and consumer surplus both decrease because the production constraint is 
binding and production decreases and hence high quality price  Hp   rises in   and the 
fraction of served consumers drops. Total welfare reaches its maximum at  ˆ*  . 
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Figure 2.2: Total welfare   FA , high quality profits   FH , low quality profits 
  FL  and consumer surplus   FC  depending on wastewater share   under full 
information. 
 
2.4. Asymmetric information 
 
Under asymmetric information consumers observe only prices, not quality. In the pricing 
game the Stackelberg leader H sets price Hp . Given Hp  the follower L has two pricing 
strategies: (i) a separation strategy that correctly signals low quality by a low price, 
L Hp p  and (ii) a pooling strategy that mimics high quality by price, L Hp p . Price 
pooling generates consumer uncertainty about quality. Of course, the Stackelberg leader 
H  takes L’s incentive to pool into account when setting price Hp . If an incentive to pool 
exists, H  may distort its price upward to force L  to separate and H must decide whether a 
price distortion is preferable to tolerating pooling. 
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The structure of this section follows this line of argument. First, we calculate when 
L  will pool H’s full information price and which price distortion is necessary to render 
L ’s pooling unprofitable to assure price separation. Second, we check whether this 
distortion is preferable for H  compared to price pooling. Third, we analyse the welfare 
effects of the price distortions depending on water allocation. We derive results for a 
uniform distribution of consumers’ valuation of high quality. The next section relaxes this 
assumption. 
 
To assure price separation, the Stackelberg leader H  maximises profit subject to its 
production constraint and a separation constraint. The separation constraint holds if L ’s 
separation profit,   RSL , larger than or equal to its pooling profit, 
P
H
P
L Xp   . L ’s  pooling profit is pooling price Hp  times L ’s market share,  , 
times total demand of uninformed consumers, PX . We assume that demand PX  is a 
result of a lottery in which risk neutral consumers that maximise their expected utility. 
Consumers pay Hp  and receive either high quality yielding utility   with probability   
or low quality yielding utility R  with probability 1  assuming that consumers know 
the water allocation and can thereby infer high and low quality market shares. Hence, 
consumers’ expected utility is     R1 . The consumer with valuation 
     1/ˆ RpH  is indifferent. Consumers with  ˆ  will buy, while all 
others abstain from buying. Then demand under price pooling is   ˆ1P HX F p  . 
Next, we obtain L ’s pooling profit   ˆ1 ,PL H Hp F p          which enters the 
separation constraint that we use in H ’s profit maximization problem in order to 
determine high quality price under separation SHp .  
 
We obtain (see Appendix 2.3): 
(2.2) 
  ˆˆ( ) 0ˆˆ( ) 1,
D
HS
H F
H
p if
p
p if
     
     
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where  DHp   is the distorted price that assures price separation, implicitly defined by 
  ˆ1 ,
0
D D
H H
D
H
R p F p
p R
        and ˆˆ  is the threshold where distorted and 
undistorted high quality prices are equal,    ˆ ˆˆ ˆD FH Hp p  . For the uniform distribution 
  1DHp     and   2/1ˆˆ R . 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Separating prices SHp   (Equation 2.2) and 
F
Lp  depending on wastewater share 
  (solid lines) and  Hp,  combinations for which L  will pool Hp  (triangle ABC). 
 
Figure 2.3 depicts separation prices for high quality,  SHp , and for low quality, 
F
Lp , for the uniform distribution. For  ˆˆ0  , L  would mimic H ’s full information 
price. Hence, the separation constraint is binding and H  needs to distort his price upwards 
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to force L  to separate. By setting  DHp  , L  loses its incentive to pool and consequently 
separates by signalling low quality with FLp . For 1ˆˆ  , L  would never mimic high 
quality by price and H  can set the full information price,  FHp . Note, that in the 
uniform distribution case  ˆˆˆ   which means that the interval where H  has to distort 
prices coincides with the interval where the production constraint is not binding. The 
triangle ABC depicts all  Hp,  combinations for which L  will pool Hp  since 
P
L
S
L   .  
 
Our next step is to analyse whether H  prefers to distort prices or to tolerate price 
pooling. To do this we check whether H ’s separation profit is higher than the 
corresponding pooling profit. The pooling profit of H  is given with 
   1P P P PH H Hp X p     , where PHp  is its profit maximizing pooling price and 
   1 P PHX p   is its sales. Here, the production constraint is never binding, since 
H ’s production of 1  is always larger than sales     ˆ1 1 PHF p       since 
   0ˆ PHpF   for all  . H  maximises its profit by pooling in the interval 
 ˆˆˆ0  , setting price  PHp  ; see Appendix 2.4. Asymmetric information prices are 
given by 
(2.3) ˆˆˆif 0
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , if
ˆˆ, if 1.
P
H L H
D
H L H H L
H H L
p p p
p p p p p R
p p p R
 
  
 
            

 
 
For  ˆˆˆ0  , tolerating pooling is profitable compared to separating. Hence, H  sets 
P
H Hp p  which L  mimics. For  ˆˆˆˆˆ  , H  sets  DHp   to prevent pooling by 
distorting its price upwards. For 1ˆˆ   , H sets the undistorted full information price 
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F
Hp . In either of the two last cases L  charges RpL   separating from H  by price. 
Figure 2.4 depicts the asymmetric information prices. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Asymmetric information prices LH pp ,  (Equation 2.3) depending on 
wastewater share   with threshold levels 16.0ˆˆˆ   and 45.0ˆˆˆ   . 
 
Under asymmetric information, total welfare is (Appendix 2.5) 
(2.4) 
 
 
 
 
1
ˆ
1
ˆˆ
1
ˆ
ˆˆˆ1 if 0
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆif
ˆˆif 1.
S
H
S
H
R P
H H L
R
A p
R
p
R p d
R f d
R f d
        
        
     



                     



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It contains total welfare for price pooling in  ˆˆ0  , for distorted price separating in 
 ˆˆˆˆˆ   and for undistorted price separating in 1ˆˆ  . Figure 2.5 depicts total 
welfare A  and its elements, H , L  and C . As   increases, total welfare drops in 
the price pooling interval (  ˆˆˆ0  ). High quality profits and consumer surplus 
decrease while low quality profits increase because the loss in high quality profits ( H ) 
and consumer surplus ( C ) cannot be compensated by the increase in low quality profits 
( L ). At ˆˆˆ , L  and C  jump to a lower level because H  switches in its pricing 
strategy from pooling to separating with distorted prices. Consequently, L  loses the 
incentive to pool and is forced to reveal low quality by charging RpL  . Consumers, 
gain certainty about quality, but have to pay an upwards distorted price for high quality. 
Since the effect of the latter dominates, consumer surplus jumps to a lower level. As   
increases in  ˆˆˆˆˆ  , the price distortion decreases, because increasing separation 
profits of L  render pooling less attractive. Hence, overall welfare increases up to the 
global maximum at ˆˆ . For  ˆˆ , undistorted prices signal quality. Welfare decreases, 
however, since too much water is allocated to low quality and the high quality sector is 
constrained in production4. 
 
Summarising the results so far, we find that the allocation of scarce fresh water 
between domestic use and irrigation determines the equilibrium prices and thereby the 
transparency of the local food market. Allocating a small share of fresh water to domestic 
use yields a price pooling equilibrium with asymmetric information about food quality 
between consumers and producers. One price is set in the market and the low quality farm 
disguises its quality and mimics high quality by price. A medium share of fresh water for 
domestic use yields a separating equilibrium in which a distorted high quality price signals 
high quality to consumers. The high quality farm distorts its price upwards to prevent 
pooling. A large share of fresh water for domestic use also yields a separating equilibrium. 
The high quality farm is, however, not threatened by pooling and can therefore signal its 
quality by the undistorted full information price. The full information welfare optimum can 
                                                 
4 See proof of proposition 2.1 for  ˆˆ . 
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be obtained because the farms signal quality with undistorted prices for water allocation 
that maximises welfare in the full information case.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Total welfare   A  (Equation 2.4), high quality profits   H  (Equation 
A2.5), low quality profits   L  (Equation A2.6) and consumer surplus   C  
(Equation A2.7) depending on wastewater share   under asymmetric information. 
 
Another interesting insight into price signalling games with unobservable product 
quality appears in the last paragraph of Appendix 2.3. Our model shows that for 1R  the 
low quality farm looses its incentive to mimic high quality by price independently of its 
share in the market. Hence, a separating equilibrium emerges and asymmetric information 
about quality does not have negative effects at all on market transparency. This result is 
driven by the relation between the maximal add-on, which we assumed to be one, and R . 
With a higher R  pooling price and low quality separating price are getting closer and the 
low quality farm would only receive a slightly higher price when pooling, while it would 
still loose demand due to quality uncertainty. For 1R  with a maximal add-on of one the 
net effect of pooling on the low quality farm’s profit is negative for all possible market 
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shares. Hence, it always separates. This is the relevant case when the unobservable quality 
of a product is only a minor characteristic compared to the observable ones. In our case, 
where the unobservable characteristic is health hazards, it is reasonable to assume that the 
consumers with the highest valuation for avoiding health risks are represented by a 
relatively large add-on. Hence, we assume 1R . 
 
2.5. Alternative distributions of consumer valuations 
 
So far we have developed our model for a uniform distribution of consumer valuations. 
While this is sufficient to illustrate the mechanisms at work, interesting insights can be 
obtained when relaxing this assumption. In many developing countries the majority of 
consumers is poor and can be characterised by a low willingness to pay for avoiding the 
health risks attached to wastewater irrigated crops. Hence, the add-on for high quality is 
small for most consumers. This yields a concave cumulative distribution function of 
reservation value for high quality. In a prospering country, on the other hand, the majority 
of consumers may prefer high quality and may be willing to pay for it. This yields a convex 
cumulative distribution function. In the subsequent section we conduct our analysis with a 
concave and a convex cumulative distribution function. 
 
We maintain the linearity of the density function and merely adapt its slope. The 
general linear density function is given by     baf  in the interval 
RR  1  and   0f  otherwise. The cumulative distribution function is then 
    22/     badfF R . Using   11  RR df   yields 
   Rbba  2/11  which fully determines the density function by its slope b . 
Note that the uniform distribution is a special case with 0b  which yields 1a . In our 
analysis we use 2b  and 2b  to generate a concave and convex cumulative 
distribution function, respectively. The density functions are     22.2f  for the 
concave case and     22.0f  for the convex case. Using these densities in the 
equations for market prices (Eq. 2.3) and welfare (Eq. A2.5 –A2.8) yields the results that 
we present in Figures 2.6-2.8. 
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Figure 2.6: Asymmetric information prices LH pp ,  (Equation 2.3) for concave 
cumulative distribution function  2b depending on wastewater share   with 
threshold levels 15.0
ˆˆˆ  , 44.0ˆˆ   and 46.0ˆ  . 
 
Figures 2.6 and 2.7 depict the asymmetric information prices (Eq. 2.3) for the 
concave and the convex cumulative density function, respectively. As in the uniform 
distribution case, a price pooling equilibrium exists for an interval of small  , a distorted 
price separating equilibrium exists for an interval of a medium sized   and an efficient 
price separating interval exists for an interval of large  . The values of the threshold levels 
ˆˆˆ  hardly change because farms adjust prices to maintain demand as reaction to the change 
in consumers’ valuation. The threshold ˆˆ  does, however, change considerably. It drops 
from 44.0ˆˆ   in the concave case to 36.0ˆˆ   in the convex case. The interval of 
undistorted prices is therefore much larger in the convex case. For both cases the full 
information welfare maximizing ˆ  is no longer equal to ˆˆ , the threshold of the efficient 
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price separating equilibrium interval. ˆ  still lies in the interval of undistorted prices for the 
concave case. This changes, however, in the convex case. There, the full information 
welfare optimal water allocation 3.0ˆ   lies in the separation interval with distorted 
prices,  ˆˆˆˆˆˆ  . The difference between the dotted line and Hp  at ˆ  in Figure 2.7 
depicts price distortion which is necessary to assure profit maximal price separation. 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Asymmetric information prices LH pp ,  (Equation 2.3) for concave 
cumulative distribution function  2b depending on wastewater share   with threshold 
levels 16.0ˆˆˆ  , 36.0ˆˆ   and 3.0ˆ  . Full information price FHp  (Equation 2.1) for 
the interval  ˆˆ0   (dashed line). 
 
Figure 2.8 depicts the implications on welfare in the convex case. As in the 
uniform case (Figure 2.5), there are two local maxima. The difference to the uniform case is 
that the full information welfare level is not one of the two local maxima. It cannot be 
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obtained because at ˆ  distorted prices cause welfare losses. The local maximum at 0  
is slightly higher 5  than the one at ˆˆ .  The agency maximises total welfare under 
asymmetric information by setting 0*  . This establishes de facto consumer certainty 
by allocating all water to high quality production. H  charges  0FH Hp p    (Eq. 2.1) 
and sells ˆ1Hy  (Figure 2.1). Since water allocation to high quality is 1 1  , ˆ  
is wasted unproductively for the sake of market efficiency. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Total welfare   A  (Equation 2.4), high quality profits   H  (Equation 
A2.5), low quality profits   L  (Equation A2.6) and consumer surplus   C  
(Equation A2.7) depending on wastewater share   under asymmetric information for 
2b . 
                                                 
5     ˆˆ6253.06291.00 AA   
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We have shown in this section that the distribution of consumers’ valuation for high 
quality is crucial for the welfare maximum in the market. If only few consumers have a 
high valuation for high quality food, the above mentioned reallocation of fresh water to 
domestic use does not pose a serious threat to maximizing welfare in the food market. This 
changes, however, if more consumers have a high valuation for high quality food, as in 
prospering countries. Then our model suggests allocating all water to fresh water irrigation 
to maximise welfare on the food market. This result does not consider welfare from 
domestic use. We return to this assumption in the discussion below. 
 
2.6. Discussion  
 
In this section we first relate the results of our model to the theoretical literature on quality 
signalling by price. Then we discuss the main assumptions. 
 
Our model displays a typical feature of models of unobservable product quality. The 
three types of equilibria that we find in our study can be found in the related literature. 
Examples are Cho and Kreps (1987) who find the full information prices when qualities are 
sufficiently different. For a duopoly Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2000: 7) find price 
pooling or distorted price separation but they argue that ’full information prices can never 
be a separating equilibrium pair‘. Contrary to their finding we show in our duopoly case 
that efficient prices can signal quality. This result is driven by the fact that the water 
allocation determines production constraints for both qualities and, hence, the size of the 
market shares.  
 
Another typical feature is that in a price pooling equilibrium the high quality 
producer and high quality demanding consumers suffer losses, while the low quality 
producer gains extra profits. This can be seen for the uniform distribution case when 
comparing the corresponding welfare functions for the pooling interval in Figures 2.2 and 
2.5. Welfare levels for the high quality farm and consumers are strictly lower in the 
asymmetric information case while they are strictly higher for the low quality farm.6 This 
may cause adverse selection in models where marginal high quality demand and high 
quality producers can withdraw from the market as in Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons. 
In our setting, however, the high quality producer stays in the market since this yields 
positive profits. This result might change if one introduces positive marginal costs of high 
                                                 
6 We assumed that producers pool for 0 . This, however, is a degenerate case in which quality certainty  
exists because only high quality is produced. Therefore there is no difference in the welfare levels between the full 
and the asymmetric information case. 
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quality production or alternative productive options. Sufficiently high marginal costs might 
render high quality production unprofitable under asymmetric information. Alternative 
production options in form of crops with known quality might also cause high quality to 
leave the market. Extending our model with these features might contribute to 
understanding cropping patterns in developing countries.  
 
Now we turn to the discussion of assumptions. We derive our main result that water 
allocation may affect the functioning of the food market with the simplest possible model. 
In particular we assume that there is a single seller for each of two qualities. In some cases 
where farmers’ associations bundle supply this assumption is warranted. In most cases, 
however, there will be many sellers of either quality. First, consider competition in the high 
quality segment. Here price competition is not effective because the production constraint is 
binding for each farmer. There is no point in lowering prices to sell more. The equilibrium 
price for high quality will be the highest market clearing price. Second, if there are many 
low quality farms, some fraction of low quality farms might mimic high quality. Then a 
consumer can no longer be certain to receive high quality for a high price. The pricing 
equilibrium is determined by consumers’ reactions to the risk of receiving low quality for a 
high price. If a sufficient fraction of consumers prefers low quality for a low price rather 
than taking the risk, demand for high-priced food drops which reduces the incentive to 
mimic and a separating equilibrium exists. Hence, relaxing our assumption of a single farm 
of each type would not change our qualitative results. 
 
A restriction of our analysis is that we do not model consumers’ fresh water demand 
for domestic use. Of course, fresh water allocation is not determined with the primary 
purpose to influence food prices but mainly driven by demands for domestic and 
agricultural use. Since the objective of this study is to provide insight how water allocation 
effects the functioning of the local food market, we restrict our attention to welfare effects 
from the food market. To integrate domestic water demand into our model would provide 
further interesting insights into welfare effects on the water basin scale, but is left to future 
research.  
 
We assume that water allocation and therefore production constraints are common 
knowledge. Consumers know the probability of getting high quality under price pooling. 
This feature provides an endogenous determination of the probabilities consumers take into 
account in a price pooling case while Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2000) assume exogenous 
equal probabilities for both quality types. Endogenous probabilities impact the market 
shares and may render the low quality producer’s incentive to mimic high quality by price 
unprofitable. The endogenous determination of the probabilities is a major difference to 
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Hertzendorf and Overgaard’s (2000) model. While one can question the accuracy with 
which consumers translate water allocation into probabilities, we show that some prior 
information on market shares affects the pricing behaviour in equilibrium. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
 
Data on water allocation between cities and agriculture show that agriculture gets 
the ’lion’s share‘. Molle and Berkoff (2006) report that in developing countries 80-95 per 
cent of the water resources get diverted to agriculture. This provides an indication that the 
order of magnitude of parameter   is between 5 per cent and 20 per cent. It is for these 
parameter values that our model predicts welfare losses in the food market due to either a 
pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium with distorted prices. Our model provides a 
tool to assess the size of these losses. This underlines the potential relevance of our model 
although an empirical estimate of the welfare losses may be difficult.  
 
We have shown that equilibrium prices in the food market crucially depend on 
consumers’ probabilities of getting high quality under price pooling. Obviously, then, 
results from models where these probabilities are exogenous can be questioned and 
particular attention must be paid to setting the exogenous probabilities. How consumers 
process indirect information in case of quality uncertainty and how this determines 
producers’ pricing behaviour and consumers’ purchasing decisions is an interesting area for 
future research in signalling games. Our findings suggest that consumers’ knowledge of 
market shares mitigates the negative effects of asymmetric information. 
 
With increasing competition for fresh water due to, for instance, climate change 
and population growth, fresh water is likely to be reallocated to domestic use. For this case 
our model predicts that initial price distortions will be reduced or even removed because the 
wastewater irrigated crops get a larger market share and their producers lose some of (or 
entirely) the incentive to mimic high quality. Besides the price distortions, our model 
captures welfare in the food market and determines the welfare maximising water 
allocation. Furthermore, our results describe the potential effects of a shift of consumers’ 
valuation of high quality. If many consumers have a high valuation for high quality food, as 
in prospering developing countries, all water should be allocated to fresh water irrigation in 
order to maximise welfare on the food market. Hence, clearly, there is a trade off. 
Reallocating fresh water to domestic use increases domestic users’ welfare but hampers the 
functioning of the food market with a corresponding decrease in welfare. We conclude that 
policy makers should consider options to reconcile domestic users’ demand for fresh water 
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and food consumers’ increasing preference for safely irrigated food. The provision of at 
least partial wastewater treatment before its use in irrigation or the introduction of a 
monitoring system that establishes transparency in the local food supply chain are possible 
options. 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix 2.1: High quality price under full information 
Maximisation problem of the high quality farm under full information: 
Since L  has a dominant strategy ( Rp FL  ), H  optimises given Rp FL  . Hence, 
demand is    1H H HX p F p  , the production constraint is  1 1HF p     
and profits are  1H H Hp F p       .  
If the production constraint is not binding, let Hp  be the interior solution which solves 
   / 0 1 / 0H H H H H Hp F p p F p p         . 
If the production constraint is binding, the profit maximising price Hp  solves 
 1 1HF p    . Hence, 
(A2.1)  1Hp F  .  
We obtain a threshold value ˆ  where H’s production constraint becomes binding. At the 
threshold ˆ  equates H Hp p  . Using (A2.1) we obtain  
(A2.2)  ˆ HF p  .  
Hence, the high quality full information price is given with 
(2.1) ˆ0
ˆ 1.
HF
H
H
p if
p
p if
 
 
       
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Appendix 2.2: Proof of Proposition 2.1  
Proof: First, note that   FA  is continuous at ˆ  because H Hp p    yields ˆ  (A2.2). 
We can show that the welfare function is increasing for  ˆ0   and decreasing for 
1ˆ  . First, we show that the welfare function is increasing for  ˆ0  . The 
welfare function is    1
H
RF
A p
R f d         . The integral is a constant 
because Hp  is independent of  . The derivative of total welfare with respect to   is 
strictly positive   0/  RW  . Hence, increasing   increases total welfare 
because water is transferred from unproductive use in high quality to productive use in low 
quality. Second, we show that the welfare function is decreasing for 1ˆ  . The 
welfare function is     
1
H
RF
A p
R f d     
     . Both terms on the right side 
of the equation depend on  . The derivative   /FA HR p        describes the 
welfare effect of the switch of the marginal consumer from the high quality sector to the 
low quality sector. R  is the welfare gain in terms of L ’s profits in the low quality 
segment. Hp , on the other hand, is the welfare in the high quality segment. With 
increasing  , H  is more constrained in its production and increases price until demand 
meets corresponding production. We have  Hp R   and     /FA  is strictly 
negative. The maximum of the welfare function is therefore  ˆ*  . ■ 
 
Appendix 2.3:  High quality separation price 
To assure price separation the high quality farm sets a price that renders the low quality 
farm indifferent between separation and pooling. Hence, the separation constraint is 
P
L
S
L   , which is  ˆ1HR p F         .  
1) A degenerate equilibrium results for 0 . Since the low quality farm does not 
produce, its profit is zero no matter its price. Furthermore, consumers face certainty about 
quality since only the high quality farm produces. The high quality farm sets its full 
information price,  0FHp . 
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2) For 0  we have to solve  ˆ1 0HR p F       . We obtain two solutions. The 
first is Hp R . Then Rˆ  and consequently     0ˆ  RFF  . The second solution 
is DH Hp p , where DHp  equates     ˆ1 , / 0D D DH H HR p F p p R            
The threshold ˆˆ  between the (distorted) separating price  DHp   and the (undistorted) 
full information price  FHp  equates    ˆ ˆˆ ˆD FH Hp p  . 
For  ˆˆ0   it is profit maximizing to set the separating price while for 1ˆˆ   it is 
profit maximizing to set the undistorted price. The high quality separation price is therefore 
(2.2) ˆˆ0
ˆˆ 1.
D
HS
H F
H
p if
p
p if
 
 
     
 
 
 
For the uniform distribution 1DHp   . This means that for any high quality price 
 1HpR , the low quality farm will pool, since PLSL   . Note, that HpR   is 
a dominant strategy for H  because 
         1 1S D SH H Hp R R R             which allows prices which the low 
quality farm will pool only if 1R . Otherwise, if 1R , the polling profit of 
the low quality farm is lower or equal to its separating profit for all high quality prices. 
Since the minimum value of   is zero, any high quality price higher than R  induces a 
separating equilibrium when 1R . The high quality farm does not need to distort its price. 
 
Appendix 2.4: Pooling price 
The high quality farm sets Hp  to maximise its pooling profit 
     HHPH pFp  ˆ11  .  
1) A degenerate equilibrium results for 1 : Any price 0Hp   yields zero profit 
because there is no high quality production.  
2) For 1  ,  let PHp  equate    ˆˆˆ1 0HFH H pF p p       . 
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The threshold ˆˆˆ  equates pooling and separating profit 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 , 1P P S SH H H Hp F p p F p                                                            
. 
 
Appendix 2.5: Total welfare under asymmetric information 
Total welfare under asymmetric information is the sum of high quality profit, low quality 
profit and consumer surplus. High quality profit is  
(A2.3)    
 
 
1
ˆ
1
1
ˆˆˆ
1 if 0
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆif
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p f d
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
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

 
 
Low quality profit is 
(A2.4)  1ˆ
'
ˆˆˆif 0
ˆˆˆif 1
RP
H
L
p f d
R
    
  
        

 
 
Consumer surplus in the low quality segment is zero and in the high quality segment 
(A2.5)  
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Total welfare is the sum of A2.3 – A2.5:  
(A2.6) 
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Chapter 3 
 
Incentives and Cost Recovery in Wastewater 
Treatment in Developing Countries: Modelling the 
Urban Water Chain*  
 
 
To improve wastewater treatment in developing countries new approaches to design 
wastewater treatment schemes have been developed. These can be operated successfully 
only if the right incentives are in place and costs can be recovered. In this chapter we 
analyze how a regulator should set incentives to maximize benefits of wastewater treatment 
while cost recovery is feasible. We study incentives by integrating a compliance game 
between a regulator and small scale industrial polluters into a model of the urban water 
chain. Our model indicates that costs can be recovered without charges to polluters or 
beneficiaries of wastewater treatment in some settings where fines are collected from firms 
for violating water quality regulations. Furthermore, we find that net benefits of wastewater 
treatment can be negative and conclude that cheaper treatment technologies need to be 
developed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*This chapter is based on Gengenbach and Weikard (2010b). Paper presented at the Tenth 
Biennial Conference of the International Society of Ecological Economists (ISEE) 2008 in 
Nairobi, Kenya. Manuscript submitted. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
In many developing countries urban wastewater is insufficiently treated resulting in health 
risks and environmental hazards. Scott, Faruqui and Raschid (2004) report that the 
proportion of urban wastewater that is treated to secondary level is zero for Africa, 35% for 
Asia, and 14% for Latin America and the Caribbean. Wastewater treatment in developing 
countries has largely failed because it has been designed as ‘high-tech’ centralized 
treatment similar to treatment plants operated in industrialized countries. The drawbacks of 
this design are high initial investments and high costs for operation and maintenance. 
Consequently, cost for operation and maintenance could not be recovered in many cases 
where facilities have been installed. Hence, centralized systems “are now being questioned 
with respect to sustainability as well as their applicability to developing countries” (Asano 
2005).  
 
New conceptual approaches to designing wastewater treatment schemes in 
developing countries are suggested. The water chain approach (Huibers and van Lier 2005) 
designs schemes taking into account the entire chain of water pollution, wastewater 
treatment and its reuse integrating pollution reduction with wastewater treatment and 
wastewater treatment with the reuse of treated wastewater. The reuse of treated wastewater 
in irrigation serves for example as a wastewater treatment step. Nhapi, Siebel and Gijzen 
(2005) propose a three step strategic approach consisting of pollution prevention and 
minimization (step 1), reuse after treatment (step 2), and discharge into the environment 
(step 3). Both approaches integrate regulation of water pollution, wastewater treatment and 
its reuse in the design process and claim that effective treatment can be established at lower 
costs. Regulation of water pollution is the crucial factor in both approaches because it is the 
most upstream action in the chain. A common example is when domestic and industrial 
polluters discharge wastewater in a common sewer where it blends together as urban 
wastewater. Regulation of water pollution demands pre-treating industrial wastewater to 
prevent industrial pollutants from entering urban wastewater which avoids the need to 
employ costly ‘high-tech’ treatment. For regulation to be effective it has to be enforced. As 
in many developing countries proper institutions are not established, enforcement of 
environmental regulation can be difficult. Lonholdt, Elberg Jorgensen and O’Hearn (2006, 
p.126) report that “industries in Thailand, as in many other Asian countries, are 
traditionally rather ‘closed’ towards the outside world” which results in “a sometimes rather 
sporadic enforcement effort”. In this chapter we integrate a compliance game between a 
regulator and industrial polluters into a model of the urban water chain in order to analyze 
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how the regulator should set incentives to maximize benefits of wastewater treatment while 
cost recovery is feasible. 
 
Studies on economic incentives for the entire wastewater treatment chain from 
water pollution to wastewater treatment and to its reuse for irrigation are scarce in a 
developing country context. The literature has rather focused on parts of the chain in 
industrialised countries where strong institutions assure treatment cost recovery and enforce 
safety guidelines for wastewater reuse. Kilgour, Okada and Nishikori (1988) and Sauer et al. 
(2003) have focused on incentives in regulating water pollution, whereas incentives in 
wastewater treatment were studied by Schwarz and McConnell (1993) and Earnhart (2004). 
Incentives in wastewater treatment and reuse were studied by Haruvy et al. (1999), 
Feinerman, Plessner, and DiSegni Eshel (2001) and Axelrad and Feinerman (2009, 2010). 
The reuse of wastewater in irrigation was studied by Dinar and Yaron (1986), Haruvy 
(1997, 1998) and Fine, Halperin and Hadas (2005). They conduct cost benefit studies on 
wastewater reuse in irrigation focusing on optimization of regional or national net benefits 
concerning wastewater reuse in different settings in Israel and the USA. Other studies 
analyze individual incentives of stakeholders. Loehman et al. (1979), Dinar, Yaron and 
Kannai (1986), Loehman and Dinar (1994) and Lejano and Davos (1995) use cooperative 
game theory to allocate costs and benefits of wastewater reuse projects for different settings 
in Israel and the USA.  
 
In this chapter we consider a typical urban setting in a developing country where 
households and firms are not separated into distinct zones. Households and firms produce 
domestic and industrial wastewater, respectively. The following wastewater treatment 
scheme is designed in accordance with the water chain approach. Firms are required to pre-
treat their industrial wastewater to domestic wastewater quality before discharge. A public 
water utility monitors whether firms pre-treat their wastewater. Pre-treated industrial and 
domestic wastewater is captured jointly and conveyed to a treatment plant which is 
designed to treat domestic wastewater to enable its safe reuse in irrigation. This setting 
raises two research questions. First, how does the water utility maximize net benefits of a 
treatment scheme by choosing the optimal monitoring rate? Second, can the costs of the 
treatment scheme be recovered for the optimal monitoring rate?  
  
To answer these questions we model a two stage compliance game where the 
water utility cannot readily observe the compliance of firms. At the first stage the water 
utility chooses the monitoring rate in order to set incentives for firms to comply. At the 
second stage each firm decides to comply and discharge pre-treated wastewater or to defect 
and discharge raw industrial wastewater. These decisions determine the fraction of raw 
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industrial wastewater in urban wastewater which determines the effectiveness of 
wastewater treatment and ultimately benefits of wastewater reuse. We model the treatment 
of urban wastewater as a production process with urban wastewater as input, treated 
wastewater as output and the treatment technology as production function: the higher the 
fraction of raw industrial wastewater in urban wastewater, the less effective is the treatment 
process; the less effective the treatment process, the higher the damages to downstream 
population, farmers, and the environment.  
 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides a formal 
model to analyze economic incentives in the entire urban water chain consisting of water 
pollution, wastewater treatment and its reuse in a developing country context. The model 
can, however, easily be adapted to developed country settings. One topical application in 
Europe is wastewater treatment upgrading under the EU Water Framework Directive which 
aims at managing water at the basin level to achieve good ecological status under the full 
cost recovery principle (European Commission 2000). The second distinguishing feature is 
related to the modelling of water. In economic studies on wastewater reuse wastewater is 
almost exclusively modelled with only one quality dimension. We model wastewater with 
multiple dimensions where each dimension represents the concentration level of one 
pollutant. This enables us to trace the concentration levels of each pollutant along the water 
chain which substantially increases transparency in two ways. First, welfare effects can be 
captured in more detail by specifying the benefit and cost functions for each pollutant along 
the chain. Second, the effect of pollutants on the treatment process can be specified 
explicitly. Salinity, for example, can strongly inhibit the aerobic biological treatment of 
wastewater (Lefebvre and Moletta 2006). We develop this example further in a later section. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces the model. 
Section 3.3 provides the general solution. Then we turn to a common scenario where 
industrial wastewater is highly saline to illustrate how our approach works. Section 3.5 
offers discussion and conclusions.  
 
3.2 The Model 
 
We introduce the model in two parts. First, we present the relevant bio-chemical, physical, 
and technical characteristics of the urban water chain. This comprises identifying the 
pollutants in the wastewater, the wastewater treatment technology and the pollutants’ 
concentration levels before and after treatment. Subsequently, we introduce the economics 
of the urban water chain: the agents of the compliance game, firms and the water utility, 
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with their strategies and payoffs. A list of symbols summarising the use of notation can be 
found in the Appendix of this chapter. Our model is static where the parameters (water flow, 
monitoring, costs, etc.) are specified for one period which can be e.g. a week or a season, 
depending the setting. 
 
The urban water chain 
We model the entire urban water chain consisting of water pollution, wastewater treatment 
and its reuse. We assume that a fixed quantity of wastewater discharge per period, of which 
households and firms generate shares   and 1 , respectively. Domestic and raw 
industrial wastewaters are characterized by their concentration levels for a set 
{1,..., }K k  of pollutants. For the purpose of this study it is sufficient to consider a 
pollutant either if it generates costs or benefits downstream (reuse) or if it influences the 
effectiveness of the treatment process.7  The k  concentration levels characterize the quality 
of domestic and raw industrial wastewater. Formally domestic and raw industrial 
wastewater quality is represented by vectors  1 ,...,D D Dkq q q  and  1 ,...,R R Rkq q q , 
respectively. Households and firms discharge their wastewater into the sewer where it 
becomes urban wastewater which is characterized by  1 ,...,U U Ukq q q . While 
households discharge directly, firms are required to pre-treat their raw industrial wastewater 
to domestic wastewater quality. Firms, however, might not comply with the requirement to 
pre-treat and discharge raw industrial wastewater which renders urban wastewater a blend 
of domestic wastewater and raw industrial wastewater. Let the compliance rate   be the 
fraction of complying firms. Then the concentration for each pollutant Ki  in urban 
wastewater is 
(3.1)          RiDiUi qqq   111 .  
Urban wastewater is conveyed to a treatment plant. Treated wastewater is characterized by 
 1 ,...,T T Tkq q q . The concentration levels of pollutant Ki  in treated wastewater is  
(3.2)  1 ,...,T U U Ui i k iq q q q    
where  1 ,...,U Ui kq q  is the treatment function for pollutant i  which may depend on the 
concentration levels of all pollutants in urban wastewater. The treatment function has a 
straightforward interpretation. Its value is the fraction of pollutant i ’s concentration that 
remains in treated wastewater. Hence, the lower the value of the treatment function, the 
                                                 
7 See Toze (2006) for a general overview on risks and benefits of the reuse of effluent. 
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lower is the concentration of pollutants in treated wastewater. The treatment function can 
take values between iˆ  ( ˆ0 1i  ) and 1.8 The value iˆ  reflects the maximum treatment 
effectivity. Maximum treatment effectivity is achieved when the concentrations of all 
pollutants in urban wastewater are at the level for which the treatment process was 
designed.9 Here we assume that the treatment plant is designed for domestic wastewater, 
D
j
U
j qq   for all Kj . If, however, the concentrations of some pollutants j K  
deviate from this level, Dj
U
j qq  , and the treatment process is sensitive to this deviation,   0/,.,1  UjUkUi qqq  for DjUj qq   or   0/,.,1  UjUkUi qqq  for DjUj qq   
the treatment process becomes partially ( ˆ 1i i   ) or totally ineffective ( 1i ). In 
most cases the pollutant concentration in urban wastewater would be higher than in 
domestic wastewater, Dj
U
j qq  . But note that we do not rule out the possibility that 
concentrations lower than Djq  can also hamper treatment. An example is a biological 
treatment with bacteria that need a minimum concentration of a target pollutant to perform 
optimally. Another example of the sensitivity of a treatment process is that a high 
concentration of salinity inhibits the biological treatment process which removes other 
pollutants. We will discuss this case below. 
 
The compliance game 
Given these characteristics of the urban wastewater flow, we now present the agents of the 
compliance game, i.e. firms and the water utility with their strategies and payoffs.  
 
Firms: We assume that each of m  firms in the set  1,...,M m  generates a quantity 
  m/1   of raw industrial wastewater, characterized by  1 ,...,R R Rkq q q  where the 
concentration of at least one pollutant i  is higher than in domestic wastewater, Di
R
i qq  . 
A regulation requires firms to decrease the concentrations of these pollutants to domestic 
wastewater concentrations before discharge. Whether a firm complies with the regulation is 
private information to the firm and cannot be observed by the water utility without costly 
                                                 
8 Note that if ˆ 1i  , then 1i . This does not represent total breakdown of the process but rather that the 
treatment process was not designed for this particular pollutant. 
9  We do not consider any other problems, for example weather conditions that potentially influence the 
effectiveness of the plant. 
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monitoring. The general characteristics of firms are, however, public information. We 
assume that firms are identical except for their pre-treatment costs Mc  which are assumed 
to be uniformly distributed over an interval  ,c c .  
 
 
Diagram 3.1: Water composition and quality in the urban water flow. 
 
A firm complies with the regulation if its pre-treatment costs are lower than or 
equal to the expected value of the fine that it may have to pay if it does not comply. The 
expected value of the fine is the product of the fine f  and the probability of being fined 
which is the monitoring rate  . Generally a firm Ml  complies if fclM   . We 
assume that the fine is exogenously given and larger or equal to the highest pre-treatment 
costs, cf   which enables to induce full compliance. The compliance rate is zero if the 
monitoring rate is too low to force the firm with the lowest pre-treatment cost to comply. 
Otherwise it is      1 / /f
c
c c dc f c c c



     . Hence, we have  
(3.3) 
   
0 if 0 /
( ) / if / /
1 if / 1.
c f
f c c c c f c f
c f

   

        
 
 
Substituting Eq.3.1 and Eq.3.3 into Eq.3.2 yields the concentration of the different 
pollutants in treated wastewater depending on the monitoring rate  
 Uiq
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i
R
i qq 
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D
iq
Industrial 
wastewater
R
iq
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T
i
U
i qq 
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(3.4)       1( ) ( ) ,..., ( ) ( )T U U Ui i k iq q q q         .  
Diagram 1 sketches our model of the urban water flow. 
 
The water utility: The water utility maximizes net benefits of the water chain by setting the 
monitoring rate  . Five items determine net benefits: (i) baseline treatment benefits (ii) 
monitoring benefits (iii) treatment costs (vi) monitoring costs, and (v) compliance costs. 
Note, that fines do not add to net benefits because they are revenues for the water utility but 
costs for firms. Baseline treatment benefits, denoted by B , capture the benefits of the 
treatment plant when the monitoring rate is zero which means that pre-treatment is not 
enforced. B  is zero if the treatment process breaks down completely in the absence of  
monitoring; else B  is positive. The second item is monitoring benefits. Monitoring 
motivates firms to pre-treat their wastewater which induces a higher effectivity of treatment 
and therefore reduces pollutant concentrations in treated wastewater. This reduction of 
pollution generates benefits along the urban water chain. Using (3.4) the monitoring 
benefits is given by 
(3.5)  1( ) ( ),..., ( )T TkB B q q   ,  
with   0/  B . The third item, treatment costs, is the operation costs of the 
treatment plant which is given by Tc . The fourth, monitoring costs, are given as the 
number of firms monitored, m , times the costs of monitoring per firm 0c  . The 
fifth, compliance costs, are the sum of the individual pre-treatment costs of all complying 
firms, 
2( )
2( )0
f fc
c c c cdc
  
  . Putting together (i) – (v) net benefits are 
(3.6)  
 
2
( ) ( )
2T
f
B B c m c
c c
              
 
 
The water utility must recover treatment and monitoring costs,  cmcT   
from charges to households Dp , farmers Fp , and firms Mp , and revenues from fines. 
We model revenues from fines as an expected value. Since the water utility monitors m  
firms of which 1 ( )   do not comply it expects to collect fines from 
 1 ( )m       firms. The budget constraint is  
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(3.7)  1 ( )T D F Mc m c p p p m f              .  
Note that, in developing countries the ability to collect charges from households and farms 
is usually limited. We will address this in the example in section 3.4. 
 
3.3 General Results 
 
We now turn to the optimal monitoring rate in the compliance game. The water utility 
maximizes net benefits by choosing the monitoring rate   (Eq.3.6) under the budget 
constraint (Eq.3.7). The Lagrangian function for this problem is 
 (3.8)      ccfcmcBBL T  /2
1 2   
              fmpppcmc MFDT    1  
 
We have to distinguish two cases. First, the budget constraint is not binding which yields an 
interior solution where the optimal monitoring rate yields the global optimum. Then, 
0 and we obtain Eq.3.9 by setting the first derivative of the net benefit function 
(Eq.3.6) equal to zero. Solving Eq.3.9 yields the optimal monitoring rate * . Marginal 
monitoring benefits must be equal to marginal monitoring costs plus marginal compliance 
costs 
(3.9)    ccfcmB  // 2    
In the second case, the budget constraint is binding. This yields a corner solution where the 
global optimum cannot be realized. Then, 0  and the budget constraint (Eq.3.7) must 
hold with equality. Hence, the optimal monitoring rate *  solves Eq.3.10. Costs from 
treatment and monitoring must be recovered by revenues from water charges and fines 
(3.10)    fmpppcmc MFDT  **1*   .  
 
The analytical results from the model can be summarized as follows. First, Eq.3.9 
shows that high marginal benefits from monitoring yield a high optimal monitoring rate. 
Second, the budget constraint (Eq.3.7) shows how the monitoring rate determines budget 
balancing. Monitoring drives two elements in the budget constraint, monitoring costs and 
revenues from fines. Monitoring costs are zero for zero monitoring and increase linearly 
with the monitoring rate. Revenues from fines are zero for zero monitoring because no firm 
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is caught. As the monitoring rate increases revenues increase, reach a maximum and fall to 
zero for a monitoring rate of 1 because all firms comply. For small monitoring rates 
monitoring costs and revenues from fines are small. This generates only a moderate effect 
on the budget constraint. For medium monitoring rates revenues from fines are high. This 
favours budget balancing. For high monitoring rates revenues from fines are low while 
monitoring costs keep increasing, which renders budget balancing difficult. A third result is 
obtained from the budget constraint (Eq.3.7). Rewriting yields 
 ( ) / * 1 ( *)T D F Mc p p p m f c           . It appears that meeting the 
budget constraint would be easier for a larger number of firms (larger m ) provided  that 
*  is constant. The latter, however, does not hold since a change in the number of firms 
changes the optimal monitoring rate (Eq.3.9) which, in turn, changes revenues from fines. 
Hence, to be able to draw conclusions we need to establish two relations. The first is the 
relation between the number of firms and the optimal monitoring rate, *( )m . The 
second is the relation between the optimal monitoring rate and revenues from fines, 
 1 ( *) f   . Because the optimal monitoring rate cannot be determined explicitly 
without further specifications of the model, it is impossible to obtain more detailed insights. 
In order to make further progress in the analysis we employ a numerical example where we 
specify the relevant functions and parameters. We turn to this in the next section. 
 
3.4. The example of small scale leather processing 
 
In this section we illustrate our model with a numerical example about the leather 
processing industry in developing countries. An example from India is provided by 
Lefebvre et al. (2006) which motivates the general setting. Tannery wastewater is 
characterized by high salinity as salt is used to preserve the fresh skins from decomposition 
after they are stripped off the animal. The salt is removed in the tannery before further 
processing by soaking which generates a highly saline effluent. Pre-treatment is suggested 
before the effluent is blended with non-saline domestic wastewaters.  
 
We first stipulate parameters of the physical water flow. All parameter values that 
we introduce in the following are listed in the Appendix of this chapter for readers’ 
convenience. Water is characterized by the concentrations of nutrients, faecal coliform 
bacteria, and salinity,  SPNK ,, . We normalize concentrations to ranges between 
zero and one for minimal and maximal concentration, respectively. The concentration of 
nutrients, faecal coliform bacteria is one for domestic and industrial wastewater. The 
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salinity concentration is low in domestic and high in industrial wastewater. This 
specification helps to isolate the inhibition of the treatment process due to high salinity. 
Hence, domestic and industrial wastewater differ only in their salinity concentration and are 
characterized by  , , (1,1,0)D D D DN P Sq q q q   and  , , (1,1,1)R R R RN P Sq q q q  , 
respectively. We assume that the share of domestic wastewater to urban wastewater is 
75.0 . 
 
To specify the wastewater treatment process we assume that removal rates under 
optimal conditions of nutrients and faecal coliform bacteria are 80% and 90%, respectively. 
This implies ˆ 0.2N   and ˆ 0.1P  . Excess nutrient and pathogen concentration does 
not influence nutrient and pathogen removal, 0/  UNN q , 0/  UPN q , 
0/  UNP q , and 0/  UPP q . The technology does not remove salt. Hence, 
1ˆ S , and 0///  UPSUNSUSS qqq  . Excess salt, however, inhibits 
biological processes for nutrient and pathogen removal such that N  and P  increase with 
salt concentrations (Dincer and Kargi 1999 and 2001, Uygur and Kargi 2004). Formally 
this is reflected in the partial derivatives of the treatment function, 3/  USN q  and 
2/  USP q . Substituting these specifications in Eq.3.4 yields the concentration of 
individual pollutants in treated wastewater depending on compliance and ultimately on the 
monitoring rate. First notice that pre-treatment only reduces salinity. Therefore, 
1U UN Pq q   which is independent of compliance. Assuming linear treatment functions 
with slopes as defined above we have 0.2 3 ( )T U UN S Nq q q     and 
0.1 2 ( )T U UP S Pq q q    . Using Eq.3.1 we obtain 
(0.75 0.25 ) 0 0.25 (1 ) 1 0.25 0.25USq               for the salt 
concentration in untreated wastewater. Hence, concentrations of nutrients, faecal coliform 
bacteria, and salt are 0.95 0.75TNq    , 0.6 0.5TPq    , and 
 0.25 1TSq    , respectively.  
 
We now turn to the treatment and monitoring benefits. We have specified the 
treatment technology such that the treatment process breaks down only partially for a 
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compliance rate of zero. We have ( 0) 0.95TNq     and ( 0) 0.6TPq    . Hence, 
baseline treatment benefits are positive and we assume 9.0B . Next, we specify the 
monitoring benefits (Eq.3.5). We already specified how the compliance rate determines the 
pollutant concentration in treated wastewater. We now specify how the reduction of 
pollutant concentration in treated wastewater generates benefits. Two monitoring benefits 
are relevant when wastewater is reused in agriculture.10 The first captures how the removal 
of faecal coliform bacteria in wastewater reduces health costs to the local population. The 
affected local population comprises for example workers in wastewater irrigated agriculture 
and consumers of wastewater irrigated food (Gengenbach and Weikard, 2010a). We assume 
that full compliance brings about effective treatment, ˆ ( 1)TP Pq   , which reduces 
health costs to zero, 0PC . By contrast, without monitoring the compliance rate is zero 
and brings about the highest concentration of bacteria, ( 0)T TP Pq q   , which causes 
health costs of 0PC . For simplicity, we assume the relation between the concentration 
of coliform bacteria and health costs to be linear. Hence, health costs are 
   ˆ( ) ( ) /T T TP PP P P P PC C C q q q       . Monitoring benefits of reduced health 
costs are ( ) ( )PP PB C C    and consequently 
   ˆ( ) ( ) /T T TPP P P P PB C q q q      . For our base case we consider low health 
costs of 1.0PC . This resembles a setting where the risk of infection is low as in 
settings with low population density. With increasing density, however, the risk of infection 
and the related health costs grow. We run two additional numerical simulations with 
5.0PC , and 1PC . The second monitoring benefit captures how the removal of 
excess nutrients in wastewater generates benefits by increasing soil productivity (Magesan 
et al. 2000) and preventing negative effects on plant growth (Toze 2006). We capture this in 
a benefit function assuming the following. When the monitoring rate is zero, nutrient 
concentration is ( 0)T TN Nq q    for which costs of excess nutrient concentration are 
1NC . By contrast, a monitoring rate of one reduces the concentration to 
ˆ ( 1)TN Nq    for which costs are zero, 0NC . For simplicity, we assume the 
                                                 
10 There are, of course, other benefits. To illustrate qualitative results it is sufficient, however, to consider only one 
type of benefit for nutrient removal and pathogen removal.   
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relation between costs and the concentration of nutrients to be linear. Hence, costs are 
   ˆ( ) ( ) /T T TN N N N N N NC C C q q q        and monitoring benefits are  
    NNN CCB   and consequently     ˆ( ) ( ) /T T TN N N N NB q q q     . 
Total monitoring benefits are ( ) ( ) ( )P NB B B    .  
 
Finally, we stipulate the parameters of the agents in the game. We assume that the 
number of firms is 10m . Their pre-treatment costs Mc  are uniformly distributed in the 
interval  0, 1c c  . We assume that charges to households, farms and firms are zero, 
0 MFD ppp . We do so to identify the cases where costs can be recovered by 
revenues from fines alone. Note that charges can be positive in other settings. The fine per 
firm for not complying is 1f . Then, using Eq.3.3, the compliance rate is simply 
f   . The water utility faces treatment costs of, 1Tc . Monitoring costs are 
1.0c  per firm. 
 
First, we illustrate how the optimal monitoring rate depends on the monitoring 
benefits. We demonstrate this by varying health costs for zero monitoring, PC . Increasing 
this parameter increases the reduction of health costs by monitoring and therefore increases 
monitoring benefits. We run our numerical example for three parameter values representing 
small ( 1.0PC ), medium ( 5.0PC ) and high monitoring benefits ( 1PC ). Note 
that PC  does not appear in the budget constraint which makes the budget the same for all 
three values of PC . 
 
The numerical example illustrates our analytical result that the optimal monitoring 
rate increases with increasing monitoring benefits. Figure 3.1 shows that for 1.0PC , 
5.0PC , and 1PC  the optimal monitoring rates are 1.0*  , 5.0*  , and 
1*  , respectively. Furthermore, the figure shows an interesting result. Net benefits are 
negative for 1.0PC  even at the optimal monitoring rate 1.0*  . This means that the 
benefits of the treatment scheme will never cover its costs. In this case the treatment 
scheme does not increase welfare. When monitoring benefits increase, however, net 
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benefits of the treatment scheme become positive for the optimal monitoring rate. This case 
is illustrated for 5.0PC  with the optimal monitoring rate 5.0*  . As monitoring 
benefits increase further, the net benefits of the treatment scheme also increase further. Our 
example shows that for 1PC  the optimal monitoring rate is 1*   which implies full 
compliance.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Total benefits as a function of the monitoring rate,   , for three different 
health costs parameters: 1.0PC , 5.0PC , and 1PC . The corresponding optimal 
monitoring rates are indicated in the graph. 
 
We now illustrate the relation between monitoring benefits and budget recovery 
for which we could not obtain analytical results. Figure 3.2 shows the domain where the 
budget constraint is met which is in our case in the interval  0.13, 0.77   . The 
budget balance is positive generating a budget surplus for optimal monitoring rates 
77.0*13.0   . For 13.0*   and 77.0*   the budget is exactly balanced, and 
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for 13.0*   and 77.0*   the budget balance is negative generating a deficit. Hence, 
the water utility cannot recover its costs for both 1.0PC  with 1.0*  , and 1PC  
with 1*  . For 5.0PC  with 5.0*  , however, cost recovery is successful.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Budget surplus as a function of the monitoring rate. The optimal monitoring 
rates, * , for three different health costs parameters ( 1.0PC , 5.0PC , and 
1PC ) are indicated in the graph. 
 
These numerical results confirm the conjecture of the previous section. For small 
monitoring rates monitoring costs and revenues from fines are small. Their net effect is too 
small to recover fixed operation costs. For medium monitoring rates revenues from fines 
are high which enables the recovery of both monitoring and fixed treatment cost. For high 
monitoring rates monitoring costs increase, while revenues from fines decrease which 
renders cost recovery impossible. 
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Figure 3.3: Total benefits as a function of the monitoring rate, ( )  , for a 30% increase 
in firms for three different health costs parameters: 1.0PC , 5.0PC , and 1PC . 
The corresponding optimal monitoring rates are indicated in the graph. 
 
These results are sensitive to a change in the number of firms. An increase of the 
number of firms reduces the optimal monitoring rate. Hence,  0/*  m . Figure 3.3 
illustrates this for a 30% increase in number of firms where the optimal monitoring rate 
decreases to 0*  , 2.0*  , and 7.0*   (compared to 1.0*  , 5.0*  , 
and 1*  ) for low, medium and high health costs, respectively. On the one hand, a lower 
monitoring rate reduces the effectiveness of the treatment scheme. On the other hand, it 
facilitates cost recovery because the rates are now in the interval where revenues from fines 
are sufficiently large. This can be seen in figure 4. Costs can now be recovered for medium 
and high health costs ( 2.0*  , and 7.0*  ), not just for medium health cost 
( 5.0*  ) in the case with a smaller number of firms. Note that this is not a general 
result as it depends on parameters and distribution of pre-treatment costs.  
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Figure 3.4: Budget surplus as a function of the monitoring rate for a 30% increase of the 
number of firms. The optimal monitoring rates, * , for three different health costs 
parameters ( 1.0PC , 5.0PC , and 1PC ) are indicated in the graph. 
  
The following summarizes and discusses our four main findings from the 
numerical example. The first finding illustrates our analytical result that the optimal 
monitoring rate increases with monitoring benefits. Second, net benefits for low optimal 
monitoring rates are negative. Hence, the treatment scheme is worse than having no-
treatment. Equation 3.6 illustrates the intuition behind this result. For a low optimal 
monitoring rate baseline benefits plus variable benefits are too low to cover costs of pre-
treatment and treatment. One way to avoid this result is to apply a treatment technology that 
is more robust against deviations of pollution concentrations from target concentrations. 
Such a technology would, hence, be less dependent on the monitoring rate. Third, the 
results are sensitive to the number of firms. An increase in the number of firms reduces the 
optimal monitoring rate which facilitates cost recovery. The fourth result is most intriguing. 
For medium optimal monitoring rates fines alone can recover the costs of the treatment 
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scheme and even generate a surplus. This result is driven by the fact that revenues from 
fines reach their maximum for medium optimal monitoring rates. 
 
3.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This chapter offers insights for policy makers to improve urban wastewater treatment in 
developing countries. We develop a model to analyze how a regulator can set incentives to 
maximize net benefits in an urban wastewater treatment scheme and to recover its costs. 
We illustrate the model with a numerical example on small scale leather processing. The 
model is a ready to use tool for empirical calibration to provide quantitative output that can 
inform planners of urban wastewater treatment schemes. On the one hand, the model can be 
applied to improve the performance of an existing wastewater treatment and monitoring 
system by identifying the optimal monitoring rate. On the other hand, it can be applied to 
identify the best suited wastewater treatment technology when new treatment schemes are 
designed or existing treatment plants are upgraded. The model can be adapted easily to 
developed country settings.  
 
Our model is sufficiently general to make it applicable in many specific settings.  
The simplifying assumptions in the numerical example section are adopted for just 
illustrative purposes. Before drawing final conclusions we want to discuss three of the 
caveats and limitations of our study. The first concerns the general model. We assume that 
firms trade off pre-treatment costs against the expected value of fines when deciding 
whether to comply or not. While this makes the model simple, firms’ compliance behaviour 
might be more complex. Some studies have reported that firms overcomply with 
environmental regulation (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995, and Bandyopadhyay and 
Horowitz 2006). In such a case our model can be adapted in Eq. 3.3. The second and third 
caveat concern only the numerical example. Second, we assume that wastewater treatment 
generates value only by reducing health hazards and reducing production losses of farmers. 
While this is not a complete list of benefits, it is sufficient too illustrate the mechanisms in 
our numerical example. Any application of the model to a real case must aim at a 
comprehensive account of benefits and adapt Eq.3.5 accordingly. Benefits from reduced 
health hazards are particularly difficult to quantify because infections must be shown to be 
wastewater related and, moreover, the monetary costs per infection are difficult to pin down. 
Third, we assume that the water utility does not collect regular charges from households, 
firms and farmers to contribute to its cost recovery. This may seem to be in conflict with 
our assumption that fines can be collected from firms. However, the collection of charges 
from polluters, like households and firms, is often not very effective in developing 
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countries. Polluters are numerous and collecting a small charge from each polluter comes at 
high transaction costs reducing net charges to almost zero. Collecting fines from firms who 
are caught not complying with regulation will then be more efficient. Collecting charges for 
treated wastewater from farmers is equally difficult. They are often poor small scale 
farmers who are not capable of paying charges. Our numerical example illustrates therefore 
the special case where charges to polluters and reusers are zero. 
 
We start our conclusions by pointing out directions for future research. Our model 
analyzes the upstream part of the chain. Other studies analyze downstream parts of the 
chain. Feinerman, Plessner, and DiSegni Eshel (2001) for example analyze bargaining 
about treatment level and cost sharing between a wastewater producing city and wastewater 
using farmers. They model the city and farmers as players whereas we model strategic 
interaction within the city but do not give farmers a strategic role. Extending our model 
with farmers as players would be a further step to analyze strategic interaction of the entire 
water chain. Solving such a model by backward induction would provide an economic 
equivalent to the “Reversed Water Chain Approach” (Van Lier and Huibers 2007). 
 
We have shown that costs of a treatment scheme cannot be fully recovered by 
revenues from fines alone when the optimal monitoring rate is in the critical intervals at the 
lower or upper ends of its domain. We therefore conclude that for these cases full cost 
recovery depends on the ability to charge polluters and downstream users who benefit from 
improved water quality. Hence, the polluter pays principle that justifies charges to upstream 
polluters gains importance. Without polluter charges it is hardly possible to cover the costs 
of an effective treatment scheme, in particular when health costs are high and treatment 
matters most. 
 
We found that net benefits can be negative for low optimal monitoring rates. This 
result is driven by treatment costs and the value of treatment without monitoring. Net 
benefits are negative if the treatment costs are high and the baseline value of treatment 
without monitoring is low. We conclude that establishing cheap and robust options for 
wastewater treatment in developing countries is of utmost importance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
Appendix:  
 
Table 3.1A: List of symbols and parameter values 
Description Symbol Value(s) 
share of domestic wastewater   0.75 
set of pollutants  kK ,..,1   , ,K N P S  
domestic wastewater   DkDD qqq ,..,1  (1,1,0)Dq   
raw industrial wastewater  RkRR qqq ,..,1  (1,1,1)Rq   
urban wastewater  UkUU qqq ,..,1   
treated wastewater  TkTT qqq ,..,1   
treated wastewater of pollutant 
Ki   1 ,...,T U U Ui i k iq q q q    
treatment function for pollutant 
Ki   UkUi qq ,.,1   
minimum value of treatment 
function for pollutant Ki  iˆ  
ˆ 0.2N  , ˆ 0.1P   
and ˆ 0S   
compliance rate    
concentration of pollutant Ki  
in treated wastewater under full 
monitoring 
 1*   Tii q   
concentration of pollutant Ki  
in treated wastewater under zero 
monitoring 
 0 TiTi qq  
 
 
set of firms  mM ,..,1  10m   
firms’ individual pre-treatment 
costs 
Mc   uniformly distributed 
interval of pre-treatment costs [ , ]c c  [0,1]  
fine f  1 
baseline monitoring benefits B  0.9 
monitoring benefit function  B        NP BBB 
 
 59 
health costs under zero 
monitoring 
PC  1.0 , 5.0  and 1 
health costs under full monitoring 
PC  0  
costs of excess nutrients under 
zero monitoring N
C  1 
costs of excess nutrients under full 
monitoring N
C  0  
treatment costs 
Tc  1 
monitoring costs c  0.1 
wastewater charges to households 
Dp  0 
wastewater charges to farms 
Fp  0 
wastewater charges to firms 
Mp   0 
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Chapter 4 
 
Cleaning a river: An analysis of voluntary joint 
action* 
 
 
River pollution creates negative externalities to downstream water users. In this chapter we 
analyze how voluntary joint action of water users can improve pollution abatement when 
optimal treatment cannot be enforced. We model a transboundary pollution game with a 
unidirectional pollutant flow. Players are identical except for their location along the river. 
We find that, surprisingly, the location of coalition members has no impact on coalition 
stability. Location does, however, affect overall welfare. The more upstream the members 
of the coalition are, the higher is the overall welfare because the positive externalities of 
cleaning accrue to a larger number of downstream water users. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* This chapter is based on Gengenbach, Weikard and Ansink (2010) Natural Resource 
Modeling forthcoming. 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter we study a transboundary river pollution game. Players are cities who, 
depending on their individual incentives, form coalitions to enhance wastewater treatment. 
Our objective is to analyze coalition stability in this setting of unidirectional river pollution. 
 
River pollution is excessive in many developing countries due to the discharge of 
improperly treated wastewater. Scott, Faruqui and Raschid (2004) report that the share of 
urban wastewater which is treated to secondary level is zero for Africa, 35% for Asia, and 
14% for Latin America and the Caribbean. For upstream polluters, wastewater discharge is 
a cheap way of disposal. Downstream water users, on the other hand, suffer damages. 
While disposing wastewater cheaply is individually optimal, it is inefficient from a river 
basin perspective. Downstream damages are negative externalities which a polluter has to 
take into account when choosing an efficient treatment level. This would lead to additional 
upstream wastewater treatment which can be achieved in two ways. First, upstream 
polluters might be forced by a regulating authority to apply optimal treatment. Enforcing 
optimal treatment is justified by the polluter pays principle which is applied in many 
developed countries. The second way to increase wastewater treatment is voluntary joint 
action between the polluters. Hophmayer-Tokich and Kliot (2008), for example, present 
two case studies from Israel where municipalities who suffer from water pollution initiated 
cooperation on wastewater treatment with upstream polluters. Since in many developing 
countries authorities cannot enforce optimal treatment, voluntary joint action seems to be a 
realistic alternative to organize wastewater treatment in many river basins. 
 
Voluntary joint action yields the welfare optimum only if all cities participate. This 
is rather straightforward in a setting with two cities that can bargain to solve the externality 
problem (Mäler, 1990). Obtaining the welfare optimum becomes difficult, however, in a 
setting with more than two cities. Some cities may decide to free-ride on upstream 
treatment which is a positive externality to them. Consequently, cities only cooperate when 
the benefits of voluntary joint action are higher than the benefits from free-riding. Both 
types of benefits depend on the other cities’ decision to cooperate. Hence, we can analyze 
voluntary joint action in wastewater treatment as a transboundary pollution game.  
 
Mäler (1989) introduced this type of game for the case of acidification in Europe. 
In his “acid rain game” a supra-national authority to regulate pollution is missing. Players 
of the game are countries who choose their emission levels in reaction to the choice of the 
emission levels of all other countries. The resulting Nash equilibrium yields the highest 
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payoff for players in the absence of cooperation and serves therefore as a benchmark for 
analyzing coalitions in such games. Folmer and von Mouche (2000) generalized this game 
to a transboundary pollution game. They present analytical results for different assumptions 
about cost functions, damage functions and the pollution transportation matrix. They 
compare the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium with full cooperation outcomes. Partial 
cooperation and the incentives for voluntary joint action, however, are not considered. 
 
In a related strand of literature the stability and formation of international 
environmental agreements (IEA) has been studied, mainly in the context of a uniformly 
mixing pollutant where abatement is a pure public good. With few exceptions this literature 
has applied and adapted models of cartel formation prominent in the literature on industrial 
organization (cf. d’Aspremont et al., 1983). The stability of coalitions is analyzed by 
assessing internal stability (no coalition member has an incentive to leave the coalition), 
and external stability (no singleton has an incentive to join the coalition). Hoel (1992), 
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994a) were the first to use this approach for the 
analysis of international environmental agreements. A common result is that there is a wide 
range of possible voluntary coalitions to control emissions. While full cooperation is stable 
when the number of players or the gains of cooperation are small, partial cooperation 
emerges for a larger number of players and if gains from cooperation are large. Carraro and 
Siniscalco (1993) point out that the number of members in a stable coalition increases when 
welfare transfers or side payments are introduced. 
 
We apply the coalition stability concept to a transboundary river pollution setting, 
thereby combining the transboundary pollution game with the international environmental 
agreements literature. The transportation matrix in our game is an upper-triangular matrix, 
as pollution can only be transported downstream. The game setting is as follows. Each city 
uses water from the river and discharges emissions into the river which causes damages to 
itself and all downstream cities. Each city can abate emissions by, for example, wastewater 
treatment which generates benefits to itself and all downstream cities by reducing damages. 
Emission abatement is costly, however, which makes cities trade off abatement benefits 
against abatement costs when choosing their optimal abatement levels. Since a regulating 
authority is missing, we assume as a benchmark that cities choose their abatement level 
maximizing their own net benefits as singletons without taking benefits of downstream 
cities into account. This defines the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. We then introduce 
cooperation in form of a coalition. Cities in the coalition choose their abatement level to 
maximize coalition benefits which are the sum of the net benefits of all member cities. 
Hence, members do take abatement benefits of downstream coalition members into account. 
Coalition members distribute the coalition payoff in order to stabilize the coalition. We 
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adopt the common assumption in the IEA literature that cities are identical with respect to 
their benefits and costs of pollution abatement. Particularly, we assume that cities have the 
same linear abatement benefit function and the same strictly convex abatement cost 
function. These assumptions enable us to analytically derive conditions for cooperation and 
coalition stability, and illustrate further insights with a numerical example. But note that in 
our river-basin setting the assumption of identical players is relaxed as cities differ in 
location. 
 
The existing literature on transboundary pollution in a river basin setting has 
mainly focused on two-player settings, which is fair given that 176 out of 261 international 
river basins are shared by only two states (Wolf 1999). Examples are Mäler (1990), Barrett 
(1994b), Fernandez (2002), and Dinar (2006). Recently, Fernandez (2009) has analyzed 
water pollution in the Tijuana River, shared by Mexico and the US, using differential game 
theory and applying various cooperative solution concepts. Not much work has been done, 
however, on the multi-player river basin setting. A notable exception is the work by Ni and 
Wang (2007) who apply principles from international water law to determine a cooperative 
sharing rule for the costs of cleaning a river. These two main principles are unlimited 
territorial integrity, which says that every player has the right to all river water within and 
upstream of his territory, and unlimited territorial sovereignty, which says that every player 
has exclusive rights to use the water on his territory (Salman, 2007). In this chapter we do 
not impose such principles, but rather assume that each city maximizes its own payoff or 
coalition payoff as discussed above. 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in two domains. First, we add to the 
literature on transboundary river pollution games by analyzing a multi-player setting. This 
literature has largely focused on two player games which can be solved by bargaining 
approaches. Second, we add to the literature on international environmental agreements. 
This literature has largely focused on uniformly mixing pollutants where the abatement of 
one player is a public good for all others and the pollution stock is the same for all players. 
Our case, however, is characterized by unidirectional pollution flow where abatement is a 
public good for downstream players only and the emission stock varies between players 
unless all upstream players choose full abatement. Hence, a player’s location matters in our 
game, which distinguishes our work from the literature on international environmental 
agreements. 
 
We find for interior solutions that all coalitions of a certain size are stable. Hence, 
location has, surprisingly, no impact on coalition stability in the river basin. Location does, 
however, affect overall welfare. The more upstream the members of the coalition are, the 
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higher is the overall welfare because downstream singletons benefit from upstream 
coalition abatement. The welfare maximizing stable coalition is therefore obtained when 
the coalition consists of the most upstream players. In the standard public goods game, on 
the other hand, only the number of players determines welfare. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the game. Section 
4.3 presents two benchmarks: all singletons and full cooperation. Section 4.4 presents 
analytical results of the coalition game. Section 4.5 presents a numerical example. Section 
4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 The model 
 
Cities along a river 
Let  1, 2, ,N n   be a finite ordered set of cities along a river with 3n  . City 1 is 
the most upstream and n  is the most downstream city. In general, Ni  is upstream of 
Nj  if and only if ji  . In absence of any abatement policies, each city Ni  
generates ie  units of emissions. These emissions are exogenous to the model and reflect a 
“business as usual” scenario. A city can reduce its emissions by choosing an abatement of 
ia  units11. Its net emissions into the river are then ii ae  . The pollution stock ie  of 
Ni  is the sum of its own and all upstream cities’ net emissions, 
   1
1
,...,
i
i i h h
h
e a a e a

  . We allow for the possibility that city 1 faces an already 
polluted river due to upstream pollution (by, for instance, an upstream country in the case 
of an international river).  
 
Each city Ni  suffers damages from its pollution stock, given by the linear 
damage function  i i i iD e d e  with 0id  . This linearity assumption, common in the 
IEA literature, eases the exposition and allows closed-form solutions to our model. Since 
abatement reduces the pollution stock, and thereby damages, it generates benefits. We 
define abatement benefits as damages before abatement minus damages after abatement: 
                                                 
11 For consistency of the terminology with the literature on environmental agreements we choose abatement, rather 
than emissions, as the choice variable of the players. 
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       1
1 1 1
,...,
i i i
i i i h i h h i h
h h h
B a a D e D e a d a
  
                . The fact that city 
i ’s benefits depend only on its own and upstream abatement captures the positive 
unidirectional externality in this game. The marginal benefit due to (upstream) abatement 
by ij   equals  
1
( ) /
i
i j i h h j i
h
B a D e a a d

         . Abatement costs are given 
by the strictly convex cost function  ii aC  with   00 iC , 0iC , and 0iC . 
City i ’s net benefits are abatement benefits minus abatement costs: 
   1,...,i i i iB a a C a . 
 
The coalition game 
We model cooperation as a two-stage coalition game like in the IEA literature. At the first 
stage each city Ni  chooses to become a member of the coalition. Its choice to become a 
member is denoted by 1i   while its choice to be a singleton is denoted by 0i  . The 
combined choices of all cities yields the coalition structure which is captured in the vector 
1( ,..., ) ( )n i i N    σ . Note that for n  cities there are nn 2  possible coalition 
structures. Each coalition structure induces a unique set of S N  cities that form the 
coalition. At the second stage coalition members and singletons choose their abatement 
levels to maximize coalition payoff and individual singleton payoffs, respectively. For 
interior solutions (see assumption 4.2, below), the first order condition for coalition 
members Si  is (see Appendix 4.1): 
(4.1) 
;
( )k i i
k S k i
d C a
 
 .  
Each coalition member equates its individual marginal abatement costs with the sum of its 
own marginal abatement benefits and the marginal benefits of downstream members. The 
first order condition for a singleton city Si  is (see Appendix 4.2): 
(4.2) ( )i i id C a  .  
Each singleton equates its individual marginal abatement costs with its individual marginal 
abatement benefits. 
 
Since the coalition structure defines whether a city is a coalition member or a 
singleton and since members and singletons have different first order conditions, each 
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coalition structure gives rise to a unique system of first order conditions. The solution to 
each of these systems of equations is a unique vector of abatements of all cities, 
( )S Si i Na a . The pollution stocks vector,  S Si i Ne e  follows with 
   
1
i
S S S
i h h
h
e e a

 a . Note that the coalition structure determines the abatement 
levels and the abatement levels determine each city’s payoff. We, therefore, obtain a 
partition function ( )v S  which assigns for each coalition S the coalition payoff 
      


Si
S
i
S
S aCBSv a  and to each singleton Sj  the singleton payoff 
     SjSj aCBSv  a . While the coalition payoff and the singleton payoffs are 
precisely determined by the partition function, a coalition is free to choose a sharing rule on 
how to distribute the coalition payoff among its members. This crucially determines 
coalition stability.  
 
In order to analyze coalition stability we employ the stability concept introduced 
by d’Aspremont et al. (1983) who decomposed stability (i.e. Nash equilibrium of the 
coalition formation game) into internal and external stability. Coalition S  is internally 
stable if no member wants to leave the coalition because its member payoff is weakly larger 
than its outside option payoff:     ,i i iv S v S i S   . Individual payoffs of members 
are determined by the coalition’s sharing rule. Following Weikard (2009) we assume that 
the sharing rule satisfies the Claim Rights Condition. The Claim Rights Condition says that 
if the coalition payoff is large enough to satisfy the ‘claims’ (outside option payoffs) of 
each member then the coalition applies a sharing rule which does so. Consequently, the 
coalition is internally stable if it applies a sharing rule that satisfies the Claim Rights 
Condition. Using the partition function it is then sufficient to check internal stability by 
calculating whether the coalition payoff is at least as large as the sum of the outside option 
payoffs: ( ) ( )S i i
i S
v S v S

 . 
 
Coalition S  is externally stable if no singleton j wants to enter the coalition 
because its singleton payoff is weakly larger than its member payoff when j would enter the 
coalition:    j j jv S v S j S   . This holds if there does not exist a coalition jS  
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( j S ) that is internally stable:     ,i j i j i jv S v S i S       (cf. Weikard 2009, 
Lemma 1). Consequently, coalitions ,jS j S    are internally unstable because coalition 
jS cannot guarantee j ’s outside option payoff and all singletons Sj  prefer to stay out 
of S . Using the partition function we can check external stability of S by checking that 
jS  is internally unstable for all  j S . 
 
Note that it is not necessary to know the precise sharing rule for analyzing the 
stability of coalition S . It is sufficient to know whether the coalition payoff exceeds the 
sum of the outside option payoffs of all members and given the Claim Rights Condition 
applies. 
 
To finish the description of the model, we introduce two assumptions, the first of 
which introduces a restriction on the characteristics of the cities. This restriction allows us 
to focus our attention on the effects of the river basin setting: 
Assumption 4.1.  Cities are identical with respect to everything but location: 
   i i iD e D e  with id d ,     i i iC a C a , and ie e  for all Ni . 
The second assumption concerns the type of solutions that we are interested in: 
Assumption 4.2.  We consider only interior solutions:  eeCd Sii
ikSk
k  

 1
;
  for all 
S N . 
Assumption 4.2 states that marginal damages of a city12 plus marginal damages of all 
downstream members in its coalition are smaller than the marginal abatement costs that it 
faces if it were to clean the river completely. This implies that its abatement is less than its 
pollution stock in the river, eea Si
S
i  1  and thereby assures that no city has an 
incentive to clean the river completely. This is a common scenario in many cases, 
particularly in developing countries, where even joint action in wastewater treatment aims 
at abating only some fraction of the overall emissions. Still, in section 4.5 we will drop this 
assumption to illustrate the structure of stable coalitions when one city cleans the river 
entirely - a case more likely to apply to developed countries.  
 
                                                 
12 This holds for members of a coalition as well as for singletons because any singleton can be considered one-
member coalition. 
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Before we analyze stability in section 4.4, we determine the abatement vector and 
payoffs of two benchmark situations, following Folmer and von Mouche (2000): first the 
Nash equilibrium for all-singletons, and then the fully cooperative solution. Then we 
analyze which coalitions are stable and how their payoffs compare to these benchmarks. 
 
4.3 Two benchmark situations 
 
Non-cooperation benchmark 
When all cities act as singletons, each city only takes into account its own damage in 
choosing its abatement level. The coalition structure is (0,...,0) S  σ  and 
equation (4.2) applies to all cities. Note that the LHS of equation (4.2) is a constant and 
because of assumption 4.1 it is also equal for all i N . Hence, the abatement level chosen 
by i  is insensitive to other cities’ abatement levels: each city has a dominant strategy. It 
follows that there exists a unique strictly dominant equilibrium (Folmer and von Mouche, 
2000, proposition 2) which we call the non-cooperation Nash equilibrium. The non-
cooperation abatement levels  i i Na  a  of this equilibrium determine the non-
cooperation pollution stock  i i Ne  e . The non-cooperation Nash equilibrium has two 
properties as summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4.1.  In the non-cooperation Nash equilibrium, individual abatement is equal 
for all cities: ia a e i N
     ,  and the pollution stock increases linearly 
downstream:  1 \i ie e e a i N n        . 
Proof.  Given assumption 4.1, the only difference between the cities’ abatement decisions is 
due to their location. Because each city has a dominant strategy the equilibrium abatement 
level of each city i  is insensitive to other cities’ abatement levels and therefore insensitive 
to the pollution stock ie
 . Therefore, using equation (4.2), the abatement decision of each 
city is equal and we have ia a i N
    . By assumption 4.2 we have 1 1a a e   , 
and by assumption 4.1 this can be generalized to a e  . The second part of the 
proposition follows directly. ■ 
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The presence of dominant strategies is a driving feature of our model. It assures 
that equilibrium abatement does not depend on the pollution stock. Given identical cities 
this implies that pollution increases downstream. 
 
Full cooperation benchmark 
In the full cooperation case, each city takes into account its own damage and damages to all 
downstream cities when choosing its abatement level. The coalition structure is the grand 
coalition, (1,...,1) S N  σ , and equation (4.1) applies to all cities. Again, note that 
the LHS of equation (4.1) is a constant, reflecting the sum of marginal damages of all 
downstream cities. In contrast to the non-cooperation benchmark, however, it is not equal 
for all cities, because each city now takes into account the effect of its abatement on the 
downstream cities. Solving for the optimum gives a unique solution which we call the full 
cooperation solution. The full cooperation abatement levels   NiNiN a a  determine the 
full cooperation pollution stock  N Ni i Ne e . The full cooperation solution has two 
properties as summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 4.2.  In the full cooperation solution, individual abatement decreases 
downstream:  1 \N Ni ia a i N n   , and the pollution stock increases at an increasing 
rate downstream:  1 2 1 \ , 1N N N Ni i i ie e e e i N n n        . 
 
Proof.  Each city takes into account the avoided marginal damage to all downstream cities 
including itself due to its abatement, see equation (4.1). Given assumption 4.1, any 
difference between Nia  and ,
N
ja j i  is due to this difference in marginal damage, which 
is entirely driven by the location of i  and j . Hence, city 1j i   takes the marginal 
damage of one city less into account, so that N Ni ja a . The second part of the proposition 
follows directly from the strict convexity of ( )iC a . ■ 
 
Other things equal, abatement by city i  is more efficient than abatement by city 
1i   because it brings about benefits to one additional city. This is the reason why 
abatement is decreasing downstream in the full cooperation benchmark, while this is not the 
case in the non-cooperation benchmark. 
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4.4 Coalition game 
 
There is no evident reason why either the non-cooperation or the full cooperation 
benchmark would be an equilibrium of the game. Cities might want to deviate from non-
cooperation because of cooperation gains and from full cooperation because of free-rider 
incentives. We therefore now turn to analyze which coalitions are stable based on 
individual payoffs applying the stability concept introduced in section 4.2. As discussed in 
that section, a city will join the coalition when its payoff as a member is higher than its 
payoff as a singleton. As a singleton, a city chooses its optimal abatement level by equating 
its marginal abatement benefits and its marginal abatement costs according to equation 
(4.2). As a coalition member, a city chooses its optimal abatement level by equating its 
marginal abatement benefits plus the sum of its downstream coalition members’ marginal 
abatement benefits with its marginal abatement costs according to equation (4.1). Whether 
it is preferable to be a member or a singleton depends on cost and benefit functions and the 
city’s location. We present some general results related to location in this section and 
illustrate these in section 4.5. 
 
Proposition 4.3. Individual abatement by singletons is equal for each city: 
S S
ja a j S   . 
 
Proof:  The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 4.1. Given assumption 4.1, the only 
difference between the singletons’ abatement decisions is due to their location. Because 
each city has a dominant strategy the equilibrium abatement level of each singleton j S  
is insensitive to other cities’ abatement levels and therefore insensitive to the pollution 
stock Sje . Therefore, using equation (4.2), the abatement decision of each city is equal and 
we have ,S Sja a j S   . ■ 
 
The result provided by proposition 4.3 is useful in analyzing the stability of any 
coalition structure. Specifically, it clarifies that leakage does not play a role in the current 
game setting. Leakage occurs when singletons react on upstream abatement by reducing 
own abatement. In general, leakage is important for coalition stability because it can 
destabilize coalitions. Due to dominant strategies, however, this leakage effect does not 
play a role in our game.  
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Proposition 4.4.  Individual abatement by coalition members decreases downstream: 
, ,S Si ja a i j S     with i j  . 
 
Proof.  The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 4.2. Each city takes into account the 
avoided marginal damage of all downstream coalition members including itself due to its 
abatement, see equation (4.1). Given assumption 4.1, any difference between Sia  and 
S
ja  
for , ,i j S i j   is due to this difference in marginal damage, which is entirely driven 
by the location of i  and j . Hence, for ,i j S  and j  downstream of i , we have that the 
marginal damage of at least one city less is taken into account, so that S Si ja a . ■ 
 
It is possible to relate abatement levels of coalition members to those of singletons as 
follows. 
 
Proposition 4.5.  Individual abatement by coalition members is strictly higher than 
individual abatement by singletons, except for the individual abatement by the most 
downstream coalition member which is equal to individual abatement by singletons: for 
,k S and k l l S     and j S , we have , \{ }S Si ja a i S k    and S Sk ja a . 
 
Proof: By proposition 4.4, the most downstream coalition member k i i S    has the 
lowest abatement level of all coalition members. Its abatement level Ska  is determined by 
equation (4.1), but because k  has no downstream coalition members, equation (4.1) 
reduces to equation (4.2). Hence, we have S Sk ja a  for j S  and 
\{ }S Si ja a i S k    follows by proposition 4.4.  ■ 
 
Hence, except for the most downstream coalition member, every coalition member 
abates strictly more than every singleton. This implies that the larger the coalition, the 
higher is total abatement. A larger coalition does not only allocate abatement more 
efficiently but also provides more abatement because more externalities are internalized. 
Propositions 4.3 to 4.5 allow us to derive some results on the size of stable coalitions. 
Proposition 4.6.  If some coalition S  is stable, then every coalition S   of size S S   
is stable. 
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Proof: We prove the proposition by demonstrating that the location of coalition members 
along the river does not affect internal nor external stability. The stable coalition S  
contains S  cities. We order the S  coalition members according to their location, and 
denote city i  being in position  by , ( )i  , so that city , (1)i  denotes city i  in the most 
upstream position of the coalition and , ( )i S  denotes city i  in the most downstream 
position of all coalition members. By proposition 4.3, singletons’ abatement levels are not 
affected by the location of the coalition members along the river: ,S Sja a j S  . By 
proposition 4.5, the same holds for coalition members’ abatement levels: 
,(1) ,(2) ,( )
S S S
i i i Sa a a   . Now consider a stable coalition S . Consider two adjacent 
cities, one of which is a coalition member and the other is not. Without loss of generality, 
let city i S  be the singleton and city 1j i S    the coalition member.  
 
The next step of our proof is to show that if i  and j  swap their membership 
status (i.e. i S   and j S  ) so that a new coalition S   is formed, then coalition S   is 
stable. Note that this swap does not affect the optimal abatement levels of any city which is 
located upstream of i  and downstream of j  because their optimal abatement conditions do 
not change. All singletons have the same condition (equation (4.2)) while the condition for 
members (equation (4.1)) does not change since the coalition structure stays the same. The 
membership swap does, however, change the optimal abatement condition of i  and j . In 
the new coalition structure S   i  becomes a member and optimizes according to equation 
(4.1) while j  becomes a singleton and optimizes according to equation (4.2). This 
membership swap does not, however, change the coalition structure in the sense that all 
members in S S   retain their position. The new member at location i  is at position  in 
the coalition which generates the same optimal abatement as if it were a member at location 
j  at position  as in the original coalition S . Hence, the membership swap merely swaps 
abatements of i  and j  in the abatement vector which yields an abatement vector 
  NiSiS a  a  given by S Si ja a  , S Sj ia a   and , \{ , }S Sk ka a k N i j    . As the 
membership swap has only an effect on i  and j , the new coalition S   is internally and 
externally stable for cities \{ , }k N i j  . Consequently it is sufficient to check internal 
and external stability related to i  and j  in order to analyze whether the membership swap 
generates a stable coalition S  . 
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Internal stability: Recall that internal stability of S   requires 
    ,i i iv S v S i S     . The membership swap can be interpreted as one coalition 
member moving one place upstream. This induces an increase in coalition payoff 
    0S Sv S v S     because city i’s payoff increases as its pollution stock decreases by 
one singleton’s emissions. Its outside option payoff  i iv S  also increases for the same 
reason by exactly the same amount. Considering that S  is internally stable and the 
coalition payoff of  S   increases by the same amount as i’s outside option, it follows that 
the coalition payoff of S   is larger or equal to the sum of outside options of its members. 
Therfore, S   is internally stable. 
 
External stability: Recall that external stability of S   requires 
   j j jv S v S j S     . Because S  is externally stable, iS  is not internally stable 
(Weikard, 2009, lemma 1). Because of the membership swap, coalition jS  is equivalent 
to coalition iS , so that jS  is not internally stable. The converse relation between 
external and internal stability also holds: if jS  is not internally stable, then S   is 
externally stable. 
 
The inductive step is to show that this is true for any two arbitrary coalitions S  and S   
with the same size S S  . This follows directly from the transitivity of the order of 
cities. ■ 
 
To link our paper with one of the workhorse specifications in public goods games, we 
introduce one additional assumption on the abatement cost function: 
Assumption 4.3. Quadratic costs: 2
1( )
2i i
C a ca . 
Barrett (1994a) showed that in a public good game with identical players under a linear 
benefits – quadratic costs specification, only coalitions with three players are stable. 
Although, in principle, location matters, the same result holds here as shown in the 
following proposition: 
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Proposition 4.7. With quadratic costs, a coalition is stable if and only if it has size 3S  . 
Proof: See Appendix 4.3.■ 
 
Proposition 4.6 tells us that if some coalition of size S  is stable, then all 
coalitions of this size are stable. Hence, the location of cities has little impact on coalition 
stability in the river basin. This shows that coalition formation in river basins is indeed 
similar to coalition formation in the standard public goods games with symmetric players 
(cf. Barrett, 1994a), as demonstrated by proposition 4.7. In the next section we employ a 
numerical example to further illustrate our case. 
 
4.5 Numerical example 
 
In this section we employ a numerical example in order to illustrate some features of our 
model. First, we illustrate propositions 4.6 and 4.7, the two main analytical results. Second, 
we relax the interior solution condition (assumption 4.2) in order to give some intuition on 
the mechanisms at work in the case of corner solutions. The numerical example is 
programmed in Matlab and works in two steps. First, it calculates the cities’ optimal 
abatements and resulting payoffs for every possible coalition structure σ  by solving the 
corresponding system of first-order-conditions. Second, it checks the stability of each 
coalition. Note that if the coalition payoff is larger than the sum of the outside options—
generating a coalition surplus—the coalition chooses a sharing rule that distributes this 
excess equally among the coalition members. 
 
The parameters that need to be specified are number of cities n , their emissions 
e , their marginal damages d , and cost function parameters c  and   of the strictly 
convex abatement cost function   1
2i i
C a ca . The condition to obtain an interior 
solution is given by   111
2 i
S d c a         where S  is the number of coalition 
members and   is the position of city i  in the coalition. The interior solution condition is 
strictest for the first member in the grand coalition, when 1i , S n , and 1 . 
Obviously, for the linear benefits - quadratic costs case ( 2  ) the requirement posed by 
the interior solution condition is weaker because the only stable coalition size is 3S   
(see proposition 4.7). 
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Table 4.1: Stability of coalitions if the interior solution conditions hold and abatement costs 
are quadratic. Coalition structure σ , size of coalition S , internal stability (ISt), external 
stability (ESt), stability (St), total welfare (TW), and individual payoffs for all cities (P1-P5) 
for parameter values 5n , 1e , 25.0d , 1c , and 2 . Stable coalitions are 
shown in bold. We use a sharing rule that distributes any coalition surplus equally among 
members. 
# σ  
S
 
I 
St 
E 
St St TW P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
1 (0,0,0,0,0) 1 1   0.78 0.031 0.094 0.156 0.219 0.281 
2 (1,1,0,0,0) 2 1   1.00 0.047 0.109 0.219 0.281 0.344 
3 (1,0,1,0,0) 2 1   1.00 0.047 0.156 0.172 0.281 0.344 
4 (1,0,0,1,0) 2 1   1.00 0.047 0.156 0.219 0.234 0.344 
5 (1,0,0,0,1) 2 1   1.00 0.047 0.156 0.219 0.281 0.297 
6 (0,1,1,0,0) 2 1   0.94 0.031 0.109 0.172 0.281 0.344 
7 (0,1,0,1,0) 2 1   0.94 0.031 0.109 0.219 0.234 0.344 
8 (0,1,0,0,1) 2 1   0.94 0.031 0.109 0.219 0.281 0.297 
9 (0,0,1,1,0) 2 1   0.88 0.031 0.094 0.172 0.234 0.344 
10 (0,0,1,0,1) 2 1   0.88 0.031 0.094 0.172 0.281 0.297 
11 (0,0,0,1,1) 2 1   0.81 0.031 0.094 0.156 0.234 0.297 
12 (1,1,1,0,0) 3 1 1 1 1.31 0.042 0.167 0.229 0.406 0.469 
13 (1,1,0,1,0) 3 1 1 1 1.31 0.042 0.167 0.344 0.292 0.469 
14 (1,1,0,0,1) 3 1 1 1 1.31 0.042 0.167 0.344 0.406 0.354 
15 (1,0,1,1,0) 3 1 1 1 1.25 0.042 0.219 0.229 0.292 0.469 
16 (1,0,1,0,1) 3 1 1 1 1.25 0.042 0.219 0.229 0.406 0.354 
17 (1,0,0,1,1) 3 1 1 1 1.19 0.042 0.219 0.281 0.292 0.354 
18 (0,1,1,1,0) 3 1 1 1 1.13 0.031 0.104 0.229 0.292 0.469 
19 (0,1,1,0,1) 3 1 1 1 1.13 0.031 0.104 0.229 0.406 0.354 
20 (0,1,0,1,1) 3 1 1 1 1.06 0.031 0.104 0.281 0.292 0.354 
21 (0,0,1,1,1) 3 1 1 1 0.94 0.031 0.094 0.167 0.292 0.354 
22 (1,1,1,1,0) 4  1  1.59 0.016 0.203 0.328 0.391 0.656 
23 (1,1,1,0,1) 4  1  1.59 0.016 0.203 0.328 0.594 0.453 
24 (1,1,0,1,1) 4  1  1.53 0.016 0.203 0.469 0.391 0.453 
25 (1,0,1,1,1) 4  1  1.41 0.016 0.281 0.266 0.391 0.453 
26 (0,1,1,1,1) 4  1  1.22 0.031 0.078 0.266 0.391 0.453 
27 (1,1,1,1,1) 5  1  1.69 -0.03813 0.213 0.400 0.525 0.588 
 
                                                 
13 Note that the payoff to city 1 in the grand coalition (# 27) is negative. This is a result of the excess coalition 
payoff being distributed equally among the coalition members. An alternative distribution rule would solve this. 
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In table 4.1 we demonstrate the stability of coalitions for the case where 5n , 
1e , 25.0d , 1c , and 2 . Because of the quadratic cost function ( 2  ), 
we know that 3S   and it can be verified that the condition for interior solutions holds 
( 175.0  ). Table 1 illustrates three features. First, all coalitions with the same number of 
members are stable (proposition 4.6). Stability is indicated by “1” in the “Stab” column and 
is the result of the coalitions being both internally and externally stable (stable coalitions 
are presented in bold). All other coalitions are not stable. Coalitions with less than three 
members are internally stable but externally unstable. While no member wants to leave the 
coalition, at least one singleton wants to join. Coalitions with more than three members are 
externally stable but not internally stable. While no singleton wants to enter the coalition, at 
least one member wants to leave. 
 
Second, in the quadratic abatement cost case, stable coalitions have three members 
(# 12-21 in table 4.1, see proposition 4.7). To further illustrate the stability of coalitions, we 
highlight the individual incentives of cities to deviate (members leave and singletons join 
the coalition) from a stable coalition. Consider coalition # 12 (1,1,1,0,0). Individual payoffs 
are given in the last 5 columns. If city 1, 2, or 3 (members) leaves the coalition, the new 
coalition structure is # 2, 3, or 6, respectively. The individual payoff of the deviant is shown 
shaded in the table. One can see that for each member the payoff in the new coalition is 
lower than the payoff in the original coalition (# 12). The same happens for singletons. If 
cities 4 or 5 (as singletons) enter the coalition, the new coalition structure is # 22 or 23, 
respectively, and a similar observation regarding payoffs can be made. 
 
Third, table 4.1 illustrates two effects of the coalition structure on total welfare. 
First, total welfare increases when more cities are in the coalition. This is a common finding 
in public good games. Second, total welfare increases when coalition members are located 
more upstream for a given coalition size. This result is intuitive since the more upstream 
coalition abatement is conducted the more cities benefit from it. 
 
We now proceed to illustrate proposition 4.6 by changing the convexity of the 
abatement cost function using different values for  . We only consider 1  which 
yields linearity for 1  and convexity otherwise. It can be verified that the condition for 
internal solutions holds for these values. Table 4.2 shows the size of stable coalitions for 
intervals of  . All simulations for 22.1  yield a stable coalition size of 3. Lower 
values of  , implying less convexity, increase the size of stable coalitions. Switching 
points occur at 22.1 , below which the size of stable coalitions increases to 4, and 
 78 
11.1 , below which the size of stable coalitions increases to 5 (grand coalition). For 
1  the grand coalition is stable. This solution is, however, trivial. Not even the first city 
abates any emissions because marginal abatement costs are too high relative to the sum of 
the members’ abatement benefits. 
 
Table 4.2: Size of stable coalitions depending on the exponent of the abatement cost 
function for parameter values 5n , 1e , 0.09d  , and 1c . 
  Size S  of stable coalitions  
22.1  3 
11.122.1    4 
111.1    5 
 
To finish this section we now present a case that violates the interior solution 
condition (assumption 4.2) in order to present corner solutions and discuss their impact on 
the size of stable coalitions. We use parameter values 5n  ,  1e , 59.0d , 1c , 
and 2 , so that the condition for interior solutions is violated for the most upstream 
coalition member. Table 4.3 illustrates two features. First, the table shows the co-existence 
of stable coalitions of different sizes, namely 3S   and 4S  .  This co-existence 
result is a standard feature that occurs for a wide range of parameter values. Second, there 
may exist cities that clean up all pollution in the river. Consider, for instance, the abatement 
vector of coalition structure # 25, where only city 2 is a singleton. This vector is 
 (1,0,1,1,1) 1.00, 0.59,1.41,1.00, 0.59 σa . The first coalition member, city 1, abates 
all its emissions. The following city, a singleton, abates less than its emissions. The 
subsequent city, a member, cleans the river entirely, abating its own emissions and cleaning 
the emissions of the upstream singleton. 
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Table 4.3: Stability of coalitions if the interior solution condition does not hold. Coalition 
structure σ , size of coalition S , internal stability (ISt), external stability (ESt), stability 
(St), total welfare (TW), and individual payoffs for all cities (P1-P5) for parameter values 
5n , 1e , 59.0d , 1c , and 2 . Stable coalitions are shown in bold. 
# σ  S  
I 
St 
E
St St TW P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 
1 (0,0,0,0,0) 1 1  4.35 0.174 0.522 0.870 1.218 1.566 
2 (1,1,0,0,0) 2 1  5.23 0.253 0.601 1.112 1.460 1.808 
3 (1,0,1,0,0) 2 1  5.23 0.253 0.764 0.949 1.460 1.808 
4 (1,0,0,1,0) 2 1  5.23 0.253 0.764 1.112 1.297 1.808 
5 (1,0,0,0,1) 2 1  5.23 0.253 0.764 1.112 1.460 1.645 
6 (0,1,1,0,0) 2 1  5.22 0.174 0.609 0.957 1.566 1.915 
7 (0,1,0,1,0) 2 1  5.22 0.174 0.609 1.218 1.305 1.915 
8 (0,1,0,0,1) 2 1  5.22 0.174 0.609 1.218 1.566 1.653 
9 (0,0,1,1,0) 2 1  4.87 0.174 0.522 0.957 1.305 1.915 
10 (0,0,1,0,1) 2 1  4.87 0.174 0.522 0.957 1.566 1.653 
11 (0,0,0,1,1) 2 1  4.53 0.174 0.522 0.870 1.305 1.653 
12 (1,1,1,0,0) 3 1 1 1 5.88 0.199 0.789 1.137 1.702 2.050 
13 (1,1,0,1,0) 3 1  5.88 0.199 0.789 1.354 1.485 2.050 
14 (1,1,0,0,1) 3 1  5.88 0.199 0.789 1.354 1.702 1.833 
15 (1,0,1,1,0) 3 1  5.76 0.204 0.764 1.142 1.490 2.156 
16 (1,0,1,0,1) 3 1  5.76 0.204 0.764 1.142 1.808 1.838 
17 (1,0,0,1,1) 3 1  5.41 0.204 0.764 1.112 1.490 1.838 
18 (0,1,1,1,0) 3 1 1 1 5.87 0.174 0.553 1.249 1.597 2.292 
19 (0,1,1,0,1) 3 1 1 1 5.87 0.174 0.553 1.249 1.944 1.946 
20 (0,1,0,1,1) 3 1  5.64 0.174 0.559 1.354 1.603 1.951 
21 (0,0,1,1,1) 3 1  5.21 0.174 0.522 0.925 1.622 1.970 
22 (1,1,1,1,0) 4  1 6.28 0.171 0.761 1.351 1.700 2.292 
23 (1,1,1,0,1) 4  1 6.28 0.171 0.761 1.351 1.944 2.048 
24 (1,1,0,1,1) 4 1 1 1 6.05 0.176 0.766 1.354 1.704 2.052 
25 (1,0,1,1,1) 4 1 1 1 6.02 0.176 0.764 1.114 1.811 2.159 
26 (0,1,1,1,1) 4  1 6.02 0.174 0.457 1.288 1.878 2.227 
27 (1,1,1,1,1) 5  1 6.43 0.155 0.745 1.335 1.925 2.273 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
Excessive river pollution is widespread in developing countries. Providing improved 
wastewater treatment remains therefore a big challenge. In this article we analyze whether 
and how cities along a river can improve wastewater treatment by voluntary joint action, 
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using a transboundary pollution game with a unidirectional pollutant flow. We adopt the 
common assumption in the IEA literature that cities are identical with respect to their 
benefits and costs of pollution abatement. Particularly, we assume that cities have the same 
linear abatement benefit function and the same strictly convex abatement cost function. Our 
model displays some typical features of standard public goods games with symmetric 
players (cf. Barrett, 1994a). First, stable coalitions consist of three members in the linear 
benefit – quadratic costs specification. Second, the size of stable coalitions increases if the 
convexity of the abatement cost function decreases. Third, with sufficiently low convexity, 
even the grand coalition becomes stable. 
 
There are also differences, however. While in the standard game (e.g. Folmer and 
von Mouche, 2000) emission abatement is a pure public good to all players, in our river 
setting it is a positive externality only to downstream cities. Hence, we introduce location 
of a player as a new element in such games and expect that it changes coalition stability. 
We find, however, for interior solutions that if a coalition of a certain size is stable, all 
coalitions of that size are stable. Hence, location has, surprisingly, no impact on coalition 
stability in the river basin. Location does, however, have an impact on overall welfare. The 
more upstream the members of the coalition are the higher is the overall welfare because 
downstream singletons benefit from upstream coalition abatement. The welfare maximum 
is therefore obtained when the coalition consists of the most upstream cities. In the standard 
public goods game, on the other hand, only the number of members determines welfare. 
 
Assumption 4.1 states that cities in our game are identical with respect to 
emissions, abatement costs and abatement benefits. This allows for some interesting 
analytical findings. Real cases generally differ from this assumption which introduces 
considerable complexity to the analysis. Due to this complexity further analytical findings 
are most likely restricted to equally strong assumptions on the characteristics of cities. 
Without such restricting assumptions one is left with calculating the equilibria for 
calibrated cases in numerical applications, much like we have done in section 4.5. The 
following example gives some intuition on how our main analytical finding would break 
down if we allow for differences among the cities. Recall our proposition 4.6 in which we 
show that if a coalition of a certain size is stable, all coalitions of that size are stable. Now, 
consider the case where only one city discharges emissions, reflecting a violation of 
assumption 4.1 such that cities are not identical anymore. Then, by construction, any stable 
coalition must contain this city and at least one downstream city in order to generate a 
coalition surplus. When the emitting city is the most downstream city this is not possible. 
Hence, location affects stability when assumption 4.1 is relaxed.  
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Our analysis is based on the assumption that optimal treatment cannot be enforced. 
Most, if not all, countries have laws and regulations on wastewater quality discharge. In 
developing countries, however, the relevant authorities often lack the power to monitor 
pollution levels and enforce treatment. As our analysis shows that voluntary cooperation 
improves the total welfare in the basin, weak governments could rather facilitate voluntary 
cooperation in form of self-enforcing coalitions. Additionally, we show that the location of 
coalition members matters for the total welfare in the river basin. We recommend that 
authorities should facilitate the formation of upstream coalitions. This will indeed induce 
larger free-riding benefits, because more singletons are located downstream of the coalition 
and benefit from coalition abatement without contributing to its costs. An interesting way 
of looking at this situation is that authorities maximize welfare – given the size of a stable 
coalition – when they maximize free-riders’ gains. Note that this only holds under a 
unidirectional pollution flow where all coalitions with the same number of members are 
stable. Finally, we do find the well-known negative effects of free-riding on coalition 
formation which prevents the formation of large coalitions. Hence, we do not expect that 
full cooperation in the form of grand coalitions will easily emerge. In our stylized 
numerical example, the grand coalition appears only for low convexity of the abatement 
cost function. This feature is not likely to hold in reality, except perhaps in early stages of 
development when advanced treatment technologies are not yet required. In such cases, 
however, the gains from cooperation are typically small. 
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix 4.1: Derivation of first order conditions for coalition members 
The coalition maximizes joint welfare, denoted S : 
 1 1( ,..., ) ( ,..., ) ( )S n i i i i
i S
a a B a a C a

  . 
Using the definition for individual benefits (avoided damage minus abatement costs), we 
obtain  1
1 1
( ,..., ) ( )
i i
i i i j i j j i i
j j
a a D e D e a C a
 
              .  
Assuming non-signatories’ abatement as given, we obtain the following maximization 
problem  1( ) 1 1max ( ,..., ) ( )i i S
i i
S n i j i j j i ia i S j j
a a D e D e a C a
   
                    
   .  
For interior solutions, using the linear damage function, we obtain the following first order 
condition for coalition member i ’s abatement:  
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;
( )k i i
k S k i
d C a
 
 . 
 
Appendix 4.2: Derivation of first order conditions for singletons 
Singletons maximize individual welfare, denoted i :      iiiiii aCaaBaa  ,..,,.., 11 .  
Assuming both other non-signatories’ abatement and coalition abatement as given, we 
obtain the following maximization problem 
 1( ) 1 1max ( ,..., ) ( )i
i i
i n i j i j j i ia j j
a a D e D e a C a
 
                   
Using the linear damage function, we obtain the following first order condition for 
singleton i ’s abatement: 
  i i id C a . 
 
Appendix 4.3: Proof of Proposition 4.7 
From the first order conditions for a linear benefits - quadratic costs specification 
(Assumptions 4.2 and 4.3) we have that singletons abate  
(A4.1) 
i
da
c
 .  
 
Coalition members take the positive externalities towards coalition partners into account. 
Hence a coalition member’s abatement depends on its position in the coalition. Member i  
in position  abates 
(A4.2) 
,( )
( 1)
i
d S
a
c
  .  
 
In order to prove the proposition we show that the coalition payoff exceeds the sum of the 
outside option payoffs for a coalition of size 3; but the coalition payoff falls short of the 
sum of the outside option payoffs for every larger coalition. We proceed in four steps. (i) 
We calculate the before-transfers payoff and (ii) the outside option payoff of each member. 
(iii) We calculate the sum of the differences between (i) and (ii) for all coalition members 
and show that it is positive for 3S   and negative for 3S  . This establishes internal 
stability for all coalitions with 3 members or less and internal instability for all coalitions 
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with more than 3 members. Finally, (iv) we show that all 2-city coalitions are externally 
unstable. 
(i) Given the abatement levels specified in (A4.1) and (A4.2) the payoff of coalition 
member i  in position () is  
(A4.3)  
  
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2 2
1
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1
2
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2
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         
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
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(ii) The outside option payoff of coalition member i  in position () can be calculated as 
(A4.4) 
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i i
d i i i
c
  
 
           
                          2 21 1 12 2 2 .d i S Sc          
 
 
(iii) To calculate the coalition surplus we calculate the difference between before-transfer  
coalition payoffs and outside option payoffs: 
 
(A4.5)  2 221 1,( ) ,( ) ,( ) 2 2( 1) 1i i i dv S Sc           S  .  
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Eq. (A4.5) shows that a member’s surplus only depends on its position in the coalition , 
not on its location in the river i. Next, we calculate the sum of all coalition members’ 
surplus: 
(A4.6) 
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It is clear from (A4.6) that the coalition surplus depends only on the size of the coalition 
and is independent of members’ location. The sign of the coalition surplus depends on the 
expression in brackets of (A4.6). We simplify this expression to   
(A4.7)  3 2112 2 9 7S S S   .  
 
It is easy to check that (A4.7) is non-negative if and only if 1 3S  . This proves 
internal stability of all coalitions with three and two (and trivially one) cities. Larger 
coalitions are internally unstable. 
(iv) Finally, because all 3-city coalitions are internally stable, every member of a 3-city 
coalition receives at least its outside option payoff. Hence, there exists for every 2-city 
coalition S a city j S  such that j prefers to join S. Therefore all 2-city coalitions are 
externally unstable. All 3-city coalitions are externally stable, because there does not exist a 
singleton who would join the coalition because all 4-city coalitions are internally unstable, 
i.e. their members receive less than their outside option payoffs. 
This completes the proof that all 3-city coalitions are stable and that there is no other stable 
coalition.   
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Exploring the scope for voluntary joint action to 
clean the Upper Citarum River Basin in Indonesia 
 
 
The Citarum River in Indonesia is severely polluted because regulation on wastewater 
treatment is not enforced. This chapter examines whether voluntary joint action – where 
downstream regions suffering from pollution compensate upstream regions for pollution 
control measures – is an option to increase welfare in the Upper Citarum River Basin. The 
problem is approached by a model of transboundary pollution. We study a coalition 
formation game for asymmetric players and calibrate the game with data for the Upper 
Citarum River Basin. We find that in the benchmark calibration no coalition with positive 
abatement is stable because abatement benefits are too small compared to abatement costs 
to motivate any coalition to provide abatement. In the sensitivity analysis, however, we find 
for higher benefits that coalitions with four or five members are stable where only the most 
upstream members abate emissions. 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
The Citarum River in Indonesia is severely polluted because regulation on wastewater 
treatment is not enforced. Improperly treated wastewater is discharged into the river as the 
cheapest way of disposal. While disposing wastewater cheaply is individually optimal, it is 
generally inefficient from a river basin perspective as it generates negative externalities to 
the downstream population. These negative externalities need to be internalized to obtain 
the welfare optimal treatment levels which are higher than the ones individually chosen. 
The Indonesian government has tried to regulate river pollution by establishing guidelines 
for the discharge of wastewater. Their enforcement, however, is weak (ADB 2007) which 
renders regulation in the Citarum River Basin ineffective. This situation calls for exploring 
alternative options instead of relying on official regulation. One such option might be 
voluntary joint action where downstream regions who suffer most from river pollution 
compensate upstream polluters for reducing pollution. “Voluntary” means that a region 
only cooperates if its cooperation payoff is at least as high as its non-cooperation payoff. 
Voluntary joint action even yields the welfare optimum if all regions join. Free riding 
incentives are, however, an obstacle to cooperation. Downstream regions that do not 
cooperate and therefore do not contribute to the cost of wastewater treatment of the 
coalition would still enjoy benefits. In this study we analyze whether cooperation between 
upstream and downstream regions in the Upper Citarum River Basin can provide 
wastewater treatment and thereby improve welfare.  
 
Our case is a transboundary pollution problem with more than two players14. Such 
problems have been analyzed as coalition formation games based on a stability concept 
from the theory of industrial cartel formation (d’Aspremont et al., 1983). A coalition is 
stable if no member has the incentive to leave the coalition (internal stability) and no non-
member has the incentive to enter the coalition (external stability). Coalition games have 
been extensively applied to the global transboundary pollution problems. Among the first 
were Hoel (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994a). More recent 
contributions include e.g. Weikard, Finus and Altamirano-Cabrera (2006) and Nagashima 
et al. (2009). In Chapter 4, I applied a coalition formation game to a transboundary river 
pollution problem with symmetric players. The Upper Citarum River Basin consists, 
however, of asymmetric rural and densely populated urban regions. One common difficulty 
with coalition formation games is that analytical results are difficult to obtain for 
asymmetric players. One way to obtain further insights for settings with asymmetric players 
                                                 
14 For two players the externality problem can be solved by bargain (Mäler, 1990). 
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is to calibrate a model to obtain numerical solutions. Nagashima et al. (2009) use this 
approach for an application to the climate change problem.  
 
This chapter continues the analysis of transboundary river pollution games in a 
multi-agent setting started in chapter 4 by calibrating a coalition formation game with 
asymmetric players for the Upper Citarum River Basin and computing its equilibria. This 
contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it is a case study which provides insights 
into the scope and structure of voluntary cooperation in wastewater treatment in the Upper 
Citarum River Basin. Second, it illustrates the applicability of the approach developed in 
Chapter 4. Third, its findings contribute to the theoretical literature on coalition formation 
games for transboundary river pollution. As analytical results of the asymmetric player 
game can only be obtained under very restrictive assumptions the findings of this chapter 
give an intuition on which assumptions should be made and how to proceed in the 
analytical analysis of these games. 
 
To specify the game we identify regions that will act as players in the game and 
quantify the parameters that describe emissions, abatement cost functions and abatement 
benefit functions. This allows computing the equilibria of the game. The following specific 
research questions will be studied in this chapter. Is there scope for stable coalition(s) in 
wastewater treatment in the Upper Citarum River Basin? What are general characteristics 
of the structure of the stable coalitions in transboundary river pollution games with 
asymmetric players? 
 
For a benchmark calibration we find that no coalition with positive coalition 
abatement is stable because abatement benefits are too small compared to abatement costs 
to motivate any coalition to provide additional abatement. As the calculation of abatement 
benefits contains considerable uncertainty we also conduct a sensitivity analysis in order to 
check which coalitions would be stable for higher abatement benefits. In the sensitivity 
analysis we find that coalitions with four or five members are stable. Only the most 
upstream members abate emissions. Regarding membership of particular regions we find 
two results. First, the most upstream region is a member in all cases except one. Second, the 
region with the highest abatement benefits is a member in all cases except one which 
indicates that the region with the highest abatement benefits is the key region in the river 
basin. Lastly, we find that total welfare is the highest for the coalition consisting of the 
regions that have the highest marginal abatement benefits.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The following section characterizes the Upper 
Citarum River Basin with its regulatory setting concerning river pollution. Section 5.3 
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presents the theoretical framework - the coalition formation game in wastewater treatment 
along a river with asymmetric players. Section 5.4 presents the calibration of the game for 
the Upper Citarum River Basin. Section 5.5 presents the results. Section 5.6 conducts a 
sensitivity analysis while section 5.7 concludes.  
 
5.2. The Upper Citarum River Basin 
 
General characteristics 
The Upper Citarum River Basin comprises the part of the Citaraum River from its spring at 
Wayang Mountain in the centre of West Java Province to the first of three reservoirs, 
Waduk Saguling. It is inhabited by approximately 5.7 million people and covers an area of 
234 088 ha including the city of Bandung, which is the provincial capital of West Java, the 
city of Cimahi, Bandung Regency, parts of Sumedang Regency and parts of Garut 
Regency.15 The Citarum River plays a significant role for the local economy. It is a main 
source for drinking water, a major supporter of agriculture, fishery and industrial 
production. Several contributories feed the Citarum River. The Upper Citraum River Basin 
is therefore divided into seven sub basins, namley Sub Das Citarum Hulu, Sub Das Citarik, 
Sub Das Cikapundung, Sub Das Cisangkuy, Sub Das Ciwidei, Sub Das Ciminyak, and Sub 
Das Cimeta.  
 
Water Pollution 
Water pollution is mainly caused by emissions from domestic water use, dryland 
agriculture, livestock breeding and industrial production. Emissions from domestic use are 
mainly coliforms from the discharge of untreated domestic wastewater. Emissions from 
dryland agriculture are pesticides and fertilizers. Emissions from livestock breeding are 
mostly dung. Emissions from industrial production are discharged from seven industrial 
clusters in the basin. The industrial clusters are Majalaya, Rancaekek, Ujung Berung, 
Banjaran, Dayeh Kolot, Cimahi and Batujajar. Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) serves 
as a general indicator for water pollution. It reached 130 mg/l at the inlet to the Saguling 
Reservoir during the dry season in 2004 (ADB 2007, p.21) 16.  
 
Institutional setup 
A general framework for integrated water resource management (IWRM) is provided by 
Indonesia’s 2004 Water Law (Al’Afghani 2006). Implementation of IWRM within a river 
basin context is being promoted through establishment of river basin management units 
                                                 
15 It is located between 7o19' - 6o24' South and 106o51' - 107o51' East. 
16 River water quality is classified as bad for a BOD value of more than 15mg/l. (Tebbutt 1998, p.96) 
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called Balai Besar. Recently, a range of water management responsibilities (such as water 
quality management) have been delegated from the central government to the kabupaten 
(district government bodies), to devolve decision-making closer to the “grass roots”. The 
local Environmental Protection Agencies are the authorities to enforce these regulations. 
“Despite attempts to improve the institutional framework for river basin and water resource 
management, there appears to be general agreement that (i) current institutional 
arrangements are highly sectoral with limited effective coordination and (ii) although 
regulatory frameworks and standards are generally in place (e.g. for water quality or 
licensing), enforcement is weak.” (ADB 2007, p.16) This indicates that the institutional 
scenario is similar to international cases where a country has exclusive rights to use the 
water in its territory which is described in the doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty 
(Barrett 1994b). 
 
5.3. The coalition game 
 
In this section we develop a coalition formation game between asymmetric players that 
might cooperate in wastewater treatment along a river. The game is characterised by its 
players, their strategies, their payoffs and the coalition stability concept.  
 
Players 
Let  1, 2, ,N n   be a finite ordered set of players– referred to as regions – along a 
river where 1 is the most upstream and n  is the most downstream one. In general, Ni  
is upstream of Nj  if and only if ji  . In absence of any abatement policies, each 
region Ni  generates ie  units of emissions. These emissions are exogenous to the 
model and reflect a “business as usual” scenario. A region can reduce its emissions by 
choosing an abatement of ia  units.17 Its net emissions into the river are then ii ae  . The 
pollution stock of Ni  is the sum of its own and all upstream region’s net emissions18, 
   1
1
,...,
i
i i h h
h
e a a e a

  . Each region Ni  suffers damages from its pollution 
                                                 
17 For consistency of the terminology with the literature on environmental agreements we choose abatement, rather 
than emissions, as the choice variable of the players. 
18 The fact that player i ’s pollution stock depends only on its own and upstream emissions and abatement 
captures the positive unidirectional externality in this game. 
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stock, given by 



i
h
hi eD
1
. Abatement generates benefits by reducing these damages. 
Abatement benefits are damages before abatement minus damages after abatement given 
with      
i
h
hhi
i
h
hiii aeDeDaaB
11
1 ,.., . Abatement costs are given by 
the cost function  ii aC . Region i ’s net benefits are abatement benefits minus abatement 
costs:    iiii aCaaB ,..,1 . 
 
Strategies 
We model cooperation as a two-stage coalition game like in the literature on international 
environmental agreements. At the first stage each region Ni  chooses to become a 
member of the coalition or not. Its choice to become a member is denoted by 1i   while 
its choice to be a singleton is denoted by 0i  . The combined choices of all players 
yields the coalition structure which is described by a vector 1( ,..., ) ( )n i i N    σ . 
Note that for n  players there are nn 2  possible coalition structures. Each coalition 
structure induces a unique set of S N  players that form the coalition. At the second 
stage coalition members and singletons choose their abatement levels to maximize coalition 
payoff and individual singleton payoffs, respectively. The first order condition for coalition 
members Si  is (see Appendix 4.1 in chapter 4): 
(5.1)    ii
ikSi
ik aCaD 
 ;
.  
Each coalition member equates its individual marginal abatement costs with the sum of its 
own marginal abatement benefits and the marginal benefits of downstream members. The 
first order condition for a singleton player Si  is (see Appendix 4.2 in chapter 4): 
(5.2)    iiii aCaD   .  
Each singleton equates its individual marginal abatement costs with its individual marginal 
abatement benefits. 
 
Since the coalition structure defines whether a player is a coalition member or a 
singleton and since members and singletons have different first order conditions, each 
coalition structure gives rise to a unique system of first order conditions. The solution to 
each of these systems of equations is a unique vector of abatements of all players, 
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( )S Si i Na a . The pollution stocks vector,  S Si i Ne e  follows with 
   
1
i
S S S
i h h
h
e e a

 a .  
 
Payoffs 
Since the coalition structure determines the abatement levels and the abatement levels 
determine the coalition payoff and the singletons’ payoffs, the coalition structure defines a 
partition function ( )v S  which gives the payoff of each singleton Si  by 
     SiSi aCBSv  a  and the coalition payoff by       


Si
S
i
S
S aCBSv a . 
While the partition function is fully determined by the coalition structure and exogenous 
parameters, the coalition is free to set a sharing rule to distribute its payoff between 
members.  
 
Coalition stability concept 
We employ a stability concept (d’Aspremont et al. 1983) which decomposes overall 
stability into internal and external stability. Internal stability means that no member wants 
to leave the coalition. It is satisfied if the payoff of each coalition member i S  is weakly 
larger than its outside option payoff when it leaves the coalition:  
   i i iv S v S i S   . External stability means that no singleton wants to enter the 
coalition. It is satisfied if the payoff of each singleton j S is weakly larger than its 
payoff if it would join the coalition:    j j jv S v S j S   . This holds for coalition 
S  if all coalitions SjS j   are not internally stable. Section 4.2.2 in chapter 4 
provides a detailed description of this stability concept applied to a river pollution game 
with symmetrical players. 
 
5.4. Calibration of the coalition game in the Upper Citarum 
River Basin 
 
In this section we calibrate our coalition formation game for the Upper Citarum River Basin. 
This includes identifying players and calibrating their emissions, abatement cost functions 
and abatement benefit functions. The calibration is summarized in Table 5.1 at the end of 
this section.  
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Regions 
We define 6n  regions as players. The most upstream region comprises of the area 
around the spring of the Citarum River and along the first two tributaries (Citarik and 
Cikeruh). We combine this area to one region because emissions from these tributaries do 
only add to the emission stock of downstream regions. The second region consists of 
Bandung City with the main tributary Cikapundung and the area along the main river south 
of Bandung. The third region consists of the area located along the tributary, Cisangkuy. 
The fourth region consists of the City of Cimahi, the tributary Cimahi and a small area 
around the main river. The fifth region consists of the area along the most downstream 
tributary, Ciwidey. Downstream of the fifth region the Citarum River enters into the 
Saguling reservoir. The sixth region consists of the area around the reservoir. Figure 5.1 
presents the Upper Citarum River Basin with its regions. We obtain data for the regions 
from the 2006 Indonesian Economic Census (BPS 2006). The Census provides data on 
village level. Regions 1-6 comprise 120, 161, 51, 44, 36 and 44 villages, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: The Upper Citarum River Basin with its players 
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Emissions: 
Domestic, industrial and agricultural wastewater is discharged into the Citarum River each 
comprising a variety of emissions. Calibrating the model for the entire range of emissions 
requires data on emissions, abatement costs and benefits for each region and for each 
pollutant. Gathering such a wide range of data was outside the scope of this study. We 
therefore confine our analysis to faecal coliform emissions from domestic wastewater the 
only data of which we have sufficient data. 
 
Data from the West Java Environmental Protection Agency (WJEPA) for the year 
2006 (WJEPA 2006) show that the concentration of faecal coliforms steadily increases 
from around 10 000 MPN (most probable number) per 100mL at the most upstream 
sampling station to 17 000 MPN/100mL at the most downstream sampling location in the 
Upper Citarum River Basin. All concentrations exceed 1000 MPN/100mL which is the 
guideline of the WHO (1989) and the Government of Indonesia (2001) for safe use in 
unrestricted irrigation. From WJEPA (2006) we derive the regions’ current emissions, ie , 
and present them in Table 5.1. These emissions are gross emissions because no 
considerable abatement is currently done. The centralized treatment plant in Bandung does 
not operate effectively (Sukarama and Pollard 2001). In the dry season it does not receive 
enough wastewater and in the rainy season it receives too much wastewater to operate 
effectively. Septic tanks are the alternative. In rural areas, however, the coverage of septic 
tanks is practically zero. In urban areas on the other hand some households are equipped 
with private septic tanks. This, however, does not result in effective treatment. Lasut, 
Jensen and Shivakoti (2008) report that in another major Indonesian city, Manado, less than 
30% of the residential septic tanks are in very good condition and that the condition and 
capacity of the majority of tanks was inadequate which causes leakage.  
 
Emission per household of a region is ii he /  where ih  is the number of 
households of region i. The data show that emissions per household in region 1 are almost 
five times higher then in the other regions. As the structure of households is similar across 
regions the excess emissions of region 1 are likely due to external effects from livestock 
breeding. We assume that the emissions per household of region 1 are equal to other 
regions’ emissions per household which yields an initial emission stock of 80030 e  
(see Table 5.1).  
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Abatement costs: 
The abatement strategies adopted by different regions consist of the choice of villages 
where abatement facilities are installed and the choice of facilities in each village. Two 
types of abatement facilities are available. Individual and communal septic tanks. The 
former type of tanks serves one household at 250 000 Rupias annually. The latter serves 
200 households. Costs per household are 80 000 Rupias fix costs plus 10 000 Rupias per ha 
that is covered by the septic tank. We use population density data on the village level to 
estimate each region’s abatement costs function based on the assumption that the most 
densely populated villages offer the cheapest abatement options. The area (in ha) covered 
by one communal septic tank in village j of region i is jiji hg ,, /200   where jig ,  is the 
residential area in ha, jih ,  is the number of households and 200 is the number of 
households served by one communal septic tank19. It is easy to calculate that for a village 
with a population density lower than 11.8 households per ha an individual septic tank is the 
cheaper option. The cost to connect 1 household to a communal or individual septic tank in 
village j in region i is therefore 
 




8.11/000250
8.11//000000200080
,
,,
,,,,
,,
jiji
jijijiji
jiji ghif
ghifhg
hgc .  
 
Multiplying the costs per household with the number of households yields the total 
abatement costs of a village,     jijijijijiji hhgchgC ,,,,,, ,,  . As an effectively 
operating septic tank removes 80% of the faecal coliforms the village’s emission abatement 
is given by jiiiji hhea ,, /8.0  . Ordering the villages according to the abatement 
costs per unit of abatement ( jiji aC ,, / ) starting with the lowest yields a convex relation, 
 ii aC , which represents that abatement becomes increasingly expensive for a region. We 
estimate the coefficients of the following function 
                                                 
19 Data was obtained in an interview with the head of the Programming and Planning Subdivision of the Housing 
and Settlement Agency of the West Java Provincial Government, Mr. Iendra Sofyan, on September 3rd 2009. A 
Communal septic tank serves 200 households spread over 1ha. Costs for planning and construction are 275 
Million Rupiah. Annual costs for operation and maintenance amount to 3.6 Million Rupias. 20% of the costs are 
related to the covered area (2ha). Average lifetime is 15 years. Discount rate: 10%. Individual septic tank: Costs 
for planning and construction are 3 Million Rupiah. Annual costs for operation and maintenance amount to 
100.000 Rupias. Average lifetime is 15 years. Discount rate: 10%. 
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      ii iiiiiii aaC     using least squares. 20  The estimated 
coefficients of the abatement cost functions for all six regions are given in Table 5.1. 
 
Abatement benefits: 
An elevated concentration of faecal coliforms causes health risks to the local population. 
Abating faecal coliforms reduces these health risks and therefore generates benefits. 
Abatement benefits are damages before abatement minus damages after abatement as 
introduced in the Section 5.3. The Stockholm Framework (WHO 2006b) provides a general 
approach to identify, quantify and manage health risks related to wastewater irrigation. To 
quantify health risks it suggests using disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) which is 
calculated by multiplying the number of cases of a disease with their average duration and 
with their severity factor. Since the DALY concept does not generate a monetary value it 
does not serve the purpose of this study. We therefore follow the Stockholm Framework by 
calculating the expected number of infections. But we amend the approach by calculating a 
monetary measure of damage instead of DALYs. 
 
There are several studies which quantify health risks for a certain disease and a 
certain target group. An example is Seidu et al. (2008) who conduct a quantitative 
microbial risk assessment associated with wastewater reuse in Accra, Ghana. They limit 
their study to rotavirus and Ascaris infections and consider only transmission to farm 
workers and consumers. Quantifying the health risks for the general population is a very 
complex issue because of the large variety of diseases (Feachem et al. 1983) and the 
complexity of their transmission (Carr 2001, Ensink, Mahmood and Dalsgraad 2007). 
Hence, we rely on the following simplifying assumptions. First, we limit the variety of 
diseases by considering only rotavirus infection which is one of the main diseases related to 
faecal coliforms in domestic wastewater. Rotavirus infection causes severe diarrhea which 
can be lethal for children. Second, we assume that the concentration of faecal coliforms in 
the Citarum River poses a general risk of infection to the local population instead of 
distinguishing between different groups like farm workers, local residents or consumers of 
wastewater irrigated vegetables. This is motivated by findings that diarrhoeal diseases are 
strongly correlated with faecal coliform contamination in water networks (Abu Amr and 
Yssim 2008) which generates a risk to the population living around these water networks.  
 
We derive the relation between concentration of E.coli in water and the risk of 
rotavirus infection from Mara et al. (2007) who analyze the risk of infection for different 
                                                 
20 Note, that the first term,   iii    , assures that   00 iC . 
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concentration levels. Note that the unit of our emission data is MPN of faecal coliforms 
while the unit in Mara et al. (2007) is MPN of E.coli. Since faecal coliform counts and 
E.coli counts may be used interchangeably (Dogan-Halkman et al. 2003) we use MPN for 
the rest of this study. From Mara et al. (2007) we obtain that the number of infections 
depend on the emissions according to the function   ii ee  7104.4  for the interval 
of 200000  ie  MPN/ 100 mL. This interval is sufficient for our study since the 
maximum FC concentration is 17 000 MPN/ 100 mL. Multiplying this with the relevant 
population of region i , ip , gives the expected number of infections. From Jeuland and 
Whittington (2009) we obtain the costs of 57000Bc  Indonesian Rupiah per infection.21 
With this specification region i ’s abatement benefit function is  
(5.3)   

 
i
h
hBiii acpaaB
1
7
1 104.4,.., . 
 
Region i ’s marginal abatement benefits are then 7104.4  Bii cpB . 
 
Table 5.1: Region dependent parameters: Emissions ie  in MPL/100mL, number of 
households ih , population ip  and emissions per household ii he / , abatement cost 
function parameters, i , i , i , and constant marginal benefits, iB  in Rupiah. 
i  
ie  ih  ip  ii he /  i  i  i  iB  
1 1997 263 493 1 010 517 0.038* 1 894.28 -1 490.2 2.12 25 344 
2 3971 524 038 2 198 924 0.008 1 600.34 -2 628.73 2.07 54 904 
3 1029 135 772 528 224 0.008 1 826.83 -907.72 2.2 13 493 
4 1474 195 299 785 532 0.008 5 235.8 -1327.45 2.02 19 516 
5 526 69 643 273 210 0.008 1 159.82 -359.7 2.44 7 037 
6 726 96 110 349 373 0.008 11 746.25 -437.66 2.35 8 762 
*Assumed to be 0.008 in the numerical model analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Jeuland and Whittington (2009) report costs per infection ranging from 2 to 10 US Dollars. We use the expected 
value of 6 US Dollars with an exchange rate of 9496 Indonesian Rupiah for 1 US Dollar (9 February, 2010).We 
obtain costs per infection of 56976Rupiah which we round to 57000 Rupiah. 
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5.5. Results 
 
The coalition game with 6 regions gives rise to 58 distinct coalitions. Computing their 
stability we find that no coalition with positive coalition abatement is stable.22 The reason 
for this is that given our calibration abatement benefits are too small compared to 
abatement costs to motivate any coalition to provide additional abatement. Abatement 
levels, marginal costs, individual marginal benefits and coalition marginal benefits of the 
grand coalition are given in Table 5.2. This result indicates that no welfare gains can be 
achieved by voluntary joint action among regions along the Upper Citarum River Basin. As 
the calculation of abatement benefits contains considerable uncertainty we conduct a 
sensitivity analysis in the next section in order to check whether we find stable coalitions 
for higher abatement benefits. 
 
Table 5.2. Region i, abatement Sia , marginal costs  Sii aC  , marginal benefits  Sii aB  
and coalition marginal benefits of each region for the grand coalition,  


ij
S
jj aB . 
i S
ia   Sii aC    Sii aB   


ij
S
jj aB  
   (thousand 
Rupiah) 
 (thousand 
Rupiah) 
 (thousand 
Rupiah) 
1 0 14 733.5 25.3 129.1 
2 0 14 869.5 54.9 103.7 
3 0 14 736.2 13.5 48.8 
4 0 16 359.4 19.5 35.3 
5 0 13 627.1 7 15.8 
6 0 14 621 8.8 8.8 
 
5.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The calibration of the parameters in the previous section is subject to considerable 
uncertainty. This holds particularly for quantifying the monetary abatement benefits. We 
calculate these benefits as a reduction of heath risks related to a reduction of faecal coliform 
concentration in discharged domestic wastewater. This calibration introduces two main 
sources of uncertainty. First, the transmission from a certain concentration of faecal 
                                                 
22 The calculation was programmed with the software package Matlab 7.1. 
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coliforms to an infection of a human is highly complex and therefore subject to large 
uncertainties. Second, we do only consider health risk from faecal coliforms as this is the 
main health risk. We do not consider other types of risks, e.g. environmental risks. Neither 
do we consider the local population’s amenity value of the Citarum River being less 
polluted. It is therefore likely that we underestimate the true abatement benefits. The 
purpose of the sensitivity analysis in this section is to identify stable coalitions for 
alternative calibrations of higher abatement benefits  
 
We analyze two scenarios. The first scenario analyzes what happens if abatement 
benefits are higher than in the base case for all regions in the river basin. This captures the 
case where the true abatement benefits are (proportionally) underestimated in the 
benchmark calibration. It can also be interpreted as a future scenario when the local 
population’s amenity value of a less polluted river increases due to higher standards of 
living. For this scenario we introduce the sensitivity parameter B  which scales up the 
individual abatement benefits of each region. The second scenario analyzes what happens if 
the abatement benefits increase for all regions but increase at a higher rate in the urban 
regions, Bandung and Chimahi City. An example is when the standard of living increases 
and the rural population migrates to urban regions which increases the probability of 
infection there. Besides B  we introduce an additional sensitivity parameter, 2B  with 
BB  2 . While B  is a scaling factor for the abatement benefits of regions 1, 3, 5 and 6, 
2B  is a scaling factor for the abatement benefits of region 2 (Bandung City) and region 4 
(Chimahi City).  
 
In scenario 1 we increase the abatement benefits of all regions by the factor 
140B . The computation yields 4 stable coalitions with 5 members where the two most 
upstream regions are always members. Only the most upstream member abates a fraction of 
his emissions while all other regions, members and singletons, do not abate. This can be 
explained by the heterogeneity of the regions. Region 2 has by far the highest individual 
abatement benefits. Only if region 2 is a member marginal coalition benefits are high 
enough for region 1 to exceed its marginal abatement costs which renders coalition 
abatement profitable. Abatement is the highest in coalition (1,1,1,1,0,1) when the region 
with the lowest marginal benefits is the only singleton. This coalition structure also 
generates the highest total welfare in the river basin (Table 5.3). This result is different 
from the case with identical regions of chapter 4, where we find that welfare is the higher 
the more upstream coalition members are located. Another result is surprisingly similar to 
the case with identical regions. Proposition 4.6 in chapter 4 states that if some coalition S  
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is stable, then every coalition S   of size S S   is stable. Although in this chapter 
regions are not identical the sensitivity analysis yields only stable coalitions with the same 
number of members. As marginal abatement costs are fairly similar among regions (Table 
5.4) while marginal benefits are quite different (Table 5.4), proposition 4.6 in chapter 4 
might be driven by identical abatement cost functions rather than identical abatement 
benefit functions. Another proposition of chapter 4, proposition 4.7, does not apply, 
however, for non-identical regions. It says that if the abatement cost functions are quadratic 
three members form a stable coalition. Although exponents are close to 2, 
44.202.2  i  a stable coalition is formed by 5 members in this sensitivity analysis. 
This indicates that the number of coalition members is sensitive to changes in the exponent 
of the abatement costs function. 
 
Table 5.3. Coalition structure, σ , number of members, S , abatement levels, Sia , and 
total welfare of stable coalitions for 140B . 
σ  S  Sa  
Total Welfare 
(million Rupiah) 
1,1,1,1,1,0 5 188,0,0,0,0,0 430.1
1,1,1,1,0,1 5 210,0,0,0,0,0 453.8
1,1,1,0,1,1 5 54,0,0,0,0,0 164.1
1,1,0,1,1,1 5 129,0,0,0,0,0 338.3
 
As benefits further increase the structure of stable coalitions changes. Increasing 
marginal benefits with the factor 220B  yields one stable coalition with five members 
and six stable coalitions with four members where the first two regions are always members 
(see Table 5.5). While only the most upstream member abates emissions in the 5-member 
coalition the two most upstream members abate emissions in the 4-member coalitions. The 
reason for that is regions 2’s membership in the 4-member coalitions and its non-
membership in the 5-member coalition. Region 2 is the main driving force for abatement 
because it has the highest marginal abatement benefits. Its high marginal abetment benefits 
are still too low, however, to lead to abatement as a singleton. Only together with other 
downstream members, their sum of marginal benefits is sufficient to induce abatement in 
region 1 and 2. The structure of stable coalitions is similar to the previous simulation 
besides the 5-member coalition. Given the first two upstream regions are members all 
coalitions with 4 members are stable. The difference to the previous simulation is one 
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member less in the stable coalitions. This indicates that increasing benefits increase free-
riding incentives and reduce the number of members in a stable coalition. 
 
Table 5.4. Region i, abatement Sia , marginal costs  Sii aC  , marginal benefits  Sii aB  
and coalition marginal benefits of each region,  


ij
S
jj aB , for stable coalition 
(1,1,1,1,0,1). 
i  S
ia   Sii aC   
(million 
Rupiah) 
 Sii aB  
(million 
Rupiah) 
 


ij
S
jj aB  
(million 
Rupiah) 
1 210 17.1 3.5 17.1 
2 0 14.9 7.7 13.5 
3 0 14.7 1.9 5.8 
4 0 16.4 2.7 3.9 
5 0 13.6 1 - 
6 0 14.6 1.2 1.2 
 
Table 5.5. Coalition structure, σ , number of members, S , abatement levels Sia , and total 
welfare of stable coalitions for 220B . 
σ  S  Sa  
 Total Welfare 
(million Rupiah) 
1,1,1,1,0,0 4 889,734,0,0,0,0 11 853.6
1,1,1,0,1,0 4 654,285,0,0,0,0 8 536
1,1,0,1,1,0 4 768,502,0,0,0,0 10 376.3
1,1,1,0,0,1 4 687,347,0,0,0,0 9 109
1,1,0,1,0,1 4 800,564,0,0,0,0 10 820.9
1,1,0,0,1,1 4 564,113,0,0,0,0 6 774.6
1,0,1,1,1,1 5 141,0,0,0,0,0 1 820.9
 
We now turn to the second scenario in which the abatement benefits of the urban 
regions increase more than the benefits of the rural regions. We increase benefits of regions 
1,3,5 and 6 by the factor 75B  and the benefits of the urban regions 2 and 4 by the 
factor 1802 B . Four coalitions with five members each are stable (Table 5.6). 
Coalition abatement is realized either by the first member alone or by the first two members. 
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Both urban regions are always members. Concerning the coalition structure we again obtain 
a very similar result as in the previous scenario. Only coalitions of one size are stable. Here 
the size is five members. This is intriguing because the result of the identical player case 
persists although the heterogeneity among regions increases since the marginal benefits of 
two regions are raised more than for the remaining ones. As abatement costs did not change 
this indicates that abatement benefits do not crucially influence the structure of stable 
coalitions as conjectured in the first scenario. The highest abatement is realized by the 
coalition where the second most downstream region is singleton because it has the lowest 
marginal abatement benefits. 
 
Table 5.6. Coalition structure, σ , number of members, S , abatement levels Sia , and total 
welfare of stable coalitions for 75B  and 1802 B . 
σ  S  Sa  
 Total Welfare 
(million Rupiah) 
1,1,1,1,1,0 5 188,11,0,0,0,0 329.1
1,1,1,1,0,1 5 199,32,0,0,0,0 348.6
1,1,0,1,1,1 5 156,0,0,0,0,0 295.2
0,1,1,1,1,1 5 0,120,0,0,0,0 43.2
 
The following summarizes the common results of the two scenarios of the 
sensitivity analysis. Regarding coalition size we find that coalitions with four or five 
members are stable. As the exponents of the abatement costs functions are higher than 2 
this result is different from the result in Chapter 4 which finds stable coalitions with three 
members for symmetrical players. Regarding abatement we find that only the most 
upstream member(s) abate emissions. The reason for this is that the sum of marginal 
benefits of the members is the highest for the most upstream members while marginal 
abatement costs are fairly equal among members. This only changes when downstream 
members have substantially lower marginal abatement costs. Regarding the membership of 
particular regions we find two common results. First, the most upstream region is a member 
providing coalition abatement in all cases except one (Table 5.6). Second, the region with 
the highest abatement benefits is a member in all cases but one (Table 5.5). This indicates 
that the region with the highest abatement benefits is the key region in the river basin. 
Without it no abatement is provided. Regarding welfare we find that total welfare is the 
highest for the coalition consisting of the regions that have the highest marginal abatement 
benefits. This might not hold in general, however, because of the following trade off. If the 
most upstream region is a member but a downstream singleton has higher marginal benefits 
abatement is lower but all regions benefit from it. If on the other hand the two regions swap 
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membership coalition abatement becomes higher but fewer regions benefit from it because 
it is done by a more downstream region. Hence, location does matter when marginal 
benefits of the regions are similar. 
 
5.7. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
We analyze whether cooperation in wastewater treatment along the Citarum River in the 
Upper Citarum River Basin might be an option to improve welfare. Before we draw final 
conclusions, the following limitations of our study need to be mentioned. A general 
limitation is the availability of data in the Upper Citarum River Basin which we try to 
overcome by filling the gaps with data from the literature. This might lead to 
inconsistencies in the data. More specifically we face limitations about the calibration of 
emissions, abatement costs and benefits. Emissions per household are very similar for 
players 2 to 6 but were almost 5 times higher for region 1. As household characteristics are 
not different among regions, we assumed that emissions per household are equal in all 
regions. This leaves an initial emission stock which cannot be abated in our model. As 
abatement benefits are linear this does not fundamentally affect our results. Nevertheless, 
the source of the initial emissions should be identified and an abatement cost function 
should be calibrated. Two limitations are related to abatement benefits. First, we confine 
our analysis to health risks from rotavirus infection to calculate abatement benefits. A 
variety of diseases can potentially be contracted, however, by getting in contact with 
wastewater (Feachem et al. 1983). Hence, the abatement benefits might be underestimated 
in this respect. Second, we calculated each region’s health risks as a general risk to its 
entire population. Since the health risks depend on the pollutant concentration in the main 
river and the area of a region stretches some distance from it the risk of infection might be 
lower for a fraction of the population in each region. The risks of infection might therefore 
be overestimated.  
 
The following concluding remarks are divided into three parts. First, I reflect the 
results of the benchmark calibration. One central finding is that that neither individual nor 
aggregate abatement benefits are sufficient to motivate abatement in the base case. Similar 
results can be found in the literature even for developed countries. Shuval, Lampert and 
Fattal (1997) estimate health risks from eating vegetables which are irrigated with 
wastewater and relate these risks to costs to prevent them. They find that meeting USEPA 
guidelines would result in an extra expenditure of 3-30 million US$ per case of disease 
prevented. The USEPA guidelines are stricter, however, than the WHO guidelines which 
apply to developing countries. Fattal, Lampert and Shuval (2004) find that treatment to 
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meet the WHO guidelines would cost 125 US$ per case prevented. This, however, still 
exceeds the 6 US$ which we use in this study.  
 
As long as emission abatement benefits are low, the installation of wastewater 
treatment facilities might be questioned in the Upper Citarum River Basin and cheaper 
options to reduce health risks need to be applied. Raising the local public’s awareness of 
the health risks such that people take individual measures to reduce these risks are likely to 
be more cost efficient in the short run. This was also suggested in the literature. Keratia, 
Drechsel and Amoah (2003) recommend for example a balanced approach which considers 
both health care and livelihoods and which focuses on low-cost options for risk reduction 
on farms and in markets. Haller, Hutton and Bartram (2007) estimate the costs and health 
benefits of water sanitation improvements. They suggest a better water management at 
household level which complements the improvement of water services to be a cost 
effective health intervention in many developing countries. 
 
The second part of the conclusions reflects on the results of the sensitivity analysis. 
When guidelines cannot be enforced it is important for a local authority like the West Java 
Environmental Protection Agency to know which coalition structure maximizes welfare in 
the river basin. Coalitions should be facilitated according to the following guidelines. First, 
the region with the highest marginal benefits is the key region for providing abatement and 
stabilizing a coalition. Second, coalitions of regions with the highest marginal abatement 
benefits maximize abatement in the Upper Citarum River Basin. This also maximizes total 
welfare. Note, however, that this might not hold in general. We provide the intuition that 
location might matter besides the size of marginal benefits at the end of section 5.6. 
  
The third part of the conclusions we point out some directions for future research. 
Our case generates similar results to the identical player case. Almost all coalitions with the 
same number of players are stable with the additional condition that the most upstream 
region and the region with the highest marginal benefits are members. Our case also 
generates different results to the identical player case. Stable coalitions have more members 
than in the identical player case. Further analytical research might lead to interesting 
insights how the characteristics of the abatement costs and abatement benefit functions 
determine coalition stability for heterogeneous agents. This holds particularly for the 
interrelation between different parameters, for example the exponents of the abatement cost 
function and marginal abatement benefits. Besides theoretical research the further 
application of the model will generate more case studies to compare with this study. As 
mentioned above case studies depend on data on how the reduction of pollutants generates 
 104 
benefits. If these relations can be quantified more precisely, reliability of the results will 
improve. Particularly the transmission of health risks needs to receive some further research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 105 
 
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 
The general objective of this thesis is to study how economic incentives of stakeholders 
determine welfare along the water chain of use, treatment and reuse and how these 
incentives can be regulated in order to maximize welfare. In chapters 2 to 5 I identified four 
characteristic settings in which either asymmetric information or externalities causes 
welfare losses in the absence of regulation. For each setting I develop a game theoretic 
model that can be used to design incentive schemes that govern the generation, treatment, 
and reuse of wastewater in developing countries such that the highest possible welfare is 
obtained. In this last chapter I summarize the individual results and the conclusions of the 
main chapters in section 6.1. In section 6.2 I draw some general conclusions from the thesis 
as a whole, relate them to the state of the art in wastewater treatment and reuse in 
developing countries and discuss directions for further research.  
 
6.1. Research questions and summary of main findings 
 
Chapter 2 raises the following research question: 
Can the allocation of fresh water between a city and fresh water farmers be an instrument 
to reduce the asymmetric information inefficiency on the local food market? 
I find that the allocation of scarce fresh water between a city and irrigation determines 
quality signalling by price and thereby transparency of the local food market. Allocating a 
small, medium, and large share of water to the city induces a pooling equilibrium, a 
separating equilibrium with distorted prices, and a separating equilibrium with efficient 
prices, respectively. The allocation of fresh water can therefore be an instrument to reduce 
price distortions on the local food market. In order to determine which equilibrium is 
welfare optimal we consider three scenarios of consumers’ valuation for fresh water 
irrigated products. We find that the more consumers have a high valuation for fresh water 
irrigated products, as in prospering developing countries, the more fresh water should be 
allocated to fresh water irrigation to maximize welfare on the food market. 
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Chapter 3 raises the following research question: 
How much monitoring maximizes welfare in the urban water chain while the costs of the 
treatment scheme can still be recovered? 
The model shows that high marginal benefits from monitoring yield a high optimal 
monitoring rate. Whether cost can be recovered depends on the monitoring rate. For small 
monitoring rates monitoring costs and revenues from fines are small which generates only a 
moderate effect on the budget constraint. For medium monitoring rates revenues from fines 
are high. This favours budget balancing. For high monitoring rates revenues from fines are 
low while monitoring costs keep increasing, which renders budget balancing difficult. 
Because the optimal monitoring rate cannot be determined explicitly without further 
specifications of the model we employ a numerical example where we specify the relevant 
functions and parameters. The numerical example illustrates three findings. First, net 
benefits for low optimal monitoring rates can be negative because for a low optimal 
monitoring rate benefits are too low to cover costs of pre-treatment and treatment. Hence, 
the treatment scheme is worse than having no-treatment. One way to avoid this result is to 
apply a treatment technology that is more robust against deviations of pollution 
concentrations from target concentrations. Such a technology would, hence, be less 
dependent on the monitoring rate. Second, the numerical analysis shows that the results are 
sensitive to the number of firms. An increase in the number of firms reduces the optimal 
monitoring rate which facilitates cost recovery. The third result is most intriguing. For 
medium optimal monitoring rates fines alone can recover the costs of the treatment scheme 
and even generate a surplus. This result is driven by the fact that revenues from fines reach 
their maximum for medium optimal monitoring rates. 
 
Chapter 4 raises the following research question: 
Can voluntary cooperation in wastewater treatment among water users improve the 
welfare in the river basin? 
I find that all coalitions of a certain size are stable for symmetric players and interior 
solutions. This is the same result as in the standard public goods game (cf. Barrett, 1994a) 
where location does not matter. Hence, location has, surprisingly, no impact on coalition 
stability in the river basin.  Location does, however, affect overall welfare. The more 
upstream the members of the coalition are the higher is the overall welfare because 
downstream singletons benefit from upstream coalition abatement. The welfare maximizing 
stable coalition is therefore obtained when the coalition consists of the most upstream 
players. In the standard public goods game with identical players (cf. Barrett, 1994a), on 
the other hand, only the number of players determines welfare. I conclude that authorities 
should facilitate the formation of upstream coalitions in river basins with identical players 
because this maximizes total welfare. 
 107 
Chapter 5 raises the following research questions: 
Is there scope for stable coalition(s) in wastewater treatment in the Upper Citarum River 
Basin? What are general characteristics of the structure of the stable coalitions in 
transboundary river pollution games with asymmetric players? 
For a benchmark calibration I find that no coalition with positive coalition abatement is 
stable because abatement benefits are too small compared to abatement costs to motivate 
any coalition to abate emissions. As the calculation of abatement benefits contains 
considerable uncertainty we also conduct a sensitivity analysis in order to check which 
coalitions turn stable for higher abatement benefits. In the sensitivity analysis I find that 
coalitions with 4 or 5 members are stable where only the most upstream members abate 
emissions. Regarding the membership of particular regions we find two results. First, the 
most upstream region is a member in all cases but one. Second, the region with the highest 
abatement benefits is a member in all cases but one which indicates that the region with the 
highest abatement benefits is the key region in the river basin. Lastly, we find that total 
welfare is the highest for the coalition consisting of the regions that have the highest 
marginal abatement benefits. This might not hold in general, however, because of the 
following trade off. If the most upstream region is a member but a downstream singleton 
has higher marginal benefits abatement is lower but all regions benefit from it. If on the 
other hand the two regions swap membership coalition abatement becomes higher but 
fewer regions benefit from it because it is done by a more downstream region. Hence, 
location does matter when marginal benefits of the regions are similar. 
 
6.2. General conclusion and future research options 
 
In this thesis I analyzed the incentives of stakeholders in the water chain in developing 
countries in four distinct settings. While the contributions to the literature of the individual 
settings are presented in section 1.3 and their main findings with conclusions in 6.1, I will 
reflect on the impact of this thesis as a whole in this section. First, I will present the general 
findings and conclusions of this thesis. Second, I will relate these conclusions to the state of 
the art of research on incentives in wastewater treatment and its reuse in developing 
countries. Third, I will suggest future research possibilities that help to meet the persisting 
challenges.  
 
A general finding of this thesis is that strategic interaction due to asymmetric 
information and externalities can have considerable negative welfare effects in the water 
chain. Asymmetric information causes inefficiencies on the local food market and hampers 
the effectiveness of a wastewater treatment scheme as presented in the second and third 
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chapter, respectively. Externalities prevent the first best solution in providing wastewater 
treatment along a river in the fourth and fifth chapter. One must therefore conclude that 
creating strong institutions which assure the functioning of markets should be a key strategy 
for improving the welfare outcome in the water chain. Concerning the different settings in 
this thesis this includes creating institutions that implement market transparency on local 
food markets, creating institutions that install a system which monitors compliance of 
industrial polluters and creating institutions that issue and implement wastewater discharge 
standards along rivers.  
 
The second conclusion is related to individual preferences of people which 
crucially drive the results. In the second chapter consumers’ preferences for either fresh or 
wastewater irrigated food determines the efficient allocation of water between fresh water 
irrigation and a city. In the third chapter the optimal monitoring level is determined by 
benefits from wastewater treatment. These benefits are ultimately determined by consumers 
and farmers preferences for safe reuse of treated wastewater. The same applies to chapters 
four and five where benefits from water pollution abatement determine cooperation in 
wastewater treatment along a river. The importance of preferences becomes particularly 
apparent in the case study in chapter five. For the benchmark calibration I find that no 
coalition with positive abatement is stable because abatement benefits are too low 
compared to abatement costs. Only in the sensitivity analysis with higher abatement 
benefits stable coalitions which provide positive abatement emerge. I therefore conclude 
that all studies which deal with wastewater treatment and reuse must have a microeconomic 
foundation that focuses on the preferences of the individual stakeholders. If these 
preferences are ignored they might generate incentives that trigger strategic interaction 
causing well-designed technical facilities or policies to fail. This also counts for applying 
general guidelines to reduce public health risks. A better way to reduce these risks is to 
develop a general methodology based on the preferences of stakeholders that can be applied 
to different cases producing individual solutions. This is the approach taken in this thesis.  
 
The following relates the contribution of this thesis to the state of wastewater 
treatment and reuse in developing countries. Hamilton et al. (2007) find that the prime 
driver for the use of wastewater in irrigation in developing countries is livelihood 
dependence and food security. Several studies describe and quantify the underlying 
incentives of stakeholders. Bradford, Brook and Hunshal (2003) study farmers who use 
wastewater for irrigation in Hubli-Dharwad, India, and find that wastewater irrigation is 
particularly lucrative during the dry season when wholesale market prices rise between 
two- and six-fold. Ensink, Simmons and van der Hoek (2004) find that wastewater 
irrigating farmers in Haroonabad and Faisalabad in Pakistan earned approximately 300 
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US$/annum more than farmers using freshwater. Besides these benefits both studies 
acknowledge the health risks for farmers and consumers. Keraita, Drechsel and Konradsen 
(2008) study farmers’ perceptions on health risks and risk reduction measures in Ghana and 
find that farmers were willing to adopt risk reduction measures to avoid further pressure 
from the media, authorities and the general public. Weldesilassie (2008) studies health risk 
reduction in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and finds that a large welfare gain to society can be 
achieved from policies for safe use of wastewater for irrigation. While these studies 
describe and quantify stakeholders’ incentives they do not analyze how these incentives 
determine strategic interaction between stakeholders. Feinerman, Plessner and DiSegni 
Eshel (2001), Axelrad and Feinerman (2009) and Axelrad and Feinerman (2010) analyze 
such incentives and interaction for the allocation of costs and benefits of wastewater reuse. 
Chapter four and five of this thesis contribute to this literature.  
 
Besides in the allocation of costs and benefits of wastewater reuse stakeholders 
interact in a variety of markets including the food market and the labour market. As the 
volume of wastewater steadily grows and therefore also the number of people who depend 
on it for their livelihoods (Quadir at al. 2008) interaction on markets related to wastewater 
reuse will also increase. Even though this development is apparent the special features of 
these interactions have not received much attention in the literature. Chapter two of this 
thesis analyzes strategic pricing on the food market when wastewater and freshwater 
irrigated food is sold. Understanding such interaction is a key to manage the water chain 
properly. By analyzing four characteristic setting this thesis contributes to this immense 
challenge. 
 
I will close my thesis with some suggestions for further research. For four settings 
I studied how economic incentives of stakeholders determine welfare along the water chain 
of use, treatment and reuse and how these incentives can be regulated in order to maximize 
welfare. Each setting is analyzed with a game theoretic model that captures the relevant 
strategic interaction among the set of involved stakeholders as players. Extending these 
models with further stakeholders as players is a step towards a more complete model of the 
entire water chain in a river basin. This might raise further interesting research questions 
and produce further insights. In the second chapter, for example, the water polluting city is 
not modelled as a player because wastewater treatment is not addressed in this chapter. If it 
were addressed, however, the city must be included in the set of players. In the third chapter, 
farmers who reuse wastewater in irrigation are neither modelled as player. In the fourth and 
fifth chapter, players are regions in the river basin. Many different types of people who 
differ in e.g. wealth, education or age live in these regions. Breaking down these regions 
into groups of heterogeneous stakeholders might be worthwhile to enhance insights.  
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Besides extending the models for further analytical insights, the models are ready-
to-use tools for applications. On the one hand such applications will produce quantitative 
insights about the effects of strategic interaction in the analyzed settings. On the other hand, 
they might give an intuition on how to extend the models of this thesis to gain further 
qualitative insights. For the application of the models one needs a thorough understanding 
of how pollution reduction translates into monetary benefits. It is particularly difficult to 
assess how pollution reduction generates benefits by reducing health hazards. Although 
considerable effort was directed to quantify these relations, it is still difficult to calibrate 
models to assess economic benefits. Further research is needed to reduce the uncertainty of 
the health and monetary benefits of a in quantifying the relation between the reduction of 
pollutant concentrations in wastewater and its monetary benefits.  
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Summary 
 
The proper management of wastewater and its reuse is crucial in order to reduce hazards 
and maintain a variety of benefits. The merits of improvements in wastewater management 
are particularly high in many developing countries where effective wastewater treatment is 
not in place and completely untreated wastewater is reused. In order to achieve the welfare 
optimum, the reuse of wastewater has to be organized in a way which trades off its benefits 
and costs efficiently. This comprises two tasks. First, technical facilities which provide the 
appropriate wastewater treatment level need to be designed. Technical facilities cannot 
operate successfully, however, when the incentives of stakeholders do not support their 
viable operation. Hence, the second task is to design an institutional setting in which the 
technical facilities can be operated effectively. This requires a complementary incentive 
scheme that brings the incentives of stakeholders in line with effective wastewater 
management. To achieve this it is necessary to understand the complex behavioural pattern 
which emerges from strategic interaction between a large variety of stakeholders along the 
water chain of use, treatment and reuse. Asymmetric information and externalities make 
this interaction even more complex.  
 
The general objective of this thesis is to study how economic incentives of 
stakeholders determine welfare along the water chain of use, treatment and reuse and 
whether these incentives can be regulated in order to maximize welfare. This thesis 
identifies four characteristic settings in which either asymmetric information or 
externalities initiate strategic interaction which causes welfare losses in the absence of 
regulation. For each setting this thesis develops a game theoretic model that can be used to 
design incentive schemes that govern the generation, treatment, and reuse of wastewater in 
developing countries such that the highest possible welfare is obtained. 
 
In chapter 2 I consider a setting where fresh water and wastewater irrigated 
products are supplied to the local food market where consumers prefer fresh water irrigated 
products, but cannot distinguish the two types of food. Hence, they face a situation of 
asymmetric information which might cause inefficiencies in the market. I assume that both 
fresh water and wastewater production is constrained because fresh water supply is limited. 
I develop a price signaling game where farmers use price to signal whether they sell fresh 
water or wastewater irrigated food to consumers. This chapter contributes to the literature 
of signalling games by integrating a public agency which sets production constraints by 
allocating a scarce resource. Besides inefficient pooling equilibria and separating equilibria 
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with distorted prices I surprisingly find efficient equilibria with undistorted prices. Efficient 
equilibria evolve if the water allocation to wastewater irrigated agriculture is large. I 
conclude that the allocation of fresh water can be an instrument to reduce price distortions 
on the local food market. 
 
In chapter 3 I analyze a typical urban setting in a developing country where 
households and industrial firms are not separated into distinct zones and urban wastewater 
consists of domestic and industrial wastewater. A treatment scheme is suggested which 
requires firms to pre-treat their industrial wastewater before discharging it into urban 
wastewater. The success of such a scheme depends on whether firms pre-treat which is 
private information to them. I develop a compliance game where a regulator has incomplete 
information about the pre-treatment compliance of firms that produce industrial wastewater. 
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing a formal model to analyze economic 
incentives in the entire urban water chain consisting of water pollution, wastewater 
treatment and its reuse in a developing country context. I find that cost recovery is most 
favourable for medium optimal monitoring rates because then fines charged to not 
complying firms are high. Furthermore, I find that net benefits of wastewater treatment can 
be negative for low optimal monitoring rates. I conclude that cheaper and more robust 
treatment technologies need to be developed.  
 
In chapter 4 I analyze cooperation in wastewater treatment among cities along a 
river where a regulating authority is absent. Without regulation downstream cities suffer 
damages and rely on cooperation in form of a self enforcing coalition in which members 
take abatement benefits of downstream coalition members into account. Coalition members 
distribute the coalition payoff in order to stabilize the coalition. Free riding is an obstacle, 
however, to such cooperation because downstream water users cannot be excluded from 
upstream cooperation treatment. To analyze this setting I develop a coalition formation 
game which contributes to the literature in two domains. First, we add to the literature on 
transboundary river pollution games by analyzing coalition stability in a multi-player 
setting. Second, we contribute to the literature on international environmental agreements 
by analyzing a case of unidirectional pollution flow where abatement is a public good for 
downstream players only and the emission stock varies between players unless all upstream 
players choose full abatement. A player’s location matters therefore in our game. I find for 
interior solutions that location has, surprisingly, no impact on coalition stability. Location 
does, however, affect overall welfare. The more upstream the members of the coalition are, 
the higher is the overall welfare because downstream singletons benefit from upstream 
coalition abatement. I conclude that authorities should facilitate the formation of upstream 
coalitions because this maximizes the welfare in the river basin. 
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Chapter 5 continues the analysis of transboundary river pollution in a multi-agent 
setting started in chapter 4 by conducting a case study in the Upper Citarum River Basin. I 
calibrate a coalition formation game with asymmetric players and compute its equilibria. 
This contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it is a case study which provides 
insights into the scope and structure of voluntary cooperation in wastewater treatment in the 
Upper Citarum River Basin. Second, it illustrates the applicability of the approach 
developed in Chapter 4. Third, its findings contribute to the theoretical literature on 
coalition formation games for transboundary river pollution. As analytical results of the 
asymmetric player game can only be obtained under very restrictive assumptions the 
findings of this chapter give an intuition on which assumptions should be made and how to 
proceed in the analytical analysis of these games. I find that in the original calibration no 
coalition with positive coalition abatement is stable because abatement benefits are too 
small compared to abatement costs to motivate any coalition to abate emissions. As the 
calculation of abatement benefits contains considerable uncertainty we also conduct a 
sensitivity analysis in order to check which coalitions turn stable for higher abatement 
benefits. In the sensitivity analysis I find that coalitions with 4 or 5 members are stable 
where only the most upstream members abate emissions. Regarding membership of 
particular regions we find two results. First, the most upstream region is a member in all 
cases but one. Second, the region with the highest abatement benefits is a member in all 
cases but one which indicates that the region with the highest abatement benefits is the key 
region in the river basin. Lastly, we find that total welfare is the highest for the coalition 
consisting of the regions that have the highest marginal abatement benefits.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 125 
 
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
Het juiste beheer van afvalwater en het hergebruik daarvan zijn belangrijk om schade te 
verminderen en verschillende voordelen te behouden. In veel ontwikkelingslanden, waar 
effectieve afvalwaterbehandeling nauwelijks plaatsvindt en onbehandeld afvalwater 
hergebruikt wordt, valt veel winst te behalen in het afvalwaterbeheer. Om het 
welvaartsoptimum te bereiken moet het hergebruik van afvalwater op een zodanige manier 
worden georganiseerd dat kosten en baten efficiënt worden afgewogen. Deze afweging 
behelst twee taken. Ten eerste moeten technische faciliteiten worden ontworpen met een 
voldoende capaciteit voor een geschikt niveau van afvalwaterbehandeling. Technische 
faciliteiten alleen zijn echter niet afdoende wanneer belanghebbenden deze niet aannemen, 
ondersteunen of gebruiken. Daarom bestaat de tweede taak uit het ontwerpen van een juiste 
institutionele omgeving waarbinnen de technische faciliteiten effectief werken. Een 
dergelijke omgeving biedt zodanige economische prikkels aan belanghebbenden dat hun 
gedrag op één lijn wordt gebracht met effectieve afvalwaterbehandeling. Hiervoor is het 
noodzakelijk het complexe gedragspatroon te begrijpen, dat bestaat uit de strategische 
interactie tussen een grote variatie aan belanghebbenden uit verschillende sectoren van de 
waterketen (gebruik, behandeling en hergebruik). Asymmetrische informatie en externe 
effecten maken deze interactie nog complexer.  
 
Het hoofddoel van deze scriptie is het onderzoeken hoe economische prikkels van 
belanghebbenden de welvaart in de waterketen (gebruik, behandeling en hergebruik) 
beïnvloeden en om te onderzoeken of deze prikkels zodanig gereguleerd kunnen worden 
dat deze welvaart wordt gemaximaliseerd. In deze scriptie beschrijf ik vier situaties waarin 
óf asymmetrische informatie, óf externe effecten de veroorzaker zijn van strategische 
interactie, waardoor bij gebrek aan regulatie welvaartsverlies optreedt. Voor elk  van deze 
situaties ontwikkel ik een speltheoretisch model dat kan worden gebruikt om een schema 
van economische prikkels te ontwerpen die het ontstaan, de behandeling en het hergebruik 
van afvalwater in ontwikkelingslanden op een zodanige manier reguleren dat de hoogst 
mogelijke welvaart wordt behaald. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 beschouw ik een scenario waarin producten die met schoon water 
en met afvalwater geïrrigeerd zijn, aan een lokale voedselmarkt worden geleverd. 
Consumenten geven de voorkeur aan producten die met schoon water geïrrigeerd zijn, maar 
kunnen niet onderscheiden welk voedsel met de ene soort en welke met de andere soort zijn 
geïrrigeerd. De consumenten bevinden zich dus in een situatie met asymmetrische 
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informatie die marktinefficiëntie zou kunnen veroorzaken. Ik veronderstel dat zowel schoon 
waterproductie als afvalwaterproductie beperkt is omdat de bron van schoon water beperkt 
is. Ik ontwikkel een spel waarin boeren hun prijs gebruiken als een signaal of zij voedsel 
verkopen dat met schoon water of afvalwater geïrrigeerd is. Dit hoofdstuk draagt bij aan de 
literatuur over dit type signaal-spellen door de introductie van een publieke instelling die 
productiebeperkingen oplegt door schaarse grondstoffen te verdelen. Naast inefficiënte 
“pooling” evenwichten en scheidende evenwichten met verstoorde prijzen, vind ik 
verassend genoeg efficiënte evenwichten met onverstoorde prijzen. Efficiënte evenwichten 
ontstaan bij een hoge allocatie van water voor landbouw dat met afvalwater geïrrigeerd 
wordt. Ik concludeer dat de allocatie van schoon water een instrument kan zijn om 
prijsverstoringen op de lokale voedselmarkt te verminderen. 
 
In hoofdstuk 3 analyseer ik een typische stedelijke situatie in een 
ontwikkelingsland waarbij de waterhuishouding van huishoudens en industrie niet zijn 
gescheiden en waarbij het stedelijke afvalwater bestaat uit zowel huishoudelijk en 
industrieel afvalwater. Ik introduceer een zuiveringsschema dat bedrijven verplicht stelt een 
eerste zuivering van afvalwater uit te voeren voordat het wordt geloosd in het stedelijke 
afvalwater. Het succes van een dergelijk schema is afhankelijk van de daadwerkelijke 
uitvoering van deze voorbehandeling door het bedrijf, informatie die niet openbaar is. Ik 
ontwerp een “compliance” spel waarbij de overheid over incomplete informatie beschikt 
wat betreft de mate waarin de bedrijven die afvalwater produceren voldoen aan het systeem 
van voorbehandeling. Dit hoofdstuk draagt bij aan de literatuur door een model aan te 
dragen voor economische stimuli in de gehele stedelijke waterketen bestaande uit 
watervervuiling, afvalwaterbehandeling en het hergebruik in de context van een 
ontwikkelingsland. Hierbij ontdek ik dat het terugverdienen van kosten het meest 
waarschijnlijk is bij een gemiddeld toezichtniveau omdat dit gepaard gaat met hogere 
boetes voor bedrijven die in overtreding zijn. Verder ontdek ik dat de netto baten van 
afvalwaterzuivering negatief kunnen zijn bij een laag toezichtniveau. Ik concludeer dat 
goedkopere en meer robuuste zuiveringstechnologieën moeten worden ontwikkeld. 
 
In hoofdstuk 4 analyseer ik samenwerking in afvalwaterzuivering tussen steden 
langs een rivier wanneer er geen regelgevende autoriteit is. Zonder regelgeving 
ondervinden stroomafwaartse steden schade en moeten ze hun toevlucht zoeken tot 
samenwerking in de vorm van een samenwerkingsverband. In een dergelijk verband houdt 
iedere stad rekening met de voordelen van afvalwaterzuivering voor de leden 
stroomafwaarts. De leden van het samenwerkingsverband verdelen de opbrengsten van de 
samenwerking onder elkaar om de samenwerking stabiel te maken en te houden. Een 
obstakel is de aanwezigheid van profiteurs die niet bijdragen aan het verband maar ook niet 
 127 
kunnen worden uitgesloten van de baten van stroomopwaartse waterzuivering. Om deze 
situatie te analyseren ontwikkel ik een samenwerkingsformatiespel dat op twee vlakken 
bijdraagt aan de literatuur. Ten eerste dragen we bij aan de literatuur op het gebied van 
grensoverschrijdende riviervervuilingsspelen door de stabiliteit van samenwerking in een 
verband met meerdere spelers te analyseren. Ten tweede dragen we bij aan de literatuur 
over internationale afspraken op milieugebied door een casus te analyseren met een 
eenzijdige vervuilingsbron, waarbij een afvalwaterzuivering alleen een publiek goed is voor 
stroomafwaarts steden en de emissie varieert tussen de steden, tenzij alle stroomopwaartse 
steden voor volledige zuivering kiezen. De locatie van de leden van het verband is daarom 
van belang. Ik heb ontdekt dat, verrassend genoeg, voor interne oplossingen de locatie van 
geen invloed is op samenwerking. De locatie heeft echter wel effect op de algemene 
welvaart. Des te verder stroomopwaarts de leden van het samenwerkingsverband zich 
bevinden, des te hoger is de algemene welvaart, omdat profiteurs stroomafwaarts profiteren 
van afvalwaterzuivering stroomopwaarts. Ik concludeer dat autoriteiten samenwerking 
stroomopwaarts zouden moeten stimuleren, omdat dit de welvaart in het stroomgebied 
maximaliseert. 
 
Hoofdstuk 5 gaat verder met de analyse van grensoverschrijdende riviervervuiling 
in een situatie met meerdere spelers uit hoofdstuk 4, met de analyse van een casus in het 
Upper Citarum stroomgebied. Ik kalibreer een samenwerkingsformatiespel met 
asymmetrische spelers en bereken de mogelijke evenwichten. Dit draagt op drie manieren 
bij aan de literatuur. Ten eerste is het een casus die inzicht geeft in de mogelijkheid en de 
structuur van vrijwillige samenwerking in afvalwaterzuivering in het Upper Citarum 
stroomgebied. Ten tweede illustreert het de toepasbaarheid van de benadering zoals 
ontwikkeld in hoofdstuk 4. Ten derde dragen de resultaten bij aan de theorie in de literatuur 
over samenwerkingsformatiespelen voor grensoverschrijdende riviervervuiling. Aangezien 
de analytische resultaten van het spel met asymmetrische spelers alleen behaald kunnen 
worden onder zeer strikte voorwaarden, geven de uitkomsten van dit hoofdstuk een richting 
aan bij de keuze van de aannames en de manier waarop de analyse kan worden aangepakt. 
Ik ontdek dat in de originele kalibratie geen enkel samenwerkingsverband stabiel is. Omdat 
de opbrengsten van zuivering te laag zijn in vergelijking met de kosten, is geen enkel 
samenwerkingsverband te motiveren tot het opzetten van waterzuivering. Aangezien de 
berekening van de voordelen van de opbrengsten aanzienlijke onzekerheden bevat, hebben 
we ook een gevoeligheidsanalyse uitgevoerd om uit te vinden welke 
samenwerkingsverbanden stabiel worden bij hogere opbrengsten. In deze analyse ontdek ik 
dat samenwerkingsverbanden met 4 tot 5 leden stabiel zijn wanneer deze zich helemaal 
stroomopwaarts bevinden. Met betrekking tot het lid zijn van specifieke regio’s vinden we 
twee resultaten. Ten eerste, de meest stroomopwaarts gelegen regio is een lid van het 
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samenwerkingsverband in alle gevallen behalve één. Ten tweede, de regio met de hoogste 
baten van waterzuivering is lid in alle gevallen behalve één, wat aangeeft dat deze een 
sleutelrol vervult in het stroomgebied. Tot slot vinden we dat de algemene welvaart het 
hoogste is voor het samenwerkingsverband dat bestaat uit regio’s met de hoogste marginale 
baten van waterzuivering. 
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